

ISSN : 0252 - 8169

**JOURNAL
OF
COMPARATIVE
LITERATURE
AND
AESTHETICS**

A VISHVANATHA KAVIRAJA INSTITUTE PUBLICATION

VOLUMES XII - XIII : 1989-1990



PROFERSOR JOHN FISHER

Imitation And Art

G O R A N S O R B O M

As far as we know man has always danced, told and performed stories, made paintings, drawing, sculptures, songs, pieces of music and poetical manifestations and used these activities in a large variety of situations as entertainment, as political propaganda, magical rites, religious ceremonies etc. Some of these uses were of great importance both to individuals and to societies. Thus it is natural that man also reflected over the nature of these activities and the results of them. The first big and well known attempt to characterize and collect all of these activities and the results of them under one head is called the theory of imitation (mimesis). It is commonly regarded as the oldest theory of art and as such as superficial and inadequate. At a closer look it is not, however, a theory of art proper but a theory of pictorial representation which was one of the foundations from which the concept of (fine) art and theories of fine art grew in the 18th century.

Imitation as the production of a distinct kind of mental image

The theory of imitation does not provide criteria in order to distinguish art from non-art but to distinguish imitations (mimemata) from 'real' things. A house, for instance, is a 'real' thing whereas a painting of a house is an imitation or an image of a house. Ajax's killing of the sheep was 'presumably a real act' whereas Homer's account of it is an imitation. The painting and the text (heard or read) are imitations in the sense that they bring forth mental images of a distinct kind in the mind of the beholders, listeners or readers.

Mental images, basically similar in that they show sensuous qualities of particulars, can occur as perceptions, illusions, hallucinations, memories,

Paper read at the fifth annual meeting of the Scandinavian Society of Aesthetics in Copenhagen 20 5-1988 and in revised form at the 11th International Congress of Aesthetics in Nottingham 2-9-1988

J. C. L. A. Vol. XII: Nos. 1-2 : 1989.

dreams, imaginations and daydreams. They differ from each other in vivacity, consistency and, first of all, in their judged relations to the assumed existing world. Perceptions are lively, consistent and true to the world which causes the perceptual 'imprint' (perception is very often described as the world's stamp on the mind through the senses like the impression in wax by a signet ring¹). If the mental image is incorrect in relation to its origin, but is believed to be correct, it is called an illusion. If the mental image is the result of no outside perceptual 'imprint' at all but is believed to be so (maybe caused by drugs or sickness) it is named an hallucination. Dreams have regularly no perceptual counterparts in the outside world. But when asleep we believe they have. Memories, as mental images of sensuous particulars, go back to perceptions of them but they are past perceptions, or we would call them hallucinations or dreams. Daydreams and imaginations may be lively and consequential but we always know the difference to perceptions; if not they would haunt us as illusions or hallucinations.

The activity of the perceptual apparatus to produce, on its own accord, mental images of sensuous particulars, whether they are memories or new images composed out of elements the beholder has sensed before, is called imagination (*fantasia*). Further, man has developed skills for the communication of imaginations. It is the skill of rendering the mental image created by imagination in an outward form and this skill is sometimes called imitation² (the term "imitation" denotes both the activity to make the outward object according to the mental image and the result of this activity). The sole function of an imitation (*mimema*) is to create mental images in the minds of its beholders, Plato says, and he calls them dreams for those who are awake³.

Essential to the perception of an imitation is that the beholder knows that mental image caused by the imitation is just similar to perceptions of the kind of thing represented in the imitation. If not, the beholder has an illusion. He would believe that he stands in front of a house or that he sees Ajax killing the sheep. The (correct) perception of an imitation contains thus the awareness that the thing perceived is not a real thing but an imitation. Imitations can, of course, be used to cheat people. But, as a matter of fact, this is not very common. Most often, the purpose of making and using imitations includes the awareness that it is an imagination. In most cases it is important that the beholder of imitations can tell the difference between 'real things' and imitations in order to act and react properly to the imitation, i. e. according to the further purposes of the imitation.

A part of the 'non-reality' of imitations resides in the basic purpose of imitations to provide men with this distinct kind of experience and that this is their sole purpose compared to 'real' things. A painting of a house cannot be used for anything else than to call forth a mental image of a house. But in its turn, the calling forth of this mental image can be used in a large variety of situations and for many secondary purposes.

The 'non-reality' of imitations is thus related to the fact that the mental image caused by the apprehension of imitation or image is not an ordinary perception in which there is a more or less correct relation between percept and perceptual object. The imitation causes an impression in the mind of its beholder, which is similar to impressions caused by things it represents, and the beholder knows that it is nothing but similar.

Paintings and texts are, of course, real things in the sense that they are objects in the world we can hear and touch. But the point is that the mental images created in the mind of the listener, reader, spectator by the painting and the text are not perceptual images of something existing in the world of the same kind as the thing represented in the imitation. The painting of a house is perceived as a house-like thing, i. e. it creates and the beholder knows that it is just similar and that this is the basic purpose and use of it. Homer's description of Ajax killing the sheep results in a mental image of this event, a mental image the listener or reader knows is just similar to the actual perception of this kind of scene.

Similarity, mental image and imitation

It is evident that the relation of similarity is important to the theory of imitation but it is not, as it is commonly thought, the relation of similarity between the thing imitation and particular things in the world, for instance between a painting of a house and houses in the world, which is the central one. There is a cluster of relations of similarity that not always are kept apart: 1. the epistemological similarity between percept and perceptual object, 2. the expressive similarity between the mental image (fantasia) in the mind of the imitator and the imitation, 3. the actual and representational similarity between the (thing) imitation and things in the world, 4. the memorial similarity between the mental image created by the imitation and (mental images of) things in the world stored in the memory, 5. the communicative similarity between the mental image of the maker and the beholder.

1. A basic assumption of the theory of imitation is that the perceptual knowledge of the outside world is based on a similarity between the thing perceived and the mental image which is the result of the contact between sensuous organ and objects in the world. In the perceptual process the sensuous organ adapts itself to the perceptual objects and the adaption is always in the form of an assimilation to the perceived object⁴. This assumption also entails a specification of the kind of knowledge characteristic of the perceptual apparatus. It gives the outward qualities of particulars; green to green, round to round etc., i. e. there is an isomorphic relation between percept and perceptual object.

2. The imagination creates, on its own accord, mental images of perceptual character that are known to be fictitious i. e. the perceiver knows that they do not have any counterparts in reality as in perception. To imitate often is the realization of this mental image in an outward form so other persons can share it. In painting, sculpture, theatre performance, dance and perhaps also in music, the making of the imitation (the outward object) is based on a similarity between mental image and imitation where the imitation is formed to be similar to the mental image. In a way, this process is the reverse of perception in which the mental image is formed by an assimilation of the sensuous organ to the outward object; in making the outward image the object is formed, by the skill (tekne) of the maker, into a similarity of the mental image. It is possible to talk about a similarity between the mental image and the imitation provided you assume the epistemological similarity between percept and perceptual object. What is in the imagination must have possible counterparts in the outside world, not necessarily whole objects but their elements.

It is also possible to imitate something by making it similar to things in the world either by using these things as models or to make casts from them. But then it is a case of representational similarity not of expressive similarity (as the terms are used in this context).

The creation of mental images by means of words is different. The text is not similar to the mental images but when heard or read the result is a mental image of perceptual character. Words, refer, it is often maintained, by means of convention, not by similarity, but they can, nevertheless, occasion mental images of perceptual character. The words (heard or read) do not resemble Ajax's killing of the sheep but they create a mental image of this situation in the mind of the listener or reader. Joseph Addison comments:

Words, when well chosen, have so great a Force in them, that a Description often gives us more lively Ideas than the Sight of Things themselves. The Reader finds a Scene drawn in Stronger Colours, and painted more to the Life in his Imagination, by the help of words. than by an actual Survey of the Scene which they describe. In this Case the Poet seems to get the better of Nature; he takes, indeed, the Landskip after her, but gives it more vigorous Touches, heightens its Beauty, and so enlivens the whole Piece, that the Images which flow from the Objects themselves appear weak and faint, in Comparison of those that come from the Expressions..⁵

3. Sometimes there is a similarity between the imitation and actual things in the world which it represents. This kind of similarity is not a necessary condition for something to be an imitation, i. e. a man-made object that causes distinct kind of mental image (as described above) to occur in the mind of the beholder. Sometimes, as in the case of paintings and sculptures, there are similarities between the painting of a house and houses in the world with regard to particular sensuous qualities. The imitator can use such similarities in order to reach the goals he has in mind; a portrait to remember someone's look, a map to find your way etc. But not so in the case of texts. Basically the painting and the text do the same job (*ut pictura poesis*) : they stimulate a mental image, which is perceptual in character, to occur in the mind of the spectator or reader/listener. But they do so by different means.

4. It is a prerequisite that both the makers and beholders or readers of imitations are acquainted with the things represented, although not necessarily the actual things themselves: "It is sufficient, that we have seen Places, Persons, or Actions in general, which bear a Resemblance, or at least some remote Analogy with what we find represented. Since it is in the Power of the Imagination, when it is once Stocked with particular Ideas, to enlarge, compound, and vary them at her own Pleasure."⁶

A perceptual experience is necessary, stored in the memory, and the power of imagination to "enlarge, compoud and veary" according to resemblance or analogy. This is neither a recognition of similarity between particular things nor a seeing something as something else but an apprehension that something is like something else but is not of its kind; a painting of a house is 'nothing but' a house-like thing. The beholder knows that it is not a house but that it is a house-like thing and he knows this because of his earlier experiences.⁷

5. The essential relation of similarity for the theory of imitation is, then, not the one between the material thing imitation and other existing things but the one between the particular kind of mental image produced both in the mind of the maker and in the mind of the spectator. No distinction between them are made because they are supposed to be basically similar provided both maker and beholder have normal perceptual apparatuses and similar background knowledge in order to make the mental image to occur. The essential thing is that man has the ability to imagine, that some persons have learnt and developed the skill to express these imaginations in an outward form so they are communication means that the perception of the imitation in all essential respects is similar to the imagination of its creator.

The causes of imitations

A sculpture which is a kind of imitation has, according to Seneca who attributes this view to Plato and Aristotle, five 'causes' for its existence: "the material, the agent, the makeup, the model and the end in view... The material is the bronze, the agent is the artist, the make-up is the form which is adapted to the material, the model is the pattern imitated by the agent, the end in view is the purpose in the maker's mind, and, finally, the result of all these is the statue itself."⁸

The material has qualities of its own. Bronze is different from marble and an aulos has another sound than a kbitara. The material has inherent limitations and virtues which have to be respected and used. It is a part of what we see and experience when we look at a sculpture and the material in itself can give rise to pleasure.

This materiality is also important for another reason. It helps us to see that it is imitation, not a 'real' thing. When we look at a sculpture we normally see that it is made of bronze, for instance, and thus we see the difference to the 'real' things it represents. It is one of many indicators to distinguish it as an imitation, i. e. that it is a man-made thing purposely made to be just similar to something but not to be of its kind.

The material is the formless stuff from which the imitation is made. When the imitator makes the imitation he forms the material in to its actual shape. He makes it in to a whole with all its interrelated parts. Material and form constitute the (thing) imitation which is perceived by the beholder. The material and form can be given measures, i. e. the rhythm and harmonia of man-made things which are experienced as pleasurable. This also holds for

the cases in which the mental image is occasioned by words. The text (heard or read) has its own sensuous qualities and proportions which participate in the apprehension of the text.

The agent the maker of the imitations) is equipped with knowledge and skill which also contributes to the final result, the imitation, the bronze sculpture in Seneca's example. These preconditions are partly innate partly acquired in the maker's learning of the trade. The skills are gained by practice sometimes aided by teaching or by reading handbooks (*teknai* and *artes*) in which the making of paintings, poems, tragedies etc. is described and regulated.

An important innate precondition of the maker is that he has a vivid and lively imagination and that he can conceive 'great thoughts'. This has to do with the model used in making the imitation. "It dose not matter," Seneca says "whether the maker has the model within or without." But it is obvious, if you look at paintings, sculptures, read poetical texts etc. that the important models are within the artist. There is no point in making a bad copy of some real, existing thing. "Art is not a copy of the real world. One of the damn things is enough"⁹ was true also in antiquity¹⁰. The imitator learns from a study of nature but he does not copy nature very often. He can do so for certain purposes but these are mostly of small interest to art history. In most cases the maker creates a mental image in his mind and it belongs to his trade to transform it into an outward object, an imitation, which can communicate his inner vision to other persons. Let us call this the internal purpose of making imitation: the creation of mental images of a distinct kind in the minds of the beholders. Whether this chain of communication is successful or not depends also on the skill of the imitator to 'squeeze out' (*exprimere*) the mental image in an outward form and on the possibility and limitations of the material (matter) to 'carry' such forms.

Most man-made things and actions have a purpose. They are made in a context of a given sort to be used instrumentally to reach given goals. "Now what is this purpose?" Seneca asks with regard to sculpture (but the question is applicable to all kinds of imitations) and he answers: "It is that which attracted the artist, which he followed when he made the statue. It may have been money, if he has made it for sale; or renown, if he has worked for reputation; or religion, if he has wrought it as a gift for a temple.." ¹¹ Beside the internal purpose of communicating the mental image created in the mind of the agent there are a number of external purposes: fame money, religious service etc.

Aristotle makes a distinction between things that are instrumentally good and such that are good or ends in themselves. In the *Politics*¹² he mentions music and drawing as two kinds of activity that under certain circumstances could be regarded as ends in themselves; they are both included in leisure (skole), the activity of the free individual as the end of human existence. An institutional confirmation of this outlook is the fact that poetry and drawing as well as music were included in the education of the free born.

In most cases, however, imitations were tied to social or cultural purposes: religion, politics, entertainment and relaxation for instance. A question often discussed is whether it is possible to teach people useful things by means of imitations, particularly poetry. The 'utile dulce' of Horace¹³ is imitations' ability to teach lessons in a sweet manner. But what can we learn from imitations?

Plato was partly very severe in this matter. Imitations (first of all poetry and music) are very useful because they can create habits in people who cannot acquire the right kind of behaviour through a knowledge of what is right and wrong. We can learn to behave rightly or wrongly through imitations but we cannot learn what is right and wrong from them. This is so because the very nature of imitations as perceptual images ties them to the world of multipliciteies and particularity. Imitations must show individual things and actions, not universalities. And true knowledge resides in the latter.

Aristotle maintained that we can learn some universal truths through imitations. We can learn what is typical and universal through concrete examples presented to us in imitations¹⁴ and, Aristotle says, men enjoy to learn things¹⁵. Further, the fact that the beholder or listener knows that it is just an imitation and not a real thing makes it possible for him to learn and enjoy it the more since the situation does not call for action, only contemplation.

Art as imitations for its own sake

Even if Aristotle maintained that the apprehension of some imitations under certain circumstances was an end in itself as a part of leisure (skole) it is not, however, until the 18th century that a group of imitations was separated from the rest of imitations because the apprehension of them was seen as different and was regarded as an end in itself. Of course, many

imitations continued to be used in human contexts of different kinds, to earn money, to reach fame, religious purposes, for entertainment and sexual excitement etc. But the important thing is that some imitations were pointed out as ends in themselves and that a realm or 'world' of its own was established in order to manifest this distinction and what it implied. They came to be set off from all other kinds of imitation, those that served other and given purposes. The ones separated began to be called works of art and the activity to make them as fine art as separated from the useful arts. The fine arts were described as such human skills and activities that produced objects for disinterested perceptual pleasure for its own sake.

Why this distinction between some imitations as instrumental and some as ends in themselves? There is, of course, a myriad of factors contributing to the establishment of such a distinction: social factors like the rise of the bourgeoisie and its need of an identity of its own to be articulated in different ways, economic factors as new forms of producing and selling imitations, the development in philosophy and psychology, the new institutions to support the new and autonomous art as museums, concert halls, theatres, the book market and public libraries and many other things which all participated in the establishment of these new ways of making and using imitations. But here only the reassessment of human emotions pleasure and perceptual knowledge will be hinted at.

In the philosophical tradition from Plato and Aristotle the knowledge we find in universals was considered to be far better than the knowledge we get from the perceptual intercourse with particulars. The world of particulars is eternally changing, is never complete, appears differently from time to time, from place to place and from person to person. It consists of the contingent qualities of things whereas the world of universals is unchanging, complete and not dependent on time, place and circumstances and contains the essence of things. In the 18th century a reassessment of the role in human life of the 'lower faculty of knowledge' takes place. It is now treated as an independent and important part of human existence. To exercise the lower faculty of knowledge, to meet the world of senses in all its variety and concreteness, was now seen as an activity in its own right and not only as the first steps towards more secure and universal knowledge.

Further, it is a pleasure in its own right to perceive the world in all its concretion and to react emotionally to it. The soul needs exercise as well as the body, abby Dubos writes¹⁶, and to him any pleasure was preferable

to no pleasure at all but it was common to distinguish between different kinds of pleasure and to value them differently. Sight is, Addison says, "the most perfect and most delightful of all our Senses" and what he calls the pleasures of Imagination are "such as arise from visual Objects, either when we have them actually in our View, or when we call up their Ides into our Minds by Paintings, Statues, Descriptions, or any the like Occasion". The pleasures of imagination, Addison writes, "are not so gross as those of Sense, nor so refined as those of the Understanding. The last are, indeed, more preferable, because they are founded on some new knowledge or Improvement in the Mind of Man; yet it must be confessed, that those of the Imagination are as great and as transporting as the other."¹⁷ To discriminate between the better and worse pleasures of imagination a special faculty was needed. Taste, both as a concept and as a praxis, was developed.

It is also possible to claim that pleasure can rise because you are interested in the thing you behold. It is, for instance, a pleasure to look at a maturing corn field which is your own, because it will secure the life of your family for the coming season. But this is not the pleasure of imagination, that Addison has in mind. You have to put such considerations into the background and promote the pleasure that arises from the mere sight of the corn field apart from any personal interests.

Pleasure is often mentioned in connection with imitations in antiquity. It is pleasurable to learn something, the beauty of the material can give pleasure as well as the rhythm and harmony of the shape of imitations. But these pleasures do not rise from the mere exercise of the lower faculties of knowledge within a disinterested mental attitude and are not as such regarded as ends in themselves; they attend other goals of the imitations.

Imitations are particularly well suited for the stimulation of our lower faculties of cognition partly because their detachment from contexts in which you are involved and expected to act. We know, says Fontenelle according to Hume¹⁸, that the play (imitation) is not real and thus we can enjoy the thing represented even if it is awful. We know that the mental image is just imaginary or fictitious and has no counterpart in reality to which we are invited or forced to react by action. In reality we act some imitations we contemplate in order to maximize our perceptual, disinterested pleasure.

You can, of course, get the same pleasure from other things than imitations, views and sounds for instance, but imitations, compared to other kinds of things are particularly well suited for the arousal of such perceptual pleasures not least because of the possibilities of the free play of the

imagination. The imagination is not tied to limitations of the existing world. It is free to compose within the range of perception anything it wants. Horace claimed that propriety (decorum) was a necessary regulating principle in the work of the imagination¹⁹. You cannot compose whatever turns up in your mind into a unit. But this regulating principle is not the same as taste as a faculty for the discernment and judgment of differences in the disinterested pleasures of imagination.

It is not necessary that objects that are suited for aesthetic experiences of the kind just described, i. e. works of art, have to be imitations although they historically were so. But during the 19th century these ties started to loosen up and in our own century not very much remains of it. The theory of imitation has lost most of its power and influence as perhaps also the 18th century idea that the ability of a man-made object to arouse an aesthetic experience is a good reason to call it a work of art.

The emergence and growth of the art world as a detached area of human activity and the reassessment of the 'world of particularities' as something important in human life is, probably, also connected with the process of secularization. It has to do with the practised and conceptualized ultimate goals of human life. Grossly simplified, for a Christian every thing and every action is but means and preparations for the eternal life beyond. When this extraterrestrial goal for human existence is criticized, doubted and, for many persons, dissolved something has to be put in its place in order to avoid personal collapse. Art in the new sense of sensuous objects for contemplation for its own sake, i. e. for the sake of the experience it gives, became one of the fundamental intrinsic goals of human life. In this way art could complement religion or replace it, which is far from being its servant.

Thus, one of the most important innovations of the 18th century is the establishment of art as a 'world' of its own with its newly created role as an end in itself, as a part of man's ultimate goals of existence. This new area of human activity was institutionalized and given a central position in the lives of many persons, groups, and societies. In the heart of this institution is the aesthetic experience as an intrinsic goal for human existence.

Of course, not all imitations were regarded as works of art in this sense, i. e. as sensuous objects recommended for aesthetic contemplation as an important end in itself; just some of them were made, used and named for this new purpose. Most of them were continuously made for other purposes and the contemplation of these imitations was not regarded as an end in

itself. Further, also other things than imitations could be made and used for sensuous contemplation as an end in itself and the use of the term "work of art" was extended to include other things than this new and particular kind of imitation. In this century the art family has proliferated enormously by the acceptance into the family of, as it seems, many other kinds of things and experiences than the traditional ones just hinted at. Often this extension was made in opposition to and defiance of the traditional outlook.

Among other thing the institution is founded on the fact that, although the aesthetic experience is particular and not the same from time to time or from person to person it is to some extent at least permanent and possible to communicate, influence and share. It became a social concern that the aesthetic experience was not regarded and treated as totally subjective and private but shared along certain lines agreed upon or practised. It is not only a basic, intrinsic value to have aesthetic experiences; it is also a basic intrinsic value to share them with other persons. The art community became an important part of the cultural heritage, in fact an important part of the intrinsic goals of human life.

A traditional role (and goal) of criticism in its many forms is to participate in the establishment of this community of aesthetic experiences and to prepare its members for the (correct) personal aesthetic experience of work of art in the individual cases. Since the aesthetic experience of particular and subjective. It is not possible to communicate it directly by means of conceptual language. You cannot describe the aesthetic experience but you can influence it by means of what you say and do. You can point out situations in which it is likely that aesthetic experiences occur, i. e. you can exemplify the aesthetic experiences; you can compare things and experiences and by so doing you build up a resource of experiences to be used in future aesthetic situations; and you can describe and refer to circumstances around the making and beholding of the work of art. These are basic forms of critical approach in its traditional form and they are all directed towards the (true or correct) communication of the aesthetic experience.

It is also important in many situations that you make as clear as possible that you do share the aesthetic experience. Tolstoy, for instance, regarded it as a basic and intrinsic value that the artist was sincere in his expression of the aesthetic experience and certainly the same was demanded of the beholder. True communication implies sincerity from all its participants. This is also

true over time. When we communicate with past individuals, groups and generations we often think it important that true communication is established and the rules of (traditional) criticism are intended to secure the true communication.

Notes and References

1. Aristotle, *On the Soul* 424 a 17—25.
2. This skill has got many names through the ages but the thought is essentially the same from Plato to Batteux and Sulzer.
3. Plato, *The Sophist* 239 D—240 B and 266 C.
4. Aristotle, *On the Soul* 417 a 20 21 and 418 a 3—6.
5. *Spectator* no. 416.
6. Ibid.
7. Cf Flavius Philostratus, *The Life of Apollonius of Tyana* II. 22.
8. *Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales* 65 8—9. Transl. by R.M. Gummere, Loeb Classical Library, London, Cambridge, Mass. 1965
9. Attribute to Virginia Woolf in Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art* London: Oxford Univ. Press 1969, P. 3.
10. Cicero comments (*Orator* II 9) on Phidias' work in the following manner: "Surely that great sculptor, while making the image of Jupiter or Minerva, did not look at any person whom he was using as a model, but in his own mind there dwelt a surpassing vision of beauty; at this he gazed and all intent on this he guided his artist's hands to produce the likeness of the god "Transl. by H.M. Hubbell in Loeb Classical Library, London, Cambridge, Mass. 1960
11. Seneca op. cit. 65. 8—9
12. VIII. 3.
13. *Ars poetica*. 343.
14. *The poetics* ch. IX.
15. Ibid. ch. IV. (1448 b 8—9)
16. *Reflexions critiques sur la Poesie et sur la Peinture*. (1719) I. 1. Nouvelle ed, 1760, p. 6.
17. Op. cit. no. 411.
18. *The Philosophical Works of David Hume*, Vol. III, "Of Tragedy", Edinburgh 1826, pp, 247—48.
19. *Ars. poetica* 1—39.

The Status Of The Religious Emotion

V. K. CHARI

The "religious emotion" (*Bhakti* in Sanskrit) is generally held to be a distinct kind of emotion because it has for its subject matter man's relationship with God, and therefore accorded a place above the ordinary human themes of love, sorrow, and so forth. Religious poetry, it is often assumed, is a distinct genre. A general distinction too is assumed between the sacred and the secular in art. But, as I shall argue below, "religious emotion" does not designate any one specific emotional state or attitude, nor does it involve a generic distinction like tragic, comic, or heroic. The terms "sacred" and "secular," "divine" and "profane," too, do not make any significant difference for the aesthetic character of a work, although they may serve as convenient labels to designate kinds of subject matter.

The association of art with religion is well known. The religious spirit has penetrated vast areas of the aesthetic activity of people of all climes. It has not only dictated the themes and symbols of their iconography, poetry, drama, music, and dance; it has also influenced their theorizing about the arts. Since the religious experience has, historically, occupied a central place in the cultural life of mankind, it has also come to have a place in the philosophy of art. In Western criticism, for instance, attempts have been made from time to time to "Christianize" or "theologize" aesthetics (e. g., St. Thomas Aquinas, Meister Eckhart, Tolstoy), although the main stream of that tradition stemming from Aristotle had been empirical and analytical. Poetic theory in Sanskrit, too, from Bharata down, was predominantly secular and uncommitted as to theological or metaphysical views. But with the rise of the various devotional cults in the medieval era, it received an out and out religious interpretation. Aesthetics was pressed into the service of theology and mysticism. The Vaisnava mystic of Bengal offered a completely revamped theory of *Rasa* and sought to deify the poetic emotion by making it a form

of god-realization.¹ In the aesthetics of this school the opposition between the secular and religious points of view comes to the surface. Rupa Gosvami and Madhusudana Sarasvati, among others, engaged in an argument against the secular standpoint of the older critics (*Alamkarikas*) who had denied that Bhakti or the devotional sentiment could be a Rasa at all. In reply, the devotionalists argued that the religious emotion was the supreme aesthetic emotion. Bhakti, they said, should be accepted as a poetic emotion by the same logic by which other emotions like love and grief are accepted as legitimate Rasas.

II

Since the devotional aesthetics of these mystics was being offered as a rival to and a modification of Bharata's doctrine of Rasa, it had to be shown to conform to the criteria stipulated by Bharata for the determination of poetic emotions. According to Bharata's Rasa-Sutra, emotions in poetry come to be expressed through the conjunction of three conditions: the causes, symptoms, and other, ancillary feelings which accompany the emotions. An emotion is identified by the object that excites it and by its outward behavioural signs, such as speech, gesture, and other, spontaneous reactions like tears, horripilation, and so on. Not all emotions, however, can attain to the status of full-fledged aesthetic moods or Rasas. Some are more basic and durable than others. In order for an emotion to become a Rasa, it should be a basic emotion (*Sthayin*), that is, it should be able to assert its identity without getting assimilated in other emotions; it should be an irreducible psychic stereotype. Bharata mentions eight such emotions: the Erotic Emotion (*Srngara*), the Heroic Emotion (*Vira*), Pathos (*Karuna*), Wonder (*Adbhuta*), Comic (*derisive*), Laughter (*Hasya*), Fear (*Bhayanaka*), Revulsion (*bhibhatsa*), and Wrath (*Raudra*). Later day writers added a ninth emotion to the list, namely, Subsidence (*Santa*). Subsidence may be described as a state of repose in which the mind is freed from all passions and perturbations, and rests in itself. This is the condition that wise men and Yogis are known to enjoy. According to the established canon, then, there are only nine basic emotions which could be developed into Rasas and sustained through an entire composition. There are a host of other emotions, too—thirty three, according to Bharata—which are called transitory emotions (*Vyabhicari-Bhavas*), jubilation, dejection, shame, indolence, eagerness, envy, and so forth. But these merely accompany the prime emotions as their accessories and serve to reinforce them. They have no independent existence and are not meaningful except with reference to one of the basic emotions. Another important article of the Rasa theory is that while, in a poem, a number of emotions, both

true over time. When we communicate with past individuals, groups and generations we often think it important that true communication is established and the rules of (traditional) criticism are intended to secure the true communication.

Notes and References

1. Aristotle, *On the Soul* 424 a 17—25.
2. This skill has got many names through the ages but the thought is essentially the same from Plato to Batteux and Sulzer.
3. Plato, *The Sophist* 239 D—240 B and 266 C.
4. Aristotle, *On the Soul* 417 a 20 21 and 418 a 3—6.
5. *Spectator* no. 416.
6. Ibid.
7. Cf Flavius Philostratus, *The Life of Apollonius of Tyana* II. 22.
8. *Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales* 65 8—9. Transl. by R.M. Gummere, Loeb Classical Library, London, Cambridge, Mass. 1965
9. Attribute to Virginia Woolf in Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art* London: Oxford Univ. Press 1969. P. 3.
10. Cicero comments (*Orator* II 9) on Phidias' work in the following manner: "Surely that great sculptor, while making the image of Jupiter or Minerva, did not look at any person whom he was using as a model, but in his own mind there dwelt a surpassing vision of beauty; at this he gazed and all intent on this he guided his artist's hands to produce the likeness of the god "Transl. by H.M. Hubbell in Loeb Classical Library, London, Cambridge, Mass. 1960
11. Seneca op. cit. 65. 8—9
12. VIII. 3.
13. *Ars poetica*. 343.
14. *The poetics* ch. IX.
15. Ibid. ch. IV. (1448 b 8 - 9)
16. *Reflexions critiques sur la Poesie et sur la Peinture*. (1719) I. 1. Nouvelle ed, 1760, p. 6.
17. Op. cit. no. 411.
18. *The Philosophical Works of David Hume*, Vol. III, "Of Tragedy", Edinburgh 1826, pp, 247—48.
19. *Ars. poetica* 1—39.

basic and transitory, may be treated, the composition as a whole must establish unity of tone in terms of a single dominant emotion, which will invariably be one of the basic emotions. Thus a tragic drama may develop some subsidiary strands of interest, such as fear and wrath. But tragic pity alone will dictate its dominant tone.

Now the devotionalists (*Bhakti-Vadins*) argue that Love of God (*bhagavat-priti*), inspired by the power of Krishna to delight man's soul—Called *hladini*—is inherent in every soul as a latent capacity, and it resides equally in the spectator/ reader (*samvijnika*), in the hero or heroine of the poem (*anukarya*), and in the actor or actress enacting that role (*anukartr*). The ultimate locus of Rasa is of course Krishna himself, the supreme *rasika* (relisher)—*rasa-raj* and the source and embodiment of all Rasas (*nikhila-rasamrta-murti*). This conception of God being the source and embodiment of aesthetic relish can be traced back to the Upanisadic saying that Brahman is indeed of the form of Rasa. Bharata's commentators (Bhattanayaka and Abhinavagupta) had asserted that aesthetic relish was equivalent to the bliss of enjoying Brahman. This theory came to be known as *Rasabrahma-vada*.

Love of Krishna (Krsna - Rati), it is further claimed, is a distinct emotion and prime emotion identified by its own separate set of criteria. It is caused by the contemplation of the person, attributes, and actions of Krishna, who is the object of that emotion, expressed by appropriate gestures, such as tears of joy, ecstatic singing and dancing, and so on and nourished by other fleeting emotions like doubt, anxiety, despair, jubilation, and so on. Finally, not only is Bhakti a legitimate Rasa, but it is the one and only Rasa that is truly aesthetic. Ordinary poetic emotions (*kavya-rasas*), having their basis in man's earthly nature, are finite, transient, and cannot be said to generate supernal delight. The religious emotion, on the other hand, is Rasa par excellence, the permanent Rasa (*nitya-rasa*), whereas the other emotions are accidental (*agantuka*)

Both Vaisnava and Saiva mystics laid stress on the emotional element of god-relation, especially on the soul's enjoyment of its relationship with a personal deity. This relationship, however, takes on a variety of attitudes to the Lord—from complete self-surrender and self-effacement (*Prapatti*) to immersion in his being. Accordingly, Bhakti manifests itself in its fivefold forms as :

1. Santa—Rati : peaceful, contemplative attachment
2. Madhura—Rati : the sweetness of passionate love, of a lover

3. *Dasya*—*Rati* : the attachment of servant to his master
4. *Sakhya*—*Rati* : the attachment of a friend
5. *Vatsalya*—*Rati* : the attachment of a parent to the child

All these sentiments of course point to the essential relishability of god-relation. Hence *Bhakti* is established as the one seminal, all-embracing *Rasa*, and the traditional nine *Rasas* are seen as its modifications or as the forms in which *Bhakti* is enjoyed.

III

In his disquisition on *Santa Rasa*, Abhinavagupta denies a separate status to *Bhakti* and to other sentiments like tenderness (*sneha*), filial feeling (*vatsalya*), and so on, as these sentiments only culminate in one or other of the nine basic emotions, or they can be subsumed under the transitory feelings.² More particularly, what we call the adoration of God (*Bhakti*) and the attention we direct on him (*sraddha*) are only a means to the attaining of that state of inward bliss, freedom, and meditative poise, which is the hall mark of *Santa Rasa*. Hence they do not deserve to be counted as separate *Rasas*.³ For Abhinavagupta, then, the religious emotion is already implicit in the *Santa* *Rasa*, not, however, as a distinct emotional state, but as composed of a variety of feelings for which Bharata has provided definite descriptive labels, such as deliberation, recollection, enthusiasm, self-assurance (born of understanding), and so forth. The *Santa Rasa* has for its basic tone (*sthayin*) the composure (*sama*), or call it the joy of inner peace, born of self-knowledge (*atma—jnana*) or knowledge of the nature of reality (*tattva—jnana*). Abhinavagupta argues further that the *Santa Rasa* is not only a distinct *Rasa*, but a primal *Rasa* which underlies all other *Rasas* as their ultimate ground or resting place (*sthayitama*). All the *Rasas* are relished in the form of *Santa*.⁴ Before him, Bhattanayaka too, arguing from the *Samkhya* standpoint, had spoken of *Santa* as the ultimate *Rasa* and the basis of all other *Rasas*. All mental states rise out of the original equilibrium of the soul (*sattva—gun*.) and subside back into it. The aesthetic state is such a quietistic condition of the mind. All other emotions originate as well as terminate in *Santa* : *santad utpadyate rasah*.⁵

One need not, however, read all this metaphysical meaning into *Santa Rasa*. For, the state of subsidence of all passions can be seen as a genuine experiential condition, in psychological terms, and as a basic mental state according to the criteria of the *Rasa* doctrine. Again, as Abhinavagupta has shown, although this state does not exhibit itself in visible dramatic action, unlike the other emotions, being a cessation of all action, it can still be

portrayed in poetry or dramatized on the stage through its appropriate expressions (*anubhavas*). In dramatic representation, the very absence of actional gestures may be taken as a kind of gesture.⁶ That Subsidence can be treated as a poetic mood is attested by much of the nature poetry of Wordsworth. Wordsworth is describing what the Sanskrit critics call the Santa Rasa when, in his "Tintern Abbey" poem he speaks of "that belssed mood"

In which the burthen of the mystry,
In which the heavy and weary weight
Of all this unintelligible world,
Is lightened... ..

At any rate, the above argument in favour of Santa Rasa seems to account for the substance of what we know as religious experience and provide a place for it in the Rasa scheme. However, Abhinavagupta's treatment of it emphasizes its metaphysical, rather than affectional, aspects. *Tattvajnana* or metaphysical knowledge is said to be the essence of this experience. The devotional mystics, on the other hand, conceived of religious experience as a deeply personal and passionate relationship with God. Metaphysical knowledge and devotion to God are two different functions of the mind. In the former, the mind dwells on the formlessness of the deity (*nirvikalpa—cittavrtti*), whereas in the latter it meditates on his manifested form (*savikalpa*) and takes on that form. Santa Rasa, being a quietistic concept, cannot also do justice to the ecstasies of devotional experience. In fact, this mood, based as it is on *vairagya*—the renunciation of all passionate attachments—is quite repugnant to god - relation, which is of the nature of a deep affection (*anuraga, pranaya*) for the Lord. For these reasons, it is argued. Bhakti does not deserve to be subsumed under Santa. Bhakti, rather than Santa, is thus given the pride of place in the devotional aesthetics as the main Rasa (*mukhya—rasa*), and the traditionally accepted Rasas are seen as secondary Rasas emanating from Bhakti (*gauna—bhaktirasas*). Santa itself becomes a particular manifestation of Bhakti.

IV

However, the objection raised by Abhinavagupta against Bhakti being accorded the status of Rasa seems valid and should be examined for its implications. Abhinavagupta's discourse on Santa Rasa is a monument of sound reasoning and demonstrates the correct application of Bharata's logic

concerning the aesthetics of Rasa. Abhinavagupta does not of course elaborate his point. But we may pursue the line of reasoning suggested by him and raise the following questions :

(i) The main argument of the devotionalist has been that the religious emotion should be given a separate status because God, rather than man, is its object. But one might argue, taking Bharata's completely humanistic emphasis into consideration, that the religious emotion, whatever its content (*visaya*), is still a psychic condition and must be presented in poetry in terms of human responses—of joy and sorrow, pleasure and pain and not as something removed from man's psychic nature. An emotion, such as the love of Krishna (*krsna rati*) may have a "religious" object for its subject matter, but it is still a human emotion and must evoke a human response. A difference in subject matter (*visaya—bheda*) ought not to constitute a difference in form and character (*svarupa—bheda*). For example, erotic feeling directed on a princess cannot be substantively different from that directed on a servant maid. Similarly, the fact that religious love is love of the transcendent God does not make the least bit of difference for the form and quality of that feeling. It must still be a feeling of a certain description—tenderness, erotic desire, yearning or whatever. Every experience, however otherworldly or transcendental, is transformed into an aesthetic emotion when it is treated in poetry, and becomes a fit subject for Rasa (*rasa—visaya*). It is realized as a human emotion even though the context may be divine.⁷ Therefore god-relation as a theme does not call for a separate aesthetic. There is nothing specially "religious" about it in aesthetic terms. In poetry, all emotions and all motifs are invariably humanized and generalized; they are secularized or "sacralized," if you like. The distinction between "secular" and "sacred" ceases. Abhinavagupta no doubt speaks of aesthetic experience (*rasasvada*) as supramundane (*alaukika*). But it is in the sense that, owing to the power of generalization, the spectator's apprehension of Rasa transcends the boundaries of person, place, and time. The emotions portrayed in poetry are realized to be at once those of the character and one's own. But no distinction is here implied between secular emotions and sacred emotions. On the contrary the implication is that the subject matter treated in poem may be an ordinary human situation, but the experience one gets out of it is something extraordinary, and "otherworldly" in a sense. As Bharata stated, the subject matter of literature is the stuff of common human experience, the feelings, actions, and conduct of the "three worlds." And this might certainly include experience of the "religious" kind too.

This emphasis on the essential emotionality of aesthetic experience and attempt to explain it in terms of human psychology should not be uncongenial to the Bhakti theorists. For they too, effect, conceive of God in intimately personal terms and humanize God's relationship with man. All the Bhakti poets, including the Vaisnava *Alvars*, the *Sriya Nayanmars*, the followers of Caitanya, the saint-poets like Kabir, Meera, and Surdas expressed their love for God in terms of everyday emotions. God—feeling is rooted in human affection of God : *para anuraktir isvare* (*Saundalya, Bhakti Sutras*); *sa tu asmin para prema—rupa* (*Narada Bhakti Sutras*), although it is insisted that it is more permanent than ordinary human affection.

(ii) But the crucial question for aesthetics is whether Bhakti can be admitted as a distinct emotion (*sthayin*), considering that the term denotes a relationship and not so much a specific emotional attitude. The Bhakti theorists have argued their case in many ways trying to install this concept in the scheme of aesthetic emotions. It has been suggested variously that the basic tone of Bhakti is *manonivesa* or *sraddha* (fixing the mind on God), *bhagavad—akara cittavrtti* (the state of mind that assumes the form of the Lord), *rati* (erotic love for God), or *cittadrava* (the melting of the heart at the thought of God). But the first two are acts of mind or forms of meditation (*dhyana*) which do not connote an emotive attitude. They cannot, in Bharata's terminology, be called *bhavas*. And both these can be symptoms (*anubhavas*) of *Santa Rasa*. Some of the other forms associated with Bhakti, such as friendly feeling and filial love are composite states admitting of various feeling attitudes, and not unitary conditions. Servitude (*dasya*) denotes a type of relationship and may express itself in a number of ways depending on the circumstances. *Maya* or the sense of the illusoriness of the world is sometimes claimed to be a *Rasa*. But this too can take on a number of emotional tones, being a metaphysical concept and not so much a feeling condition. And it can accompany *Santa* as an exciting circumstance. If erotic love is taken as the basis of Bhakti, then, it does not differ from *Sringara Rasa* and hence that need for a separate Bhakti *Rasa* would be obviated. As I have argued before, the fact that Krishna is the object of *Rati* does not make it another kind of *Rati*; whether it is Krishna or some earthly lover, like *Dusyanta*, whether it is felt by god or man, it still remains love. Thus either Bhakti has no emotional basis or it can be subsumed under one or other of the nine basic emotions.

To meet this difficulty, the Bhaktivadin may resort to the argument that Bhakti is a kind of composite, all-embracing *Rasa*, taking diverse forms and running the whole gamut of human emotions from love to fear and sorrow.

But a composite emotion of this kind is an impossibility since it contravenes a fundamental article of the *Rasa* theory : a *Rasa*, by definition, must have a single basic tone (*sthayin*). Again, even supposing that all the nine emotions may be treated within the same devotional poem, only one of them will ultimately establish itself as the dominant *Rasa*: it is not possible for all of them to be given equal importance. When, for instance, the erotic sentiment gains principal importance the mood will be *Srngara*. Furthermore, all the same character without regard to their propriety and mutual congruence. Thus, if the person of the poem is the devotee he cannot, at the same time and with equal intensity, feel both love and anger towards his god. If love is developed as the principal theme, then, anger may enter only as a transitory feeling. There is also the question of the locus of these emotions which, according to our theorists, go to make up *Bhakti*, the objects on which they are directed, and propriety in that regard. Feelings such as Wrath, Disgust, and Pity cannot be directed on God, who is an object of adoration. That is, God cannot be the intensional object (*alanbana—vibhava*) of these feelings. The devotee does not become furious with his God, nor pity him, nor turn away from him in disgust. But he can suffer revulsion or pity for himself. Wonder too can be treated only as having its locus in the *Bhakti*. He can marvel at himself. Erotic love can be shown both in God and his devotees : God is the object of enjoyment to the *Bhakta*, but he also delights in his *Bhakta* or in his consort. Thus if *Bhakti* is taken as a composite *Rasa* it cannot establish for itself a definite locus, for the emotions of which it is composed change their ground (*adhikarana*) and can not consistently be attributed to the persons constituting the relationship—God and Man. Paramatman and Jivatman. From this it appears that *Bhakti* is not a term for a unitary *Rasa*, but denotes a type of relationship, which may admit of a number of emotive attitudes depending upon the nature of the situation.

Bhakti, understood as god—relation, may, then, be expressed in poetry through a number of emotional attitudes. And these may be divided into those residing in the devotee and those residing in the deity, or in both.

I. Emotions which can reside in the *Bhakta* and which are caused directly by God as the object of the emotion :—The *Bhakta* can go through a whole range of emotional crises in his encounter with God—from utter despondency to ecstatic joy. Thus, pines for his God, enjoys union with him, laments his separation, suffers grief and despair over the fallen condition of his soul, marvels at God's grandeur, is afraid of his wrath, disgusted with own body and his sensuous attachment to worldly things, and finally reits in god—realization.

(i) (*Srngara*) (erotic passion) : in its twofold aspect of love—in—union (*Sambhoga*) and love—in—separation (*vipralambha*). In the Krishna cult, for example, the Bhakta adopts the lives and attitudes of Krishna's Gopis; he becomes God's bride (*kanta*) since "all souls are feminine to God." This is also a familiar concept in Christian devotional mysticism.

Sambhoga : In love—in—union are represented the variout stages from the first awakening of love (*purva—raga*) to its final fulfilment, e. g., the songs of Kabir and Meera. Or consider the intense eroticism of some of Edward Taylor's *Preparatory Meditations* :

I shall be The Bride Espoused by Thee
 And Thou my bridegroom Deare Espoused shalt be.
 Be Thou my lily, make Thou me Thy knot :
 Be Thou my flowers, I'll be The Flower Pot.
 Be Thou my Song, and make Lord, me Thy Pipe.
 Make me the Couch on which Thy love doth ly.

Vipralambha : The pain of separation is the theme of Jayadeva's *Gita Govinda*. It is also portrayed in the songs of Kabir and Vidyapati. At the symbolical level love-in-separation represents the soul's alienation from Paramatman. The soul feels extreme agitation (*paruma vyakulata*) when losing sight or remembrance of the Lord.

(ii) *Karuna* : Meditation on the pathetic, stricken condition of the soul is characteristic of a phase of religious experience called "The Dark Night of the Soul." The devotee thinks of his unworthiness and his vulnerability to sin and sensuous indulgence, and sometimes falls into deep despair. Typical expressions of this mood of self—castigation (*nirveda*) and penitence may be found in the Holy Sonnets of Donne, as in this instance :

To poor me is allowed
 No ease ; for long yet vehement grief hath been
 The effect and cause, punishment and sin.

Or in others such as "Batter my heart, three personed God," and "Spit in my face you Jews." Hopkins's "Terrible Sonnets" too are a most poignant expression of a soul in torment, in the grip of desolation and despair resulting from a sense of alienation from God. It should not, however, be supposed that this mood of grief is terminal, for in terms of devotional philosophy, there is no ultimate despair. The devotee must live on the hope, however remote, that he will be redeemed by God's grace. This is especially true of Christian theology.

(iii) *Adbhuta* : One most important aspect of the devotional mind is its adoration of God's superhuman attributes. The devotee celebrates the marvellous beauty, brilliance, and power of the Lord. A famous example of this is Arjuna's vision of Krishna's Cosmic Form (*Visva-rupa*) in the eleventh chapter of the *Gita*. A vast number of devotional lyrics in Sanskrit and other Indian languages are given to the glorification of the perfect form and splendour of the images of the deities. The same sentiment is expressed in Hopkins's sonnet "God's Grandeur": "The world is charged with the grandeur of God," etc.

(iv) *Bhayanaka* : In Hindu theology, God does not typically become an object of fear to the Bhakta, as in the Old Testament theology, although, in some cases, he is contemplated in his fearful aspect also, e. g., Kali. In Bhakti literature, fear is exhibited only by God's enemies, e.g., Kamsa, Hiranya-kasipu

(v) *Vibhatsa* : Disgust or revulsion is never directed on the deity, but one's own self and on worldly objects which lure the soul away and of which the soul grows sick. The sense of spiritual revulsion is expressed in these words of Hopkins, "I am gall, I am heartburn.../ Selfyeast of spirit a dull dough sours," or by Taylor in these words: "I am but a flesh and blood bag."

(vi) *Hasya, Vira, Raudra* : The comic, heroic, and the wrathful sentiments cannot, at least in their intense form, be properly attributed to the devotee. No doubt, the devotee may sometimes deride his god for not taking care of him, or boast of his achievements in the service of God, or even express anger at God's desertion or injustice, e. g., Job in *The Book of Job* Samson in *Samson Agonistes*. But these sentiments can only enter as transitory feelings in an overall mood either of a lover's complaint or of a pathetic outcry; they cannot be developed as dominant moods.

(vii) *Santa* : This mood can be experienced by the devotee as the final fruit of his spiritual quest. When the soul realizes its unity with God it enjoys the bliss of inward peace--the peace that "passeth understanding."

II, Emotions which reside in the Lord and which are caused by their appropriate objects:--

Not only does the Bhakta direct his emotions on God too may be shown to feel emotions like love, pity, anger, etc.

[i] *Srngara* : both union and separation ; e. g., the loves of Krishna in *Gita Govinda Srikrnakarnamrta*.

[ii] *Vira* : The Lord's incarnations and his heroic exploits in slaying the demons and preserving the moral order.

[iii] *Karuna* : Divine compassion, God's self-gift to the soul; but the sentiment can only be developed as a subsidiary motif accompanying a dominant mood, for God never really becomes pathetic, even for the sake of his creatures.

[iv] *Raudra* : God in his wrathful aspect (*ugramurti*), his fury in slaying the demons and punishing the wicked.

[v] *Santa* : The Lord in his serene aspect (*santamurti*). Not all emotions can be attributed to God, especially Fear and Disgust. But these and other sentiments can be portrayed in the inferior gods. A verse on Saiva Tantra has it,

Erotic love and other emotions may be displayed in the places allotted to the eight gods. And in the centre one should display the serene form of Devadeva (Siva).⁸

V

The foregoing discussion leads us to conclude that the attempt of the Bhakti theorists to set up a rival "religious" aesthetic as opposed to the purely secular conception of Bharata was from the beginning plagued by inconsistencies. The Rasa theory offered by Bharata and his commentators was, in fact, large enough to encompass the whole range of human emotions, and there was no need for a separate theory of religious emotion. The traditional critics certainly do not neglect religious experience. Innumerable instances of religious poetry are discussed and analyzed by them for their aesthetic value-- for their meaning, emotive tone, and formal features--but never in terms other than the aesthetic.

It appears further that, in spite of their theoretical pretensions, the Bhakti theorists were not concerned with aesthetics as much as they were with theology--a fact that leads them ultimately to denigrate the poetic emotion (*kavyarasa*) itself as being of an inferior order to what they called Bhakti-Rasa. In the final analysis, the Rasa of which they speak turns out to be a means to spiritual emancipation rather than to poetic enjoyment *per se*. While under the inspiration of Bhakti movement a whole body of the most beautiful literature, the most haunting songs and lyrics, arose both in Sanskrit and the regional languages, the aesthetics of the classical tradition stemming from Bharata has remained unaffected. The Bhakti reinterpretation of the traditional aesthetics has been, at best, a minor episode in the history of Indian poetics

Notes and Reference

1. For a discussion of the Vaisnava theorists, see V. Raghavan, *The Number of Rasas* (Madras : Adyar Library, 1967), pp. 141-60.

2. See *Abhinavabharati*, ch. VI, "Santa-prakaranam."

3. *Abhinavabharati* : na tayoh prthagrasatvena gananam.

4. *Abhinavabharati* : sarvarasa-
nam santapraya eva asvadah.

5. *Abhinavabharati*, ch. VI.

6. Jagannatha, *Rasagangadhara*

(BHU ed.), I 155 : "Marmaprakasa" of Nagesa.

7. Cf. Helen Gardner's remark about *Paradise Lost* : "Milton was not writing a work of Christian apologetics. He was writing an epic poem, re-telling the best-known story in the world." *A Reading of Paradise Lost*.

8. *astanam iha devanam stugaradin pradarsayet, madhye ca devadevasya santam rupam pradarsayet*. Quoted in *Abhinavabharati*, "Santa-Prakaranam."

1895-1915 : The Second Renaissance

SEHDEV KUMAR

In western civilization, the Renaissance marks the high point of its creative expression. For over one century, in art and architecture, sculpture and music, human imagination sought and discovered new modes of expression. Amongst them was the discovery of the perspective; rendering three-dimensional space on the two dimensions of canvas, space not *as it is* but as it *appears to be* to the observer from his position. The discovery of the perspective in painting had come to imply a subtle shift in philosophical sensibilities : absolutism and relativism, communal and the individual, subjective and objective, space and time. The communal 'points of view' gave way to an individual point of view' that created *The Birth of Venus* and *Mona Lisa*.

What did the Renaissance mean to the ordinary people - the peasants, the workers, the simple folk ? Perhaps not much, because unlike the scientific and industrial revolutions of the later periods, the Renaissance wrought no significant political or socio-economic changes. The Renaissance had created new ways of 'reflecting' on the world, but not 'changing' it.

In the history of ideas, however, the two decades, from 1895-1915, mark a far more crucial intermingling of abstract thought and concrete influences than almost two centuries of Renaissance. This Second Renaissance, if it may be so named, triggered an unprecedented perceptual revolution in our view of the world, not only of atoms and molecules, space and time, mass and energy, but also of the human mind, through a new understanding of the unconscious and of dreams, in psychology, art and literature. This Second Renaissance created a *Stream of Perspectives* which was unparalleled impact on communal life, at all levels and for all generations to come. This paper outlines some of the features of this Second Renaissance.

I

The Second Renaissance started with physics, which became in the words of Jacob Bronowski, "the greatest collective work of science -- no more, than that, the greatest collective work of art of the twentieth century."¹

There are many names associated with what came to be known as *Modern Physics* or *The Second Scientific Revolution*: Roentgen, Poincare, Bacquerel, Curies, Thomson, Planck, Einstein, Minkowski Bohr. Their work challenged the fundamental concepts of physical universe, believed to be true for over two hundred years. Mass and energy were interlinked, space and time became a continuum, waveparticle quality was established, energy was quantised. Atom had an intricate structure, radio-activity was discovered. With the invention of the x-rays, the Third Eye was opened, to reveal a world within a world within a world....

Any one or all off these could be regarded as hall-mark of the Second Renaissance, but the year 1900 should mark a definite turning point in this exhilarating voyage. In 1933, in an afternoon lunch walk, the German physicist, Max Planck remarked to his companion: "I have had a conception today as revolutionary and as great as the kind of thought that Newton had" And so it was. In his famous paper "Zur Theorie des Gesetzes der Energieverteilung in Normal-Spektrum", Planck presented his revolutionary Quantum Theory, according to which, energy, like matter, existed in discrete packets or quanta. The size of the quantum for any particular form of electromagnetic radiation was in direct proportion to its frequency, expressed in the equation

$$\epsilon = h\nu$$

where h was Planck's constant, with a value of 6.61×10^{-27} erg seconds.

This is the fundamental law of Quantum Theory, and an undisputed foundation - stone of the new revolution in physics. Modern physics, with its genesis in 1900, would not without new forms of mathematical analysis involving quanta, this being referred to as quantum mechanics.

This radical departure from Newtonian physics encountered strong opposition. However, its successful explanation of black-body radiation spectra, its important role in Albert Einstein's explanation of the photoelectric effect in 1905, and its further development by Niels Bohr in his model of the hydrogen atom in 1913 finally established the validity of Planck's concept of the quantum.

Another giant of this Second Renaissance was Albert Einstein. His 1905 paper "Über einen die Erzeugung und Verwandlung des Lichtes betreffenden Heuristischen Gesichtspunkt" (On a Heuristic Viewpoint Concerning the Production and Transformation of Light) was described by Einstein himself as "very revolutionary". The heuristic viewpoint

of the titles was nothing less than the suggestion that light be considered a collection of independent particles of energy, which he called light quanta. Dismissing a century of evidence supporting the wave theory of light, Einstein's proposal of light quanta could immediately account for several puzzling properties of fluorescence, photoionization, and especially of the photoelectric effect. His quantitative prediction of the relationship between the maximum energy of the photoelectrons and the frequency of the incident light was not verified experimentally for a decade. However, with the introduction of the concept of the wave-particle duality Einstein extended Planck's concept of the quantum theory of matter to radiation, "a kind of fusion of the wave and emission theories".³

Here was another blow to 'classical' physics. Einstein regarded the separateness of the concepts electromagnetism and particle mechanics as the outstanding fault of physical theory. He did not, however, subscribe to the electromagnetic programme but originated new strategies for unifying the parts of physics; his 1905 light-quantum hypothesis and relativity theory were the traits of such strategies.

The stated purpose of Einstein's first paper on relativity in 1905, "Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper" ("On the Electrodynamics of moving bodies") was to produce a "simple and consistent theory of the electrodynamics of moving bodies based on Maxwell's theory for stationary bodies".⁴ But his work stemmed from the Michelson-Morley experiment of 1887. The experiment had been unable to detect any difference in the velocity of light with changes in its direction through the ether. Einstein therefore began with the assumption that the velocity of light in a vacuum is always constant despite any motion of its source, or the person measuring the light. Furthermore he cancelled out the ether as unnecessary by assuming that light travelled in quanta. Without the ether, Einstein pointed out, there was certainly nothing in the universe that could be viewed as at 'absolute rest', nor could any motion be considered an 'absolute motion'. Hence all motion is relative to the frame of reference.

He showed that from this simple assumption of the constancy of the velocity of light and the relativity of motion, the Michelson-Morley experiment could be explained and Maxwell's electromagnetic equations could be kept. He also deduced that the velocity of light in a vacuum was therefore the maximum speed at which information could be transferred.

All sorts of peculiar results followed. The rate at which time passed varied with velocity of motion. Space and time vanished as separate entities

and were replaced by a fused "space-time". This was presented in the "Kinematical Part" of Einstein's paper "On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies". Meaning of time in physics has been a subject relatively exempt from fundamental scrutiny because of the extraordinary strength of traditional intuitive beliefs. Einstein later acknowledged that his familiarity with the writings of David Hume and Ernst Mach had fostered the kind of critical reasoning underlying this part of his work.

The concept of absolute simultaneity, so "rooted in the unconscious"⁵ presented the most formidable psychological obstacle, and made his theory look so obscure and contrary to common sense. With this theory of interrelatedness of mass and energy through $E=mc^2$, it was no longer sufficient to speak of Lavoisier's conservation of mass or of Helmholtz' conservation of energy. Instead there was the greater generalisation of the conservation of mass-energy.

The universal implications of Einstein's theory were established in 1907 and 1908 by Hermann Minkowski. He argued that relativity implied a complete revision of our conception of space and time, and that this revision applied throughout physics and not just to electrodynamics where it originated. His four-dimensional formulation of the theory, his application of it to mechanics, and his advocacy generally had a decisive historical importance in winning physics to the new theory and in clarifying its revolutionary significance.

Minkowski's point of view that space and time should be considered as forming one geometrical object, space-time, a four-dimensional flat space, led Einstein, in his General Theory of Relativity in 1915, to analyze the relations between the descriptions of phenomena in frames accelerated relative to each other. From these relations Einstein concluded that this four-dimensional space cannot be flat, and that gravitation is the name given to those phenomena that appear because space-time is not flat. And thus the curvature of space-time is due to its energy and mass content.

In the past six decades, since the enunciation of Einstein's theories, many observations have been made, and experiments performed to establish the validity of his theories. Through his work, all basic tenets of physical universe sought new relationships: mass and energy, particle and wave, space and time, gravitation and electromagnetism. Many of these concepts are undoubtedly abstruse and 'abstract' but their 'concretisation' through nuclear

power, in peace and in war, have created a new world, with far-reaching political and economic implications. Thus for once, it will be no exaggeration to suggest that the physical world--and through it other life--after Einstein was never the same again.

Perhaps it will be right to retrace a few steps and acknowledge the significance of the scientific groundwork that led to the theories of Planck and Einstein, and are part of the two decades, 1895-1915, of the Second Renaissance. On November 5, 1895, Roentgen discovered x-rays. As the first x-ray photograph of the hand of an octogenarian anatomist, Kolliker, was taken on January 25, 1896, what had been created by Shakespeare three hundred years earlier, in the images of poetry, had become a reality:

Hamlet: Come, come and sit down; you shall not budge; You go not, till I
set you up a glass where you may see the the inmost part of you.

Queen: What wilt thou do ? Thou wilt not murder me,

Polonius: What ho ! Help, help, help !

(*Hamlet*, Act III, Scene 4)

Soon after, x-rays were being used for medical purposes. And the rest is history. And yet there was no convincing explanation for this remarkable phenomenon. However more observations were being made, and more things discovered. For instance Henri Poincare hypothesized in January 1896 that the glass wall of a Crookes tube struck by cathode rays are emitting "hyperfluorescence". Meanwhile Henri Becquerel, on the Museum d' Historie Naturelle discovered that uranium salts shielded from light for several months spontaneously emitted rays related in their effects to Roentgen rays (x-rays). February 1896 thus marks the discovery of the phenomenon of "radioactivity". However, the term "radioactivity" was coined by M. and Mme. Curie on July 18, 1898 at the time of their discovery of polonium, named after Mme Curie's hometown in Poland.

Discoveries of Poincare and Becquerel had made Marie and Pierre Curie question if there existed other elements capable, like uranium, of emitting radiation. In addition to polonium, in November 1898, they discovered radium.

That the Curies were able to isolate radium at all was in itself a remarkable feat in the state of chemistry at the turn of century. To obtain only one-tenth of a gram of the pure element required the chemical reduction of a ton of pitchblende,

This new radiation from the newly discovered radioactive materials was baffling. In Mme. Curie's words:

"...This tenacious property, which could not be destroyed by the great number of chemical reactions, we carried out, which, in comparable reactions, always followed, the same path, and manifested itself with an intensity clearly related to the quantity of inactive material retrieved, ...must be an absolutely essential character of the material itself."⁶

The Curies were reasoning as chemists: the physicist's atom was still in limbo, although the connection between electricity and matter was being revealed, with the discovery of electron in 1897 at Cambridge by J. J. Thomson

By 1899 Becquerel noted that the radiation could be deflected by a magnetic field so that at least part of it consisted of tiny, charged particles. In 1900 he decided that the part that was negatively charged consisted of spreading electrons, identical in nature to those of the cathode rays as earlier identified by J. J. Thomson.

What slowed the interpretation of the phenomenon of radioactivity, as even Mme. Curie herself acknowledged, was the experimental datum that the radiant activity of uranium, thorium, radium, and probably also of actinium, was constant.

The Rutherford - Soddy exponential law of radioactive decay was not applied by the Curies till 1906, when they observed: 'Every atom of a radioactive body functions as a constant source of energy...which implies a revision of the principles of conservation.'⁷

So in one way or another, all researchers in physics at the turn of the century, were beginning to challenge the classical theories of physical universe. And what was seen as separate entities, gravitation, electro-magnetism--were beginning to be realized as inter-linked, and as inseparable

Perhaps this brief chapter of the Second Renaissance can be concluded with reference to Danish physicist, Niels Bohr. Bohr's remarkable 1913 paper "On the Constitution of Atoms and Molecules" presented a new model of the atom, based on quantum physics. Thus heralding yet another intellectual breakthrough in search of the primary unit that constitutes the physical universe. This search for the structure and the nature of the 'elementary' particle was to continue for the next six decades - and has not been, by any means, concluded. Nevertheless, the new revolutionary laws and concepts,

parallel in significance with Newton's laws of over two centuries ago, were well-established in the beginning of the 20th century.

II

Time is just a device from stopping every thing happening at once.

—Graffiti

It is curious that Jacob Bronowski's notion of 'work of art' should be so deeply rooted in the genesis of modern physics. For it was physicist Neils Bohr who in a conversation with Werner Heisenberg, the enunciator of principle of uncertainty, had once remarked: "When it comes to atoms, language can be used only as in poetry. The poet, too, is not nearly so concerned with describing facts as with creation images."⁸

Images! Well the images that emerged in art from the year 1900 are distinct from those before it. And if 'the whole history of art is', as according to Herbert Read, "a history of modes of visual perception of the various ways in which man has seen the world"⁹, then as in physics, the year 1900, marks a turning point in art.

At the beginning of the new century European art had reached a stage which is best described by the French phrase, *reculer pour mieux sauter*. At the Great World Exhibition in Paris in 1900, the Impressionist and post-Impressionists had been admitted in strength. But already something new was beginning to germinate. The notion that there is an underlying structure, a world within a world of the atom, captured the imagination of the artist. Modern art, it has been suggested, therefore starts at the same time as modern physics.¹⁰

However, just a month after the discovery of the x-rays, in December 1895, Lumiere Brothers - August and Louis - in Paris and Edison, independently, in the United States, invented a revolutionary new mode of perception and expression: the motion - picture. The movies, of course, recorded the motion - and hence time - but as the syntax for the language-structure of cinema developed through the use of close-up parallel-cutting, dissolves, pans, flash-backs, flash-forwards; etc, the emerging montage created new timespace relationships, or what may be termed a 'stream of perspectives'. With every new perspective, a new set of spatial, temporal and experiential co-ordinates with reference to the observed. Theoretically, each separate frame of the motion-picture-24 separate pictures in one second could be a unique temporal-spatial perspective, creating what James Joyce called in 1924 'a stream of consciousness.'

Indeed Joyce's writing, so cinematic' in character, owed much to the invention of cinema; Joyce being one of the first owners of a movie-house in Dublin in 1906.

Like x-rays, here was a new mode of 'seeing'. In the words of D.W. Griffith, the foremost inventor of the language of cinema: "The task I am trying to achieve is above all to make you *see*" (1913). Here was an echo of the words of Joseph Conrad in his preface to *Nigger of the Narcissus* (1897): "My task which I am trying to achieve is, by the power of the written world, to make you hear, to make you feel - it is, before all, to make you *see*."

So with this new perceptual mode of temporal-spatial perspectives, inspired by the inner structure of the atom and the crystals, the artist's interest shifted from the skin and the features to the underlying geometry, whether in natural forms as in Juan Gris' *Still Life* or Umberto Boccioni's *The Forces of a Street* or in human form in their *Pierrot* or *Dynamism of a Cyclist* respectively.

This is believed to be the beginning of Fauvism, and soon after, of Cubism, the latter considered by most art historians as the most significant, complete and radical revolution in painting since the Renaissance. Beginning with Pablo Picasso's *Demoiselle d'Avignon* (1907), the geometrical 'structurization' of the constituent planes of a Cubist painting, becomes increasingly a montage of shifting temporal-spatial perspectives as in a film. No longer the line of vision between the paints and the model was fixed. No longer did the finished work represent a frozen instant or a momentary impression of a passing world. Instead it moved in space with time. Duchamp's *Nude Descending the Staircase* (1912) or Braque's *Woman With a Guitar* (1914) or Gris' *L'Homme a la Pipe* (1911) or Leiger's *Les Femmes* (1911) or Picasso's *Harlequin* (1913) were not merely a new play of light and shade or colour or planes, but a consistent artistic endeavour to reduce to two fixed dimensions of canvas the three dimensions of space and infinite moments of time. The results were often bold, intriguing, novel, but rarely--as must be expected--easily 'comprehensible'. Not without significance however many of the distinguished physicists were attracted to the new art-form. Neils Bohr owned Jean Metzinger's *Woman on a Horse* and Franz Marc's *Deer in a Forest* was a favourite with the scientists.

It would be fair to mention that the entire question of influences and origins of cultural or artistic movements cannot be precisely determined, and is even antithetic to the creative spirit.

Picasso himself has defined Cubism as "an art dealing primarily with forms, and when it is realized, it is there to live its own life". The aim is not *analyse* a given subject : in the same statement Picasso disowned any idea of research, which he saw rather as 'the principal fault of modern art'. Cubism, he said, has kept itself within the limits and limitations of painting as always practised - only the subjects painted might be different, "as we have introduced into painting objects and forms that were formerly ignored." But "Mathematics, trigonometry, chemistry, psycho - analysis, music and whatnot have been related to Cubism to give an easier interpretation. All this has been pure literature, not to say nonsense, which brought bad results, blinding people with theories".¹¹

As mentioned earlier, I believe, it is not possible to determine the source of cultural and artistic expressions in any precise, mechanistic manner. One can, borrowing E.M. Forster's phrase — 'only connect' seemingly unrelated things with perhaps some degree of plausibility. As instance, rumblings of Einsteinian notions to the manifesto of Futurist movement in painting in 1910 ; "objects in motion multiply and distort themselves like vibrations passing through space."

Over the years, cinema itself has been experimenting with 'time', to create a sort of 'cubistic cinema' and from the early magical, experiments of George Melles, to the contemporary cinema there have been many innovative attempts to represent the psychological and objective multi-dimensions of time. Alain Resnais' *Last Year at Marienbad* (1961) or *Hiroshima Mon Amour* (1956), Norman McLaren's *Pas De Deux* (1967), Fellini's *8 1/2* (1964) are imaginative experiments in exploring new modes of perception. They create another 'stream of perspectives', filled with dreams, flash-backs, flash-forwards, and fragment of imagination, exploring all levels of consciousness and memory. It was this possibility of cubistic evolution of cinema that made W.B. Yeats see the movie as a world of Platonic ideals with a film projector playing "a spume upon a ghostly paradigm of things".

Both motion-pictures and Cubism were attempts at representing time, adding a temporal dimension to spatial perspective. The space-time continuity, subject-object equation, relativism and absolutism, all of immense exploration in physics, sought and discovered their parallel in art and cinema. Like x-rays, atomic structure and radioactivity, cinema too has had far-reaching influences on many facets of the twentieth century.

III

And the seasons they go round and round,

And the painted ponies they go up and down,
 We're riding on a carousel of time
 We can't go back
 We can only look behind from where we came
 and go round and round and round in the circle game.

— Joni Mitchell

One of the more naughty problems in contemporary biology is the nature of biological rhythms. Many of the living organisms, heart-beat or pulse rate, for instance, display some kind of diurnal, circadian, lunar or solar cyclic behaviour. The term 'living clock' has often been applied to repetitive cycle of events in time. However, there is a certain imprecision in that use. A rhythm is not necessarily a clock. Many of the rhythms observed in plants and other living organisms are indeed in phase with lunar or solar cycles. But from that it cannot be inferred that they have a "sense of time", or that they can "tell" time. German botanist, Wilhelm Pfeffer, in his monumental study *Handbuch der pflanzenphysiologie* in 1897, presented the first major study of 'living clocks'. He observed that plants display daily sleep movements, their leaves being elevated by day and drooping at night, with such sleep rhythms persisting even when light and temperature were kept constant. At about the same time, Georges Bohn working in Paris in 1903, made some significant discoveries that anticipated some of the most striking work on the lunar rhythms of marine organisms.

The interest in rhythmic behaviour of living organisms has existed since ancient times, comprising the substance of much folk-lore. Aristotle, for instance, wrote of the swelling of the ovaries of sea urchins at full moon; he even described these tiny creatures in such detail that their chewing organ is known to zoologists as Aristotle's lantern.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, there seems to emerge a more concerted attempt to understand not only how nature's rhythms influence living organisms but also how organisms mark the passing time. Charles Darwin's pioneering work *Power of Movements in Plants* (1880) addressed itself to such questions as *why do plants sleep*? It seems to have laid the foundation for all later studies about rhythms in living nature.

At the Nobel Institute for Physical Chemistry at Stockholm, at the beginning of the century, Svante Arrhenius studied data on the periodic occurrence of bronchitis and on the periodic variations in birth and death rates. He noted the lunar periodicity of menstruation in the human female

and even suggested the periodic onset of epilepsy. Earlier in 1890's he had suggested that biological rhythms might be caused by the tides in the cosmic forces that surround the earth.¹²

Karl von Frisch at the University of Munich in 1910's did pioneering work on communication among bees and the ways they orient themselves in flight. This sense of time of the bees, and navigation of birds are amongst some of the most crucial aspects of the study of biological rhythms that continues to be of an increasing interest to biologists.

It is not without significance that at about the beginning of the century, cyclical behaviour of nature began to fascinate the historians, who saw in history a kind of temporal botany and zoology. Oswald Spengler's great work *The Decline of the West* appeared in 1918, but the book was finished before the war began in 1914. Spengler was not the first modern writer to notice the phenomenon, real or apparent, of cyclical time. In 1911, the historian and archeologist Sir Frinders Petrie pointed out cyclical patterns in Western civilization, but he drew no conclusions from these patterns. Spengler was the first to treat cyclical time and seasonal development as the evidence, the key to a naturalistic science of history. He was also the first to expand this would-be science to cover world history. Most importantly he wrote with such cloudy brilliance, such a vivid sense of detail and destiny that *The Decline of the West* has become a phoenix book. Initially burned by historians for its frequent blunder and reborn with enquiring readers for its ability to do what Boccaccio said poetry could do - "to submit the shows of things to the desires of the mind".

Again, at the beginning of this century, Henri Bergson and Samuel Alexander began to explore the nature of time and memory, and were the first philosophers, in the words of Alexander, to "take time seriously". In 1910, in his *Time and Free Will* Bergson presents two possible conceptions of time. One is that of duration as "the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former state." The other conception of time arises when "we set our states of consciousness side-by-side in such a way as to perceive them simultaneously, no longer in one another, but alongside; in a word we project time into space, we express duration in terms of extensity, and succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or chain, the parts of which touch without penetrating one another."¹³

The greatest and most revolutionary finding of modern psychology, it has been suggested is the discovery of the unconscious by Sigmund Freud,

ie, that realm of the psyche which manifests itself relatively independently of the structure of our conscious mind. It is the "time-binding machinery" in which the evolutionary history of events and the experiences and reactions to them are carefully filed. It is the plastic expression of man's biological history, or what Wilder Penfield calls, 'the built-in tape-recorder of strips of time', which may be triggered by stimulating the temporal lobes in the brain and thus unlocking the past.¹⁴ Meerloo has suggested that Man, when expressing himself, makes use of a "kinetic melody", a symphony of functions, in which the whole organism is mobilized.¹⁵

An individual's evolution is not only along his anatomical forms and functions, but also along his awareness of time, his awareness of becoming, of growth of duration and his reactions to his involvement in time and history.

It was this attempt at unravelling the multi - dimensionality of human - consciousness, that got Freud into the study of dreams, "the most valuable of all discoveries it has been my good fortune to make. Insight such as this falls to one's lot once in a lifetime". *The Interpretation of Dreams* remained Freud's favourite book. The manuscript on the book was finished in 1898, but Freud was so convinced that his discovery was such a revolutionary breakthrough in the realm of ideas, that he wanted the book to bear its publication date as 1900, to mark the beginning of a new century. Alas, in the first decade of its publication, it sold only a few hundred copies.

In a letter to his friend Fliess, Freud described a return visit to the Bellevue hotel in Vienna, where he had had his famous Irma dream, asking, "Do you suppose that someday a marble table will be placed on the house, inscribed with the words - "In this House on July 24th 1895, the Secret of Dreams was revealed to Dr. Sigmund Freud", adding, "at the moment there seems little prospect of it".

Since 1900, of course, both the psychological and physiological research about dreams, has evolved significantly. However, Freud did unmistakably, open a new window on the human - mind, and exerted, for better or for worse, an unprecedented influence on literature, art and human-mores. With the publication of Havelock Ellis' *Studies in the Psychology of Sex* (1897 - 1900) and Freud's *Three Treatises on the Theory of Sex* (1905) playwrights, novelists and artists took another flight of fancy. In dramatic literature, for instance, although the dream motif has appeared for a long time, the first to put on the stage a dream world, with overtones of sexuality, in the spirit of contemporary psychological thinking was August Strindberg. The three

parts of *To Damascus* (1898-1904) are masterly transcriptions of dreams and obsessions. Writings of Proust, Thomas Mann, D.H. Lawrence, James Joyce and Strindberg bear the unmistakable influence of contemporary 'scientific' meanderings in the human-psyche. As if, each one of them, in his own way, were *seeing* through the same window that Freud - and a little differently, Jung - had opened against the Victorian age. Freud had provided a new mode of perception, a new set of "x-rays", another way of "seeing". As a reaction against the long victorian era, the 1920's, with their manners and mores, art and fantasies, set out to represent all--with much distortion and popularisation--that the new psychology, physics and art had created.

Another coincidence of great minds during the period 1895-1915 occurred in the social sciences. Coming from widely disparate backgrounds, often having little contact with or knowledge of the others, perhaps a score of men forged those ideas and methods which today dominates the fields of economic and political science, and psychology and sociology. Their names are less familiar than those of Comte and Spencer; few people speak knowingly of Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto, E. A. Ross and William McDougall, George Simmel and Georges Sorel. It is their more famous contemporaries--Ivan Pavlov and his concept of 'conditioned reflex', William James' *The Principles of Psychology* (1890), and *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902), James Watson-- the father of behaviourism, Thorstein Veblen and Max Weber, Sigmund Freud and Emile Durkheim who are today regarded as the founders of modern psychology and sociology.

Perhaps it will be important to mention that the triumphs of physics served to lure the 'objectification' of psychology. For instance, the associationist school of Herbart, the Mills and Bain, regarded the self or ego not as a pre-existing source of psychological representation as did the older orthodox view, but as pieced together by the association of discrete ideas. The physiology of the "conditioned reflexes", initiated by Pavlov, carried this line of thought further, and led naturally to the psychology of behaviourism developed by James Watson in 1914 and the following years. The fundamental ideas were outlined in 1894 and 1900 by Lloyd Morgan, a British psychologist who founded the American school of animal psychology.

These investigators broke away from the prevalent interpretation of the actions of animals in terms of supposed consciousness, and set to work to observe their behaviour, and later on that of men, "objectively" as the facts of physics and chemistry are observed. It is unfortunate, I believe, that though physics has undergone revolutionary philosophical changes since

1900, social sciences, psychology amongst them, have tended to become increasingly mechanistic.¹⁶ Nevertheless, just as x-rays had created a new mode of "seeing" the inner structure, Freud's interpretation of dreams provided a new window on the 'unconscious'. In truth, all attempts whether in sociology, psychology, biology or politics, were beginning to unravel the structural components of the organic, inorganic or human systems. And it was during this Second Renaissance, that the foundation stone of such enquiries was laid.

IV

Like H.G. Wells' *Time Machine* (1895), Lumiere Brothers' cinematograph 'played with time', thus creating a new mode of perception. However, there were two other revolutionary inventions during the Renaissance of 1895-1915: one was wireless telegraphy and radio, and the other was the flying machine. These too became new modes of perception, experientially altering our concepts of space and time in radical new ways.

Marconi's wireless telegraph, and our present-day radio and television, trace their origin directly to Maxwell's theory of the electromagnetic field and ether waves, followed by Hertz's experimental proof of the theory. The works of Maxwell and Hertz gave Marconi, in his own words; "the greatest insight into the hidden mechanisms of nature which has yet been made by the intellect of man".¹⁷ In 1895, Marconi sent his first wireless telegraphic message. The wireless communication across the English channel was sent in 1899, and two years later, on December, 1901 from southwest tip of England to Newfoundland. In 1900, R.A. Fessenden sent out the first sound-wave signals from the Massachusetts coast, and the wireless receivers picked up the music. Today the entire space all around us is permeated with myriad criss-crossing radio waves, carrying music, messages and pictures, to be captured instantaneously, at great heights or immense depths, by receivers moving at phenomenal speeds. Indeed, we are a part of a 'global village' not through physical proximity or social concern but because the waves engulf us, one all.

This instantaneity can and has become a new tool of manipulation and control, a new Faustian power in the hands of those whose fingers are on all the crucial buttons. But whereas there is no going back on the awe-inspiring inventions of Marconi and Fessenden, there are still many political and cultural alternatives open in their use.¹⁸

In addition to the waves criss-crossing our space, there are flying machines hovering in the sky. For long assumed impossible, it was in the

beginning of the century, on December 17, 1903, that Wright Brothers, Wilbur and Orville, flew the first power-driven heavier-than-air machine in free, controlled flight. In their plane *Kitty Hawk*, the Wright Brothers 'made history'. In their four flights that day, Orville was up in the air for 12 seconds, and Wilbur in the last and longest flight for 59 seconds. What had started out with Samuel Langley on May 6, 18-6 in a steamdriven unmanned model aerodrome of 14-foot wing spread, had now come to be a new reality. Alexander Graham Bell was one of the observer at Langley's flight. He wrote : "... it seems to me that no one who was present on this interesting occasion could have failed to recognize that the practicability of mechanical flight had been demonstrated."¹⁹ In 1908 as Orville Wright carried two occupants in his machine over a closed 125 mile course, at a speed of 42 miles per hour, a new era had begun. Like the invention of the wheel, this new invention too had far-reaching implications.

There is much that has been written about the economic and political conditions that spur personal and collective creativity. In discussing the Rise of the Medici and the birth of Florentine Renaissance, Will Durant writes :

"... it took more than a revival of antiquity to make the Renaissance. And first of all it took money--smelly bourgeois money : the profits of skillful managers and underpaid labor; of hazardous voyages to the East, and laborious crossings of the Alps, to buy goods cheap and sell them dear; of careful calculations, investments, and loans; of interest and dividends accumulated until enough surplus could be spared from the pleasures of flesh, from the purchase of senators, signories, and mistresses, to pay a Michelangelo or a Titian to transmute wealth into beauty; and perfume a fortune with a breath of art. Money is the root of all civilization."²⁰

The genesis of creativity for the Second Renaissance was quite different. There were no patrons--rich or bourgeois--for Plutarch or Einstein, Lumiere or Wright Brothers, Freud or Pavlov, Curies or Picasso. Most of them worked against an indifferent or hostile environment, in smelly, ill-equipped laboratories or studies, on no or meagre salaries. No doubt all of them were amply awarded with honour, and some with money, after their theories were well-established. It seems there was a tide in the affairs of men', a Zeitgeist--spirit of the era--that permeated all creative endeavours. In the history of ideas, these two decades 1895-1915 remain quite exalting. If the original Renaissance is marked by the discovery of perspective, this Second Renaissance may perhaps be known by the discovery of 'stream of perspectives'.

Notes and References

1 Bronowski, J. *Ascent of Man* (Toronto : Little Brown & Co.), 1973, p. 346.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 336.

3 Einstein, Albert, "Autobiographical Notes" in P. A. Schilpp, Editor, *Albert Einstein : Philosopher-Scientist* (Evanston, Illinois), 1949, p. 52.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 51.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 51.

6 Quoted in *Dictionary of Scientific Biography*, Vol. III, Ed. C.C. Gillispie (New York : Charles Scribner's Sons), 1971, p. 499.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 498.

8 Quoted in *Ascent of Man*, *Ibid.*, p. 340.

9 Read, Herbt *A Concise History of Modern Painting* (London : Frederick A. Praeger), 1959, p. 12.

10 Bronowski, J. *Ibid.*, p. 346.

11 Originally an interview with Picasso (in Spanish) translated by Forbes Watson, *The Arts*, May 1923.

12 Svante Arrhenius : "Die Enwirkung kosmischer Einglusse und physiologische Verhältnisse", Skandinavisches Archiv fur Physiologies, Vol. VIII (1898), pp. 367-416. Quoted in *The Living Clocks* : Ritchie Ward, Mentor Books, p. 74.

13 Bergson, Henri. *Time and Free Will* (New York : McMillan), 1910, pp. 100-101.

14 Penfield, W. "Symposium on the Brain and Mind", *A. M. A. Arch. Neurol. and Psychiat.*, Vol. 87, 1952.

15 Meerloo, J.A.M. "The Time Sense in Psychiatry", in *The Voices of Time*, Ed. J.T. Fraser (New York: George Braziller), 1966, pp. 235-252.

16 Kumar, Sehdev, "Ecological Psychology : Images of Childhood", sent for publication. This paper discusses in detail the influence of 'hard' sciences on the methodology of social sciences.

17 Marconi, G. "Wireless Telegraphy", published in *Smithsonian Treasury of Science*, Ed. Webster P. True, Vol. I (New York : Simon & Schuster), 1960.

18 Kumar, Sehdev. "The problems of Cultural Autonomy : Mass Media in Third World" sent for publication.

19 Langley, S.P. "Story of Experiments in Mechanical Flight", published in *Smithsonian Treasury of Science*, *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 1056-1074.

20 Durant, Will. "The Story of Civilization : Part V" *The Renaissance* (New York : Simon & Schuster), 1953, pp. 67-68.

Jung's Science in "Answer to Job" and the Hindu Matrix of Form

ROBERT GRIFFIN

No single Work of Jung's--or indeed of analytic psychology--has inspired more controversy among scientist and theologian alike than *Answer to Job*. Since the text is unusually devoid of proper nouns and terminology -- aside from cabalistic and Biblical references from Genesis to Apocalypse -- the reader must be relatively steeped in the Jungian canon to properly situate the writer's thought. Over its rambling course, the purpose of that complex essay emerges as an attempt to differentiate what is real from what exists ("Matter is an hypothesis"). This abstract distinction is epitomized and dramatized through the profoundly perplexing encounter of creature and Creator, and through other momentous pairs of opposites drawn from Eastern and Western creation mythologies. In the Prefatory Note for *Answer to Job*, Jung cryptically volunteers that the inspiration for the book derived from the "problems of Christ as a symbolic figure . . . represented in the traditional zodiacal symbolism of the two fishes." Such images, we are told in a well known formulation, "clearly relate to a few basic principles or archetypes" of which the deep structure is "unknowable as such." As the essay progresses, the formulation of this iconology becomes sharper :

"Religion means precisely the function which links us back to the eternal myth . . . myth is not fiction : it consists of facts that are continually repeated. The fact that the life of Christ is largely myth does absolutely nothing to disprove its factual truth -- quite the contrary. I would even go so far as to say that the mythtical character of a life is just what expresses its universal human validity. It is a *symbolum*, a bringing together of heterogeneous natures."¹

Despite this emerging clarity, the enigmatic allusion to the icons of Christological myth becomes a motif that both accounts for the philosophical fuzziness (e.g., the ontological status of the nonphysical) with which Jung is still occasionally charged and yet -- for those conversant with Jung, as Hans Shaer implied long ago -- enriches our understanding of the functioning of

contentious yet basic terms in the lexicon of analytic psychology. What some see as a loss of skeptical scientific rigor is actually an attempted return to a para- or pre-mechanistic theological attitude of mind. At the same time, as the Jung/Freud correspondence make clear, Jung's polyvalence corresponds roughly to the shift of attention in twentieth-century mathematics from ratios and proportions to functions, which has many important consequences in other fields. In the study of maxima and minima functions, for instance, it is customary to substitute unusual and unique trial values for one variable at a time, and to watch the result in the values taken on by the other variables and by the whole function in consequence. Sometimes the result is an indeterminate or nonsensical expression, and sometimes it is a transformation into another class of functions whose unsuspected relations to the original class is thus discovered. The mathematical result is a clarification and definition of the properties of the ideas involved. The physical universe is increasingly viewed as an organism of organisms, or at least as an organic mechanism in which biological function and mathematical function are comparable. Accordingly, in *Job* and elsewhere Jung propounds psychological analogies with the biosphere in order to countervail against an exclusive and dogmatic determinism in physics -- held over from the waning nineteenth century -- that was applied uncritically to fields in the humanities and social sciences. The fallacy, as Jung perceived and demythologized it, is simple : take any formula, find a similar form or plastic material, select a suitable analogy, condense the analogy to a metaphor, take the metaphor literally, and you have a scientific philosophy. The solar system was thus derived from conic sections, and Bohr's atom from the solar system. Thus did the analogy of the world to an organic mechanism enter psychology as *Gestalten* or forms devouring the faculties of the soul, the complexes of the psyche, and the reflexes of the nervous system. Thus did the Marxist theory of history originate in both mechanics and Christian theology.

Most recently, *Job* has become the center of renewed attention by Mary Wolff-Salin in *No Other Light : Points of Convergence in Psychology and Spirituality*.² Concentrating largely on the Apocalypse, Wolff-Salin's underlying thesis is acceptable enough. In order to respond to this book, one has to understand it." The point is well taken that "He is writing psychology based on empirical experience"; we will see that the observation places Jung squarely within the tradition of philosophical rationalism (but with an important qualification), which from Plato to Kant had insisted that all

knowledge be constructed after the pattern of geometry. The essence of the qualification is the fact that since the advent of non-Euclidean geometry, mathematical geometry has been reduced to analytic truth, whereas synthetic geometry has been surrendered to empiricism; Jung's illicit commentary in *Job* on this dualism has important implications for the psychology of geometric form. Yet Wolff-Salin's search for clues to the core of Jung's cryptic theory about the law of opposites tends to discuss the exceptional opaqueness of Jung's allusions seriatim without finding a unifying image, metaphor or idea. The ambivalent nature of Yahweh -- transcendent yet immanent, wholly prior to yet fulfilled through creation -- which emerges in the concept of Sophia/Wisdom is left in shadow, merely juxtaposed to the mysterious pact of Virgin and Son without illuminating it. Jung's sense of urgency ("There must be some dire necessity responsible for the anamnesis of Sophia's more observed than explicated. And the possible Eastern mythological derivation of such a Creator is queried yet left unresolved and isolated.

As *Job* unfolds, it is apparent that Jung's essay is really about the subjugation of the Old Adam to the "pairs of opposites" and the anamnesis (re-membrance) of the New. From its prefiguration in Daniel to its sanctioned prophecy in the Apocalypse, the most arresting symbolic representation of this coexistence is Christ of the Apocalypse seated in the almond-shaded womb (*mandorla*) of the universe -- the form of Pisces -- attended by the four mythical beasts of the zodiac quadrants in the measuring wheel of time (p. 383). In the *mandorla* of the virginal womb, *Christos* opens the door of light, through contemplation of the humble or invisible world, as the passage beyond form to a new perception of being. Pisces is the end of the signs of the zodiac and thus of the domination of the spirit by the stars; the coming of the Christian era coincides approximately with the entry of the sun into Pisces in the equinoctial precession, as derived from the philosophy of Babylonian mathematical speculation. Pisces thus represents both fulfillment and dissolution, and therefore as the Christian sign it marks the dissolution of the spirit's subjection to elemental forces. Although the *mandorla* was found by nineteenth-century art history to be the standard measuring unit of Gothic architectural sculpture, and from Augustine through Dante symbolizes the incarnation of Christ triumphant (*Paradiso* 26 : 2), Jung uses it as a polymorphous icon precisely to undermine dogmatic formulations by discussing its separable features in concert with earlier symbology of Eastern derivation: "Hence the unmistakable analogies between certain Indian and Christian ideas" (p. 441; cf. p. 437). In unrelated contexts throughout the

eighteen volumes of his collected works, he comments on its universal return, for instance, in the establishment by Jacob of the mythical city of Luz, the forerunner of Beth-El; in the calling of Jeremiah where Yahweh puns on the etymological affinities in Hebrew between "perception" and "rebirth"; in the annunciation to the virginal Nana -- the daughter of Cybele and mother of the dying and reviving Eastern deity Attys, who conceived by placing an almond in her bosom, and so on.

While the substance and conventions of the argument appear to be drawn primarily from Judeo-Christian symbolism and related iconography, then, they are complemented at key junctures by both reference to traditional mathematical speculation and complex mythic references from Hindu philosophy and art that best exemplify the symbolic role of the pantocrator pictured in the last sentence of *Job*, "whose form has no knowable boundaries, who encompasses him on all sides, fathomless as the abysses of the earth and vast as the sky." The mathematical and mythical components of Jung's thought are so complicated yet so basic to the paradoxes illustrated by *Job* -- which James Joyce labeled as the "mythametical" dimensions of modern art -- that they should be winnowed for separate commentary.

The recurrent and familiar aphorism in philosophy that summarizes this feature of Jung's thought says that reality is a sphere having an infinite radius and a center at every point. Jung's particular formulation takes in the projective fields made by Bruno and Leibnitz as well as some of the dark remarks of Einstein about the shape of the universe. Far from being nonsensical, its principal of order can be stated. The infinite sphere in mathematics denotes a series of spheres each of which represents a stage of discovery. A set of assumptions is laid down and developed by deductive and intuitive methods into a system. The system so generated is a finite sphere. As soon as it is sufficiently developed, there is discovered an underlying set of assumptions within a larger system than the former as its consequence. When this is developed, it is a sphere including the former as one of its dependent parts. Modern multidimensional geometry thus includes Euclidean geometry. This latter sphere is in turn a subdivision of a still more inclusive sphere, and the expansive process apparently never ends. Modern comparative literature shows similarly ordered sets of allegories. The microcosm of the individual mind is similar to the cultural macrocosm, and the corresponding series of spheres is an intellectual biography, a mind in the making. The infinity of spheres is suggestive of the Pythagorean numbering system with its densities, compactness and continuities. Paradoxes of

counting are solved by correlating the members of one series with those of another. Jung implies that we can bring a similar analogical calculus to bear on the series of mathematical and mythical spheres. Alan Watts has commented perceptively on Jung's analogical syntheses in coordinating scientific and spiritual absolutes, with the restricting caveat that religious and any other experience of inspiration and enthusiasm can be expressed only analogically.³

Let us now reconsider the arabesque, mythic dimensions in the concluding sentence of *Job*, with its convoluted image of an enlightened person possessed (in both senses of the term) of the ever-evolving, involuted One "whose form has no knowable boundaries, who encompasses him on all sides." Jung's intentionally troubling language corresponds to the notion in Vedanta that reality is not an empirical datum, since separation of experience into facts is fundamentally a convention of language and thought. To assert that reality has no knowable boundaries does not mean that it is boundlessly large but rather that it is indefinable, and that differentiated things are created by the word-and-thought of the Logos, which is "no-thing." Through his omnibus study of Eastern religious philosophy and of the culture of Southwestern American Indians, Jung the polymath was struck by an engaging coincidence: in Sanskrit "being" and "becoming" stem from the same word (*bhu*); Uto-Aztec and Athabascan Indian languages of New Mexico and Arizona contain verbs but no nouns, so that the world can be described only as process.

The most essential of the mythic images drawn from the Subcontinent is the matrix of all worldly shapes which informs *Job* as "the pneumatic nature of Sophia as well as her world-building Maya Character." Jung thus hypostatizes Sophia and Maya as the *prima materia* which was the original Womb of Creation. This seems to capture the sense of the Office of St. Mary: in the time before time was, "a new thing is done in both natures"; the two natures are the divine All of "that which was" (Logos) and the Void of "that which was not" (Sophia). Before his Incarnation as the "only-begotten Son," Jesus was simply the Word and Wisdom of God. Hence, in a typical Jungian formulation of thought, *Job* opens with an image that epitomizes the Christian mystery and closes with an allusion to one of the most daunting notions in Indian thought (cf. 10 : 237; 11 : 963).

The concept of Maya was introduced to European critical discourse in the first great wave of Indophilia by Friedrich Creuzer's *Symbolik und*

Mythologie (1810), which, according to Jung's account to Freud one century later, absolutely "fired" him. Maya is the symbolic manifestation of the Hindu trinity of Brahma the creator, Vishnu the sustainer and Shiva the destroyer. She is the universal Mother, the world in its natural "appearance" of delusion. Engendered as *prima materia* by the breath of God, her epiphany as the universal bodily reflection of divine thought is present in the syllable OM and symbolically represented in the *mandorla* shape of the hands in prayerful attitude (cf. pp. 391, 401).⁴ This is the same shape in which God the Son (not as Jesus but as Sophia/Wisdom) is pictured in icons of the Eastern Orthodox Church, enthroned in the midst of concentric lines; the superimposed amygdalate shapes symbolize the intersection and interpenetration of heaven and earth, and the perpetual sacrifice that regenerates creative force through the dual streams of ascent and descent. In the sixteenth century Bruno's *De monade numero et figura* represented androgyny by two interlocking circles -- the marriage of heaven and earth -- whose common *mandorla* section is "the space in which two are one".

Both the issue and wife of Brahma, Maya and her unimaginable consort compose an androgynous couple, since Maya reconciles all pairs of opposites, one pole balanced against another through the ceaseless interplay of existence. A mindbender to conceptualize, Maya is the very warp and woof of the cosmic veil which conceals the origin and passing of our life's dream (p. 394). She is conventionally yet variously embodied in the mythological images of world tree, almond, cosmic egg and lotus. Her epiphany in such world forms coincides with and arises from the Sacred Union (*hierosqamos*) which weds the primal forces of heaven (circle) and earth (square) to produce as a compromise form the vulva-matrix in which (to return to the example at hand) Christ is bodied forth in the tympanum of cathedrals from Istanbul to Northern France (cf. p. 421). Throughout the nineteenth century Maya's praises were sung as the supreme anima and Femme Fatale, and the etymology of her name was dissected by writers and philosophers whom Jung either admired or assaulted: Michelet, Quinet, Heine, Schopenhauer, Leconte de Lisle, Laforgue, Rilke and Joyce. This is to say nothing of the volumes of dreamwork analysis where the art therapy of patients returns time and again and with stunning uniformity to the same thesaurus of mythic prototypes.⁵ As a result of this insight, the projected figure of Maya allows Jung to penetrate the patina of mythologized sex in the numbing succession, on the numbing succession, on the cusp of this century, of Femme Fatale

types; he thus unveils the sexualized mythology at the heart of creation myths the world over.

Maya originates from the Sanskrit roots *ma*, *matr*' meaning to measure," and hence is etymologically related to the words *mother*, *matter*, *matrix*, and *meter* (*Maitri Upanishad* 6,6). She is no-thing which, once divided and measured, creates the appearance of the world's multiple forms and the delusion that there is anything but the imperishable One. As Jung put it -- paraphrasing the *Svetasvatara Upanishad* -- the wedding of *Atman* (Soul) with *purusha* (form of self) in *Maya* "gives reality the glint of illusion" (10 : 463; 12 : 5). It is the gap between ultimate knowledge and our finitude that *Maya* measures, and the breadth of mythic expression inspired by the antinomy of the One and the many far exceeds a translation of *Maya* as mere "illusion." In fact, for Jung *Maya* embodies the dilemma of speaking of archetypes, which by definition exist only as potentialities. Since *Maya* is the sense of the difference in the created world, all discourse on transcendental entities is a "measuring out" of our distance from the absolute. The procedure of measuring is the discourse itself, and any process occurring within the frame of *Maya* language becomes discourse about the structure of *Maya* and about the "appearance" of the transcendent. The difference between speech and silence, then, is the analogical measure of the difference between *Brahman* troubled by human distinctions and *Brahman* without limitations.

The Judeo-Christian equivalent to the hierogamy of *Brahma* and *Maya* is of course the first verse of *Genesis*, and thus the *Enuma Elish* in which the god-hero *Marduk* divides with his double-edged sword the "footless" (= unmeasured, fathomless) water serpent *Chaos-Tiamat*, creating the Primal Mother by dismembering chaos into separate, measured things (cf. pp. 397, 447, 462). She is the abyssal void by which the art and power of the *Logos*, God's "rude breathing" moving over and against the oceanic deep, causes multiplicity to appear (p. 388); from the initiating imagery of the two fishes through the various reflections on the oceanic abyss of *prima materia*, the etiological imagery guides Jung's ruminations through *Job*. Until her creation through apparent division, she is the uncreated female aspect of Godhead; this is the reference point in Jung's otherwise puzzling pronouncement in 'The Psychology of Eastern Meditation' that "the Indian likes to turn back into the maternal depths of Nature" (11 : 570). As the progenitor and dissolver of opposites, *Maya* is the mysterious energy behind the image

of the world tree and *axis mundi* of existence, whose hidden and immortal root is Brahma.

As an Indophile, it was entirely natural that Jung be attracted to the pramatic manifestations of Maya as they bear on and lead to therapeutic healing, as in the reconciled opposites and Fire Serpentine of Kundalini Yoga (16 : 336). But through decades of intellectual and spiritual cohabitation with this "measure of the immeasurable," the notion of Maya broadened in his comparative studies so as to (a) imbue his reflections from Alchemy to Zen and (b) become a shorthand system of metonymic reference which, once again, makes his intellectual style maddeningly abstruse when allusions go unrecognized or brilliantly auroral when they are caught. In "Eastern and Western Thinking" Jung himself anticipated the charge of enigmatic logic and challenged the hegemony of narrow empiricism and philosophizing by Cartesian coordinates. There he drew on the mythic paradigm of the hierogamy of Idea incarnate in Matter "Matter : is an hypothesis. When you say 'matter,' you are really creating a symbol for something unknown, which may just as well be 'spirit' or anything else; it may even be God " And he goes on to complete the traditional Eastern trichotomy by defining "mind" as "the matrix of all those patterns that give apperception its peculiar character, "most dramatically through mythological motifs such as the ryonciliatson of pairs of opposites and especiall the veil of Maya.

To be sure, Jung's occasional lyrical abandon (India is "a multi-colored veil of Maya", 10 : 515) opens him to being viewed as neo-Romantic -- a judgment that he eagerly abetted in rambling expatiations on "the weaving and rending of the veil as the ageless melody of India -- this contradiction fascinates me" (11 : 579). Despite his *elan*, the *pars pro toto* of veil for the entire complex of Hindu thought and iconology allows the image a wide field of reference and at the same time is compatible with both Judeo-Christian and Hindu myth. Moses, for instance, was forced to veil his eyes and thus *re-veal* the *mysterium tremendum et fascinans* at the resplendent source of all forms (Exodus 34 : 29-35). Comparably, the cosmic mystery of Maya has three powers. The first is that of obscuring brahman; the second, that of projecting ihe world-illusion; and the third, that of revealing Brahman through the illusion. As both image and idea, then -- image *of* idea -- the veil of Maya serves Jung in an important capacity for the discussion and exemplification of the symbolic operation of the psyche. It bespeaks the

separation and link -- the Sun Door *par excellence* -- between progression and regression, the contingent and transcendent, between the emergence to consciousness in the human macrocosm and the projection of this psychic rebirth into cosmogonic myths of worldwide distribution : "once again the solidity and tangibility of matter, so fervently believed in and so convincing to the senses, dissolves into Maya, into an emanation of primordial thought and will" (18 : 464; cf. 8 : 38). Correspondingly, in substantiating such abstractions, Maya's veil is the reflex, shorthand term at the core of Jung's explications of such common mythologems as the grail-like Sophia/Wisdom of his treatises on alchemy or (Via Leo Frobenius) the slain and reborn water dragon (8 : 180).

With its subsections of "Christ, a Symbol of the Self" and "The Ambivalence of the Fish Symbol," the *Aion* volume offers the fullest demonstration of the "mana" in or around the anima archetype, and of the connection between narrative detail and the power of projected mythic attributes, as they pertain to *Answer to Job*. The overture to Part III ("The Syzygy : Anima and Animus") -- "What, then, is this projection-making factor ? The East calls it the 'Spinning Woman' -- Maya, who creates illusion by her dancing" -- would approximate nonsense if we fail to recognize it as an abbreviated coding of concepts that are surgically elaborated elsewhere for their therapeutic component : "Interposed between the ego and the world, she [the anima archetype] acts like an ever-changing Shakti, who weaves the veil of Maya and dances the illusion of existence. But functioning between the ego and the unconscious, the anima becomes the matrix of all the divine and semi-divine figures, from the pagan goddess to the Virgin" (16 : 295).

The duality at play here between anima and figuration, threat and boon, ancient and modern, reflects Jung's deep interest in the endemic spread of the Femme Fatale in art and literature throughout *fin de siècle* Europe. She was often modeled on the All-Mother Cybele -- as in Marcel Lenoir's painting "Le Monstre" or Flaubert's tale of the veiled dancer named Salome -- who nourishes her offsprings before eating them back into the womb of the earth. "She" is both the Holy Virgin holding the strand of cosmic unity which passes through the *mandorla* of her womb, and "She" is the chain-weaver who, since the early Romantics, binds her emasculated prey with a single strand of her hair. While adequate exposition of this heritage would require volumes of discourse, one brief observation suffices to indicate Jung's important innovations.

In attempting to locate the common mythic denominator in the countless renditions of the Ewig Weibliche, Jung postulated a fundamental psychic geometry over the course of his writings [that unified, for instance, the Byzantine and Gothic *mandorla* matrix housing Christ of the Apocalypse, and the almond from which Attys was born to his earthly mother through the graces of Cybele, his divine mother and consort. In turn, this amygdaline shape was homologized with the spindle in both folklore (e.g., Grimms's "Rose Bud") and myth -- the steadfast Penelope superimposed on the spellbinding Circe. Projected to cosmic dimension, the polymorphous mythic form transposes into the diamond-shaped spindle running through the center of Mother Earth that, in pre-Socratic and Platonic texts (e.g., *Timæus* 36b-39d; *Republic* 616c-17b and elsewhere, spins the fates of us all: -- the eternal dynamic implicit in daily and annual birth, conflict, death, and resurrection.

This rich brew of composite mythologies is consonant with Jung's theoretical abstractions in "Synchronicity" about a geometrical principle underlying the physical world -- "the strongest tie that links the lower world to the heavens." From the "measuring" solar deity of *Rig Veda* to the Rosicrucians, cabalists, Freemasons and Theosophists of the late nineteenth century, this is the world form adumbrated in the mythic emblem of the conical rays of the All-Father which meet on the water surface and project in shadow to the diamond point below (as in the lone illustration of *anna-maya-kosha* in *Finnegans Wake*, emended from Bruno and Euclid's first proposition). In the latter half of *Job* this universalized symbolism comes together in the complex image of "the sharp two-edged sword" of "Christ blended with the Ancient of Days" from the Apocalypse who created the world "by weight, shape and measure" (pp. 321, 437). This symbolism had a particular attraction to medieval artists who pictured God distanced from the world, portrayed as Christ illuminated, and holding a compass by its pivot point while he measures his creation between the points of his dividers, which represent such pairs of opposites as life and death, spirit and flesh, good and evil, being and non-being. It was the image selected by Blake for the frontispiece of his engraved volume *Europe*. The beginning and conclusion of the measured circle are focused only at the pivot point (cf. "Dominus possedit me" from *Proverbs*). Hence, in the Rites of Resurrection prior to Easter the priest with the line of his hand divides the waters of the *uterus ecclesiae*, singing praises of the "arcane admixture of God's power" for those who have been "conceived in sanctity in the immaculate

womb" (cf. *Transformation Symbols in the Mass* 2 : 11). Since we resort to temporal and figurative language, we delude ourselves into thinking that the geometric configuration of right and left legs of the triangle allows us to speak knowingly of an ultimate duality of pivot and circumference or of archetype and its manifestation; but our illusive and illusory language always leaves us playing around the circumference of an omnipresent, nonexistent center. This single notion of the world engendered and calibrated by twin compass points which join at a single source of illumination creates multiplicity from unity. The true end of mankind lies nowhere on the space of the circle, nowhere in the wheel of time, but only at the pivot point of the calipers -- beyond the pairs of opposites and above such lumbering monstrosities of Jungian terminology as *enantiodynamia* and *syzygy*.

Answer to Job, with its pre-textual "problem" of Christ and the sacramental mystery of the two symbolic fishes, is likely to remain a puzzling work for its essential postulation of Christ as the unique and perfect synthesis of the conscious and unconscious, as of all paired opposites -- the issue of the *hieros gamos* of God his blue-veiled earthly consort, Jung's command of the language of mythic discourse drawn from East and West -- from the two complementary fishes discernible in the Yin/Yang emblem to the emergence of the Fisher from the virginal *mandorla* above the "Sunset" portal of Notre Dame de Chartres -- neither wins nor subverts his stupendous claim, so much as it sustains and queries the living mystery of symbolic form. At the same time, the deep paradox of a Creator beyond good and evil at the center of Jung's thought surpasses narrow and superannuated notions of what passes for scientific inquiry. It is said that the function of theology has always been to spiritualize the sacraments, i.e., to discover and formulate their symbolic function and to reduce popular belief in their causal efficacy to its proper status. The function of philosophical criticism is to intellectualize scientific method, i.e., to discover and formulate its symbolic significance and to reduce popular belief in its causal efficacy to proper status. With regard to the symbolic function of science and its conclusions, at present it can only be said that they are wavering shadows of those clear and distinct ideas without which experience is neither good nor true, Their present mathematical and mythic embodiments are intimations of some such immortality.

Notes and References

- 1 All citations in the text are to the *Collected Works of C. G. Jung* (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1967). Page citations alone are to *Answer to Job* in volume 11 of that edition.
- 2 (New York : Crossroad, 1986). Her argument has been condensed in the lead article of *Books and Religion* 14 (October, 1986) '1, 4, 14-15.
- 3 *The Supreme Identity : An Essay on Oriental Metaphysic and the Christian Religion* (New York : Random House, 1972). pp. 35, 88-89.
- 4 Two years before the publication of *Job* Rene Guenon commented on a *mandoral*-shaped symbol brought from Smyrna by the Order of Carmelites, which combines the spelling of AVE and AUM (*Le Roi du monde* [Paris : Editions Traditionnelles, 1950], pp. 19, 33-35). Cf. Jung, p. 436.
- 5 Cf. the liberating fantasy of the patient who described a diamond ensconced in a vulva, yet who knew nothing of the "Jewel in the Lotus" motif (representing the union of opposites) of the Buddha in meditation.

Words and Works*

ARTHUR FINE-

The less there is to see, the more there is to say.

H. ROSENBERG

Kandinsky's watercolor of 1910, "First Abstract Painting," marks the baptism (if not the birth) of abstract art. Kandinsky also began to write an explanation and defense of his move to abstraction at the same time that he produced the work itself. It was an essay, entitled "Content and Form," for the catalogue of the Second International Salon at Odessa. Throughout the next year Kandinsky's art progressed from watercolor to abstract oil paintings, in the "Improvisations" series of 1911-12. Similarly, during the same period, he revised and extended this early essay into a book, *Concerning the Spiritual in Art*, that was published in January of 1912. Clearly Kandinsky felt a need to put words of explanation around his works of art. He was not alone in this feeling, for most of the innovators (and disciples) of the abstract movement seem to have felt and expressed a similar need.¹ This need for words was quickly attended to by a growing body of interpreters, validators and prophets. Almost as fast as the abstract artists could produce their work, the art community provided journals devoted exclusively to the discussion of these abstract works: *De Stijl* (Leyden, 1917), *Vecht, Gegenstand, Objet* (Berlin, 1922); and *Axis* (London, 1935). For many of us the names of these journals ring the history of abstract art as surely as do the names of the major artists, and more surely than the names of even the major works of these artists. Thus it seems fair to say that abstract art grew up swimming in a sea of words.

The movement of abstract art, however, not unique in this respect. For it seems to me that twentieth century art as a whole is distinguished from its ancestors by the virtual torrent of words that sweeps it along, and by the extent to which these words function as explanation, interpretation and validation -- as opposed to the art-traditional style of commentary and criticism. It is instructive, for instance, to examine the representative sample of forty-two styles of twentieth century work catalogued in Jack Burnham's *The Structure of Art* and to find associated with each style its own school of words and word merchants.² The salient feature shared by these schools is

the feature already noted in connection with Kandinsky, the felt need to supplement the work of art with words.

This need, I think, creates a problem, formulated in an awkward but memorable way by the British painter and sometime art commentator Patrick Heron, who writes,

The fact that painting comes *before* criticism is a fact of which many are today increasingly unaware

Heron continues,

Art criticism used to be an...activity...which took took place after the event; it was essentially retrospective by nature... By contrast painting used to be the result of an essentially non-verbal consciousness or perception ... All this is changed, .. Increasingly, we *see* what we read, we *paint* what we are told that we see.....³

The twentieth century phenomenon of words surrounding works points to a deep contradiction in beliefs about art, a contradiction shared equally by artists and audience, and that shapes the art-world in which we all live. The contradiction is inherent in Heron's reference to "non-verbal consciousness." For Heron reminds us that, as we usually think of it, the creative work of the artist is intuitive, non-verbal and (essentially) not conceptual -- at least not in the way that the work of the logician or philosopher is conceptual. Art trades in images and forms rather than concepts and words. To put it in a trendy way, art is the work of the right-brain, not the left. If it succeeds, then art expands the capacity of the right brain to do its own particular work. You might say that successful art expands our consciousness, or our capacity to perceive the world or to experience it. One would not say that art itself articulates or enables us better to put into words (or to conceptualize) what that experience is like. If art is a mode of communication at all, then one would say that it communicates with us directly, or in its own terms but, in any case, not by means of a verbal or conceptual medium.

These are commonplace ideas in the world of art, ideas shared by both producers and consumers of art. I would not claim that everyone believes them, but rather that they constitute a stereotype for artistic endeavor and appreciation. As such they form an important conception of art, a conception that influences the art experience alike of both the believer in the conception and the non-believer. Let me encapsulate this important stereotype by means of the following formula,

ART = Work-Without-Words.

This stereotype, however, seems to run at cross purposes with the fact already noted, that the activity of the artist, and the fruits of that activity, seem increasingly to call for a surrounding of words : verbal elucidation, verbal description, verbal commentary, verbal criticism, verbal interpretation, verbal explanation, verbal validation, .. Often enough, these days, we get the beginnings of this word-flood right at the exhibition, on a looped tape that repeats the word-setting over and over, and then over again. Thus art in this century seems to fit another stereotype, according to the formula,

ART = Work-Needing-Words.

How are we to reconcile these stereotypes ? How are we to explain, or perhaps explain away, the apparent contradiction ?

Buried in the massive literature on the contemporary arts there are several attempts to explain the phenomenon of words, and I think three of these explanations are worth some serious attention.

The first idea is a simple and interesting one, expressed in some of the essays of Harold Rosenberg. Rosenberg was the theoretician -- the primary interpreter and validator -- of American "action painting" in the 1950's. (He coined the term "action painting" to refer to what the Europeans still like to call "painting by gesture".) In essays from that period he attacks the humanist as a reactionary for whom, in Rosenberg's beautiful phrase, "The thinking of painters [as expressed in their writing] only adds verbal insult to retinal injury."⁴ Rosenberg then proceeds to defend the "verbal insult" in the following way. He writes,

The intellectualistic character of all current audiences is an effect of the steady transformation of the whole populace into professionals and semi-professionals the essential mark of a profession is its evolution of a unique language or jargon into which it translates its subject matter and in which its methods, purposes and relations to other arts and sciences are formulated. The more incomprehensible this lingo is to outsiders, the more thoroughly it identifies the profession as such and elevates it out of the reach of mere amateurs and craftsmen.⁵

Thus Rosenberg sees in the phenomenon of art as work-needing-words an aspect of the twentieth century tendency towards professionalization. For professionalization, he thinks, requires a specialized jargon. It is rather like the formation of a street-gang, with its own secret codes and pass-words.

One can hardly quarrel with Rosenberg's perception of the general tendency towards professionalization in the arts. Not long ago, for example, I attended an arts conference featuring several well-known Chicago and New York artists. During the conference the topics of greatest interest turned out to be those concerned with retirement benefits and health insurance for artists. Except for the general style of dress (namely, in the official decorated-jeans uniform of the art-gang) it could well have been a meeting of the subcommittee on insurance of the American Medical Association. There is no doubt about it, Rosenberg is correct in seeing an increasing professionalization among artists.

But does this really get to the heart of the problem? For the felt need to interpret, explain and validate one's art in words seems to be a need felt by artists to communicate outside the confines of their own heads or those of their special art-cronies; outside, even, their comfortable niche in the local art-world. It is a need whose expression is addressed to public audiences at public exhibitions, it is proclaimed (as first with Kandinsky) in general catalogues of their works, and published (and projected) in journals and books (and videotapes) disseminated throughout the world. To be sure, artists sometimes write just for themselves and the members of their gang. And of course the gang instinct is there, and is sometimes expressed in a ritualized jargon. But this gang phenomenon, I think, is only a small part of the larger phenomenon of words. It touches not at all on the felt need for public verbal expression as the dominant background setting for one's work.

Rosenberg's suggestion about professionalization, despite its simplicity and aptness as a commentary on the current art scene, does not seem adequate as an explanation of art as work-needing-words. It is as though the A.M.A., as part of a public education campaign, issued a series of pamphlets on cancer that were written entirely in medical Latin. Suppose, then, that a knowledgeable commentator on the medical scene tried to explain this to us as follows. "Look, these doctors -- you know -- these guys are professionals. They have their own lingo." It won't do. The word-neediness of contemporary art is something more than the need of the neighborhood art gang for a secret password. We must look beyond the phenomenon of professionalization in the arts to account for it.

In the article by Patick Heron, the one with the pungent reminder that painting comes before criticism, there is another suggestion for the word-neediness of the current art scene. This second suggestion is also

connected with significant features of twentieth century culture. Heron focuses the idea that much of our cultural life is dominated by the media. He writes,

"Television, films, glossy reproductions can circle the globe in a trice -- arriving on the other side of the world months and even years before those cumbersome objects, the painted canvases on their stretchers, can catch up with the distorted image of themselves which 'the media' have distributed in advance."⁶

What Heron perceives is what I would describe as a rather nasty, two stage acculturation process. The first stage we are presented with a reproduction of the work of art, on film or television, or in a picture catalogue or book. This accustoms us, right off, to experiencing the work of art itself through the medium of something else -- the reproduction. This stage is naturally and appropriately accompanied by descriptions in words of the reproduction and, perhaps, of how it compares with the original. In the second stage (as it were), the reproduction is removed and, habituated as we are to a surrounding medium for experiencing the work, we naturally look to the word descriptions themselves to help us. Thus, we come to rely on words and eventually, as in the stereotypical formula, to feel that the work *needs* the help of words.

Let me refer to this two-stage process as the word-addiction model. In this model the media play the role of dealers who first get us hooked and then, when we really feel that need for words, reap the profits.⁷ In this word addiction model, as in the previous suggestion about professionalization, I think we can recognize a significant truth about the arts in contemporary life. We are all over-exposed to mass media and the media themselves are over-laden with words. Moreover the reliance on words is a readily observable phenomenon. If you hesitate to acknowledge it in yourself, then just stand back from any exhibit and notice the reflex behaviour of the audience who almost invariably *first* read the posted text and only afterwards view the displayed work. Look about you during a concert and notice how many people in the audience are actually reaping the program notes while (one assumes) listening to the performance, and how many more anxiously check and re-check the program, I suppose, so as to confirm what they are hearing.⁸

The word-addiction model certainly addresses such phenomena and, moreover, goes some way to getting at the felt *need* for words. But it is

not, I think, adequate as an explanation. From the fact of a very widespread word addiction it does not follow that the process leading to the addiction is rooted in the media in the way that the model requires. For instance, one could not plausibly suggest that Kandinsky's need to surround his abstract paintings with words was a need derived from a media-induced habit of viewing reproductions-cum-text. For one thing, even if Kandinsky had such a habit (which is unlikely, although as a law professor he may well have become addicted to words and, as a poet, he showed his love for them) we must wonder why the need for words was not expressed earlier. For nearly a decade prior to 1910 Kandinsky was a painter, experimenting with color, light and form in numerous quasi-representational paintings. But in this period there is no exercise of words, no expression of the need to set his paintings off with words. It is only with his flight from the object that Kandinsky falls prey to the word-need. The addiction model, for all its aptness as a comment on the influence of the media, seems insensitive to such nuances of word-neediness in the arts. Let me expand on this idea

I imagine myself in a gallery (or studio) in front of a large, painted canvass. The paint is thick, heavily laid on with brush and palette knife. The strokes overlap, fusing linework and brushwork, Contours, figures -- even backgrounds -- are vague. The colors dominate, especially the reds. The painting comes with a displayed text which reads.

Ambiguous space...the dislocated space in which the flux of modern life takes place. Tension then arises out of the difficulty in determining where the figure is placed as it emerges from its chaotic environment to assume its own identity.⁹

I can readily imagine looking closely at the painting, being puzzled by it, trying hard but not really knowing what to make of it, and feeling acutely the need for the written text to help me out (a need probably destined for frustration, in this instance). In this imaginery episode, I think we can see the idea of addiction. I *feel* the need for words. I *can't get on* without them. But now change the picture and imagine the scene differently. In this second vignette I enter a small gallery and my eye is immediately caught by a deeply vibrant orange rectangle, offcentered on a large canvass and set in a small parade of geometrical designs. I drink in the color and gradually feel myself fused with the plane of the painting, marching in tune with the surrounding forms. The experience of the painting leaves me full inside, and genuinely moved. After a while I think to glance at the title ("Rectangle, Number Three"), and I wonder a bit about the painter and what she was

trying to do. In this second story there *is* on felt need for words, nor has the artist bothered to express any.

These imaginary tales show us how the audience may experience the need for words selectively : sometimes acutely, sometimes not at all. They complement the earlier references to Kandinsky, which show the same selectivity of needs on the part of the artist. No genuine addiction to words would show up this way. For were we really addicted to taking art with words, then we could hardly take it straight, unless already fixed. Moreover the media do not seem to fit in any plausible way with the variations and selectivity of the need. The word-addiction model, therefore, can not adequately account for these important features of our wordneediness.

The explanations proffered so far attend to certain aspects of the phenomenon of words : a secret art-jargon fits nicely with professionalization, and the general felt need for words goes along with an addictive acculturation to the media. But other, and central, aspects of the phenomenon remain. In particular the public surrounding of works with words and the variability in the need for such word settings have not yet been properly addressed. I believe that getting at such factors requires that we move from external-based accounts (explanations rooted primarily in features of general culture) to accounts of a more internal sort, ones that draw their insight from art-specific conceptions.

The third account I want to consider here is just of this internalist variety. This account is rooted in reflections about the pace of change in this century, but more specifically about the pace of change in the arts. It directs our attention to features such as these : that new artistic abstractions are derived from old abstractions at a dizzying rate; that current thought moves away from the concept of the art-work as an object to the idea of the work as a process, or event or even an experience; the divide between art and reality that made room for the older mimetic conception of art has given way to a mere gap in which the arts often conceive of themselves as residing; that the art-world promotes innovation almost -- it seems -- for the sake of innovation.

The following bewildering array of contemporary works, assembled (for purposes of ridicule and chastisement) by Edward Cone, shows the results of such rapid change.

At the Venice Biennale of 1972 a "keynote" exhibit consisted of ten thousand hatching butterfly eggs in the Piazza San Marco. ... Another

exhibit at the same show included, in addition to a dancing couple (live) and some skeletons (dead), an apparent Mongoloid sitting in a chair. ... In the same year, Christo succeeded in stretching an orange curtain across Rifle Gap, Colorado. Since then he has covered the cave at Kings Beach, Rhode Island with 150,000 square feet of polypropylene fabric.

John Cage, the composer who is perhaps best known for his four minutes and thirty-three seconds of silence, has produced other music by recording random sounds in New York City. ... Douglas Huebler's "Location Piece No. 7" depends on the behavior of snow, which is allowed to melt and then to evaporate. ... some work of Jack Reynolds ... included, among other oddities, one box of live chicks and dead cornstalks, and another full of live mice with grain bags.

Some art is achieved through personal mutilation. Chris Burden, possibly the most accomplished member of this school, on one occasion had himself shot in the arm, on another he was crucified on a Volkswagen. Vito Acconci gave his own body a thorough biting.

Only last year the Tate Gallery raised a storm by the purchase of a work by Carl Andre. It consisted of 120 standard bricks, arranged, according to instructions, in a rectangle ten bricks long by six wide by two high. Cone's article is entitled "One Hundred Metronomes," after Ligeti's "Poeme Symphonique" in which one hundred metronomes are wound up and then set to tick away until they all run down.

One might well expect that the rapid change in the art-world that allows latitude for such a puzzling and complex variety of works would need to foster reliance on some relatively stable medium in which to interpret, explain and validate the new art; thus, one might come to expect the reliance on the medium of language itself. Jack Burnham has recourse to the writings of the anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss on just this theme. In "The Raw And The Cooked," Levi-Strauss writes,

Does not this dependence on a different idiom [ie., on words] betray a feeling of anxiety that, in the absence of a fairly apportioned code, complex messages may be inadequately received by those people to whom they have, after all, to be addressed? Once language has been *unhinged*, it inevitably tends to fall apart ...¹¹

Burnham endorses this view, remarking that words supply what the work itself lacks. And Burnham joins Levi-Strauss and Cone in wagging a

critical finger at modern art for having become unhinged from its legitimating arthistorical foundation. I do not wish to endorse this traditionalist criticism of modern art, but I do believe that the idea here involves a significant and widely held conception of art, and one especially relevant to the phenomena of word-neediness.

The idea is that a work of art contains a message written in a special code. One then tries to promote this idea along the following lines. The pace of change in the arts, one suggests, has been so rapid that virtually no-one can keep up with the newly invented codes. So words have to surround the work in order to do the job of decoding what used to be done by conventions learned from the history of art itself. Thus not only does art need the help of words but it needs that help in public, where it is shown, and selectively so. For, artforms closer to the historically understood codes will require words to direct the decoding less than do those artforms representing a sharper break with the already assimilated traditions. Thus the idea that a work of art contains a coded message seems to promise an account for just those aspects of the phenomenon of words that we identified as requiring explanation.

According to this idea of a code, when we are puzzled about a work we are puzzled about the coded message. We might be asking, "what does this work say; what is it about?" How are the surrounding words supposed to help here? I think one can best answer that by illustration.

Suppose we are examining two works, each consists of a closed glass tube mounted horizontally on an apparatus that keeps the tube in motion. Each tube is filled with a sticky blue liquid that wriggles and squirms as the tube moves. How are we to tell what these works say? Indeed how are we to tell whether these are two distinct works at all, rather than two examples of the same generic type--like two lithographs--or one work and one copy? One way might be this. Suppose each work comes with a written text attached to it. One text reads, "Blues got me down." The other text is a bit of dirty dialogue from the film "Deep Throat." In such a situation it seems clear enough that we really do need help to understand the works, and that the surrounding words actually help us. In some sense, it is perfectly obvious how the words help, although to articulate the "how" itself in words is not easy to do. Fortunately, I need not even try to do it, for once we have grasped the illustration we already have all there is to get,

What we have, in the example, is some understanding of the works, an understanding to which we have been led by the accompanying text. We might, for instance, now be inclined to say that one work makes a statement about feeling blue, whereas the other work says something about sex. (Given the text, of course, there are also other statements we might attribute to the work, other things for it to be about.) We might also say that now, having read the accompanying texts, we've got the message. So we can say that these works are different because one is about the blues, the other about sex. But I hope we would recognize in our inclination to talk this way (ie, in terms of messages, statements, codes, etc.) the utilization of a useful but limited metaphor. A moving glass tube filled with a blue viscous substance does not contain any coded message (unless, perhaps, a secret agent hid one there). It is a mute object and, literally, makes no statement whatsoever. Nor does it refer; it is not "about" anything at all (not even about "art itself", as some would have it). The idea that a work of art literally contains a coded message (presumably put there intentionally by the artist and to be decoded by the audience) is a mistaken idea.

It is a deep mistake, commonly made and widely influential. It colors and distorts our understanding of art. Whole interpretive repertoire's have been built in this mistaken way. Listen, for example, to John Berger on Magritte,

Magritte accepts and uses a certain language of painting. The language is over 500 years old ... It assumes that the truth is to be found in appearances ... It assumes continuity in time as also in space. It is a language which treats, most naturally, of *objects* ... It is capable of expressing spiritual experience ... I cannot trace here the transformation which this language underwent during five centuries ...

Magritte never questioned the aptness of this language for expressing what he had to say. Thus there is no obscurity in his art. Everything is plainly readable. .. (I use the word *readable* metaphorically : His language is visual, not literary, though being a language, it signifies something other than itself.)¹²

Despite his disclaimer, it is clear that Berger takes the metaphor literally, and so uses it throughout his interpretive writings. A recent pictorial introduction to the aesthetics of photography, described by The Sunday Times reviewer (quoted on the back cover) as "... the most ..

informative visual essay on the nature and concerns of photography to be seen in Britain for many a decade" is entitled, *Reading Photography*. The lead essay begins, "This show is an attempt to provide a basic working vocabulary for reading photographs," and the succeeding essays go on in detail about the vocabulary and grammar of a photograph.¹³ The same idea of reading a photograph is exploited in nearly every critical review.¹⁴ And even Susan Sontag,¹⁵ whose wittgensteinian heritage ought to have helped her avoid the temptation, describes a photograph as a quotation, and a book of photographs as a book of quotations (p. 71). In discussing the Godard and Gorin film, *A Letter to Jane*, Sontag tells us "The film is also a model lesson on how to read any photograph, how to decipher the un-innocent nature of a photograph's framing, angle and focus," (p. 108) Sontag seems to hesitate just a moment before entirely swallowing the secret coded message idea when she writes in an iffy way, "If photographs are messages, the message is both transparent and mysterious." But then she immediately takes the bait by quoting approvingly from Diane Arbus, "A photograph is a secret about a secret," (p. 111). Not only commentators, interpreters and critics, but the professional art historians as well have been absorbed with the language/message metaphor. It is, for example, the essential core around which Jack Burnham tries to build his whole structuralist history.¹⁶ And, finally, as good and perceptive a philosopher of art as Arthur Danto cannot pull himself away from the idea of art as a language, having semantic and representative functions, and being (semantically) "about" something (in the modern period, usually about art itself.)¹⁷

If ever there were a case of language becoming unhinged, having lost touch with its roots, it is here in the description of artworks as being written in a certain language, as containing a message, as requiring decoding, as making a statement, as being about this (or that). Useful metaphors, having to do with the syntax and semantics of language, have become detached from the contexts in which they function metaphorically and taken instead as literal insights about the very nature of art itself, the nuclei of interpretive, historical and philosophical theories of art and artworks. It is exactly as though at a concert one listener remarked of the music, "That was very moving," and a companion responded first by asking about the speed and direction of the motion, and then went on to offer a theory involving musical masses whose forces and mutual interactions gave rise to the resultant vectors of motion.

Indeed, the idea that a work of art contains a message to be decoded becomes especially forced and misleading if we apply it to music, and if we keep in mind the actual experience of listening to a piece of music.¹⁸ Do we get, or even try to get any message in listening to music? What, after all, does Bartok's *Concerto for Orchestra* say? How do we tell? How many bars are required for which part of the message? Is it true, what the concerto says? Is the truth (or falsity) relevant to the value of the music? Could Bartok have coded the message incorrectly? Would it improve the concerto if the code were improved? Etc. Of course, every metaphor can be stretched. And those still pulled by the metaphor of coded language could no doubt produce answers to even such silly questions. (Would there be any common basis for the answers? ¹⁹) But for the rest of us, I hope, here surely the resources of the metaphor come to end.

The metaphor of an artwork encapsulating a coded message leads to a mistaken conception of art. The mistake, as I have emphasized is an influential one and clearly the attraction of the metaphor, full blown, is powerful. Before we can get on with understanding the phenomenon of words in contemporary art, I think we must get at the source of the power. It comes, I think, from the most common ideas of art as a form of expression and communication. These ideas, in turn, derive from our belief that a work of art is something meaningful to be *understood*. The connections here are put as boldly as one could wish by John Berger, quoting Susan Sontag.

Meaning is the result of understanding functions. "And functioning takes place in time, ... Only that which narrates can make us understand."²⁰ These brief remarks suggest the following theory.²¹ To understand a work of art is to grasp its meaning (or meanings if more than one). But, since understanding is only brought about by a narrative, grasping the meaning of a work of art must be identified with getting the narrative told by the work. (Thus we arrive at the "reading the painting/photograph" idiom.) In turn, the narrative told by the work is what it expresses and, hopefully, communicates. This is the (coded) message. Thus, works of art express and communicate messages; these messages convey the meaning of the work, and understanding the work is just getting the message. It is this chain of connections, bound together by the view that only narratives lead to understanding, which is the source of the language metaphor. But not only is every link in this chain weak, the view that attaches understanding to narrative is a complete distortion of how understanding is achieved.

I do not want to take up the question of whether (or to what extent) works of art express and communicate. It will be sufficient to offer a suggestion and a reminder. The suggestion is that even to the extent to which a work does express or communicate there may be no object--no "thing"--that one can identify as what is expressed, or what is communicated. "That's an expressive work; it really speaks (communicates) to me." Such an assertion may well be like, "It moves me. It fascinates me. I like it." So I suggest.²³ The reminder is just to keep in mind that part of what the history of modern art calls into question is precisely whether art does (or can) serve the semantic functions of expression and communication. So the requirement that a work express or communicate a hidden message begs a central issue in contemporary art, as well as being insensitive to the nuances of the subject. When asked "If you cast a beer can, is that a comment?", Jasper Johns replied, sincerely and with genuine perplexity, "On what?"²³

I do want to address the idea that only narratives lead to understanding. This idea is at best only a partial truth even in its proper domain, that of language. For even there, to understand an assertion, comment or question need not depend on a *narrative* context. An exchange of greetings ("How are you?" "Fine, and you?") is an intelligible self-contained whole. Its intelligibility, of course, depends on the entire nexus of language use. But no special narrative or "message" makes for the mutual understanding in such an exchange. There are, to be sure, other kinds of cases. In some cases we fail to understand what is being said until a larger context is set out or an explanatory story is told. "The Absolute multiplies furiously" can be understood in a narrative where "The Absolute" is the name of a rabbit. Sometimes understanding in a work of art is somewhat like this. For example in the bottom right hand corner of one of Rauschenberg's earliest exhibited works ("White Painting With Numbers") there is a five-pointed red star. Calvin Tomkins tells the story of Rauschenberg's student life at the time of the painting and of how "he had just learned that art galleries used little red stars to indicate that a work has been sold."²⁴ This narrative certainly helps us understand the presence of the star. The presence of other elements in the painting might well be understood with the help of similar narratives. But what we call "understanding the painting" is not something to be achieved by understanding the presence of all these different parts. It is, rather, more like understanding a greeting, or a smile, or an embrace. It is closer to that special sympathy between people that we call "understanding at first sight" than it is to the work done by a telegrapher

in decoding a message. When we come to understand a work of art we enter into a significant and meaningful relationship with the work. The work, we can say, becomes significant or meaningful for us. But such a relationship need not, and generally does not involve the transmission of any message (or the like). The central mistake is the crude idea that to be significant is to signify something, that to be meaningful is (literally) to possess as an object (like a message) some thing which is a "maning".²⁵

To understand a work of art (in the sense of "understanding" that concerns us here) is just *to be in touch with the work*. It is as simple as simple as that, and involves no messages coded or otherwise. It is also as complicated as that, involving the idea of a significant integration of the work into one's life. The idea of *being in touch with*, suggests that the work affects us and in a causal way -- like being pulled or pushed, in general, being moved. The determinants of that causal interaction, (the determinants, that is, of how one experiences the work) are exceedingly complex. But this much is clear enough, they involve contextual features concerning the properties of the work, its physical setting and its cultural (historical, intellectual, etc.) surroundings. They also involve corresponding contextual features concerning us, the audience. Such a causal interaction mediated by contextual features at both the cause (work) end and the effect (audience) end is what understanding (when it occurs) amounts to. This is how a work speaks to us and expresses itself. This is what is to grasp the meaning of a work. It is to be on the "effect" end of such a causa relationship, to be touched by the work.

If we replace the mistaken picture of an encoded message by the idea of a contextually mediated causal connection, then I think we are finally in a position to understand the felt need for word-settings throughout the development of art in the modern era. Go back to my simple illustration of the moving liquid-filled tubes. What the words do is to provide a context to connect the viewer to the work. They address the question, "How am I to respond to what is in front of me?" They do not enable the work to convey any special message, nor do they determine any special response on our part. But, by narrowing down the plethora of possible modes of response, they provide just enough guidance for us to have an opportunity to experience the work as significant. The text directs us, for example, to think of sex (in one case) or to attend to moods (in the other) and the plus the details of the work, plus the setting, does the job. The words, to put it somewhat pretentiously, make it possible for us to understand the works.²⁶

Thus it is not that the pace of change in the modern period has altered the codes by which we decipher the messages of modern art. It is, rather, that the opening up of art along the lines of "anything goes" has utterly removed the traditional guidelines for how to interact significantly with a work. The reliable contextual features of artistic production, of presentation and of audience participation, contexts that had been set by traditional practices, have been winnowed down to a vanishing point. This has left a gap: the need for new contexts rich enough to facilitate connections between the work and the audience. As in the operation of a conservation law in physics, something had to flow in to fill the gap. We know the result, a flood of words.

I think we can see how nicely this explanation fits the phenomena if we attend to the character of the words that flow around the artistic works. Recalling her relationship with Robert Rauschenberg, Rachel Rosenthal reports,

And when he'd talk about his work example at the Egan Gallery during his show there, it had such conviction and strength and total involvement. He was such a master of theater! I saw him open people's eyes to his work with words I knew they didn't understand.²⁷

With words I knew they didn't understand! Of course, the use of words that are not understood, the descriptions and commentary on art in a language that often crosses the limits of intelligibility is the most conspicuous feature (and to some the most disturbing one) of the world of art-words. But why not? If, as I have suggested, the words surrounding works of art are there to provide part of the context facilitating responses to the works, then it is not necessary that the words serve their usual, cognitive functions. They need not convey ideas, or codes, or even coherent patterns of thoughts. Moods, feelings, associations and the like will do. Attend to the nonsense notes that Duchamp produced to accompany his infamous "The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even." Duchamp speaks of the Bride as "a sort of automobile with quite feeble cylinders" having "desiregears" fuelled by "love-gasoline." He rattles on about "oscillating density", "emancipated metal", "timid power", "draft pistons", etc. This is language on holiday, creating word-music and theater, designed to help put us in touch with the work. Of course, I must quickly say that much of the wordiness of the current art scene seems to me to fail. Its pretensions create a cacaphony that actually interferes with our connecting to the work. The manufacturers

of this noise are to be criticized (and weeded out) on just these grounds : they hinder rather than help; their words close our eyes to art rather than open them. Nevertheless, the conception of the experience of art as a contextually mediated causal relationship between the work and the audience provides the basis, I think, for understanding the wordneediness of contemporary art, and the significant features of the sea of words that surround the works.

I began this essay by suggesting a possible contradiction between the stereotype of art as work-without-words and the current sense of art as work-needing-words. I think we can now see the obvious resolution; it is the causal conception according to which art is *work-needing-context*. In a period in which traditional contexts change only slowly, it is easy and natural not to notice the essential role of contextual features in our experience of art; thus the original stereotype. In a period of more rapid change, the reliance on context becomes apparent. Modern art forces our attention to context. That is one of the great "discoveries" of our times. When the contexts are heavily laden with words, we get the second formula. But we must not be fooled by the use of words, for the role they play is not specifically cognitive so much as, more generally, connective. And this fact raises an interesting question and a fresh possibility. Why words ? Why not try to connect the work to the audience in non-verbal, more gestural, ways ? Here are new dimensions in which, I think, contemporary art is already moving.

Notes and References

•. The epigraph is taken from Harold Rosenberg; "Defining Art" in Gregory Battcock (ed.), *Minimal Art* (E.P. Dutton, New York, 1968) p. 306. The present essay grew out of a lecture in a series "The arts in a climate of change" organized by Helens S. Fine, sponsored by The Chicago Consortium of Colleges and The Museum of Contemporary Art, and held in the Chicago Film-makers and A.R.C. facilities during the spring of 1978. My deep thanks to Helene who not only encouraged my participation in the series but, over the years, helped tutor my understanding of contemporary art. Thanks too to Marty Hurtig whose enthusiasm and resources, as an artist and teacher, were an important source of stimulation. Thanks, finally, to Doug Stalker and to the many students whose lively response to the videotape of that talk have persuaded me to this present effort.

1. Almost any good study of the abstract movement will document this phenomenon of works surrounded by words, but usually by inadvertance; ie., without noticing that this feature of the movement itself needs to be understood. A good study, and a good example of this inadvertent documentation, is Dora Vallier, *Abstract Art*, trans. J.

Griffin, (The Orion Press, New York, 1970).

2. There is one curious exception. Writing of the surrealism of Rene Magritte Burnham notes, "Magritte's painting needs no commentary; also the artist's few statements are of little help." Notice the language of "needs". Jack Burnham, *The Structure of Art* (George Braziller, New York, 1971) p. 98.

3. Patrick Heron, "The Shape of Color", in Benard Smith (ed.) *Concerning Contemporary Art* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975) pp. 154-180. The quoted passages are on pp. 154-155.

4. Harold Rosenberg, *The Tradition of The New* (McGraw Hill Book Company, New York, 1965, p. 43.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64.

6. Heron, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

7. Remember the refrain from Tom Lehrer's song "The Old Dope Peddler" ? "He gives the kids free samples/because he knows full well/that today's young innocent faces/will be tomorrow's clientele."

8 Even contemporary theater is no exception to the rule of the program notes. Several years ago I attended the London premiere of two newly

commissioned one - act plays by Harold Pinter. The program gave the titles, in order to performance, with a brief account of the content of each play. During the interval between plays I did some extra hard listening to comments from the audience. As expected, the audience reaction and appreciation, as I overheard it, was largely in the terms set by the program description of the first play. No-one I listened to had noticed, however, that the play just performed was not the one described as first in the notes. Without announcement, the order of performances had been reversed!

9. Unfortunately, this is no parody but an actual commentary by Barbara Rose on Dekooning's "Woman and Bicycle", quoted approvingly in Burnham, *op. cit.*, p. 105. One might note how Rose's words could fit my imaginary painting, as well (?) as the entirely different Dekooning, and recall my earlier warning about the A.M.A. trying to explain cancer by means of a text written in Latin. Here too the difficult is "explained" by the unintelligible.

10. Edward T. Cone, "One Hundred Metronomes", *The American Scholar* 46 (1977) p. 445.

11. Burnham, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

12. John Berger, *About Looking* (Pantheon Books, New York, 1980) p. 155.

13. Jonathan Bayer, *Reading Photographs* (Pantheon Books, New York, 1977).

14. A good example is Rosalind Kraus's essay on the photographs of Brassai: "Nightwalkers", *Art Journal* (Spring, 1981) 33-38.

15. Susan Sontag, *On Photography* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux New York, 1977). The next few page references are to this book. I think that Sontag is a little more wary of the language/message metaphor than most. For she recognizes the utter variability in the "message". according to context. See, for example, her discussion of the Minamata photographs on p. 106. And she sees that something has gone wrong with the language metaphor when she demurs from valery's suggestion about photographs as descriptions, p. 45. But she does not use these insights to let herself out of the language trap.

16. Burnham, *op. cit.*

17. These ideas are developed and modified by Arthur Danto in *The Transfiguration of the Commonplace* (Cambridge, Harvard U. press, 1981) and in three important earlier articles: "The Artworld", *Journal of Philosophy* LXI (1964) 571-584; Artworks and Real Things", *Theoria* XXXIX (1973) 1-17, and "The Transfiguration of the Commonplace",

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism XXXIII (1974) 139-148. (The first two articles are reprinted in G. Dickie and R. Sclanfani (eds.), *Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology* (St. Martins Press, New York, 1977.)) George Dickie's *The Art Circle* (Haren Pub, New York, 1984) contains a good discussion and critique of Danto's views (in Chapter Two). Appropriately, Dickie is puzzled about Danto's language thesis. (My thanks to George for letting me have a draft copy of the book manuscript). Richard Wollheim, *Art And Its Objects* (Penguin Books Ltd, Harmondsworth, England, 1970) also pursues the analogy between art and language (in Secs. 45-58). But for Wollheim the interest is in seeing both art and language as, in Wittgenstein's sense, forms of life. Thus Wollheim explicitly (Sec. 56) rejects the analogy between art and a code, the idea that a work of art contains a message to be decoded (or "read"). Moreover he is sensitive to important limitations (Secs. 57 and 58) on the entire language analogy.

18. It is appropriate to come to see the limitations of the language metaphor in terms of musical experience. For the desire to produce an experience, visually similar to the experience of music is one of the important springboards of the

modern visual arts. See, for example, Vallier (*op. cit.*, p. 52) on Kandinsky, and recall the final "boogie-woogie" paintings of Mondrian.

19. Compare even the basic "vocabulary" of a photograph according to Sontag, *op. cit.*, (framing, angle, focus) with that of the experts assembled by Bayer, *op. cit.*, (time symbol, organization, space, light). The appropriate response seems to be that of Wittgenstein to the idea of a private code. "One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can't talk about 'right'." L. Wittgenstein *Philosophical Investigations* trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Macmillan Co., New York, 1953), par. 258, p. 92c.

20. John Berger, *op. cit.*, p. 51. The passage from Sontag is supposed to be from her *op. cit.*, but Berger does not give a page reference and, so far, I have been unable to find the passage there.

21. If one emphasized more the concept of function (or use), then one could perhaps build a different theory. Since the one I suggest is certainly wrong, perhaps Berger and Sontag would plead that it is this other theory they actually had in mind. Perhaps so.

22. In this context Wollheim, *loc. cit.*, talks about intransitive verbs. I think it is much the same idea.

23. Jasper Johns, Interview with G.R. Swenson in John Russell and Suzi Gablik (eds.) *Pop Art Redefined* (Praeger, New York, 1969), p. 83. Johns goes on to comment about how the public uses of a work defines its meaning in a way essentially out of the control of the artist. Specifically with reference to his beer cans, (ale, actually) his only intention was to see whether a story he had heard, in which De Kooning remarked that his dealer (Leo Castelli) could sell anything, even two beer cans, was correct. It was. The cans were sold for \$900, and then resold for \$90,000.

24. Calvin Tomkins, *Off The Wall* (Penguin Books, New York, 1981) p. 53.

25. My thanks to Micky Forbes for putting me onto the grammar of "signify/significant" here and, more generally, for her responsive ears.

26. I do not want to place too much emphasis on the use of words in this illustration. For clearly other ways of enriching the setting of the work might achieve similar effects. For instance, a silent film-snippet from "Deep Throat" in the one case, or a bit of accompanying blues music in the other.

27. Quoted in Calvin Tomkins, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

Types of Interpretation and the Work of Art

RUTH LORAND

Types of Interpretation and The Work of Art

Most discussions on interpretation of art tend to deal either with normative issues, namely, the criteria of the right or preferred method of interpretation¹, or with the general logic of interpretation namely, whether it has a status of a statement, or of an expression of impression or of a prescription of how to approach the work². There is yet another important question concerning the role of interpretation in the total experience of art and the range of views extend from that of Croce³, that art is not to be interpreted, but directly apprehended, to that of Danto who sees art essentially as an object that has to be interpreted⁴.

In this paper I will not deal with any of these important questions, but rather with a more modest one : what types of interpretation there are and how each of them relates to art.

The preoccupation with the more general questions left only meager attention to interpretative typology. One might get the impression that all interpretative activities share exactly the same problems, and that they are all relevant to art in the same way. My view is that although there are common features to all interpretative activities, which justifies putting them within the same category, there are significant differences among the various types which are worth considering. The understanding of interpretative activity cannot be complete, I believe, without such a typology. It would enable one to distinguish between problems that are pertinent to interpretation in general and problems that pertain to a certain type only.

In a short paper, Hampshire examines several uses of the word interpretation, focusing mainly on the different circumstances and various fields to which the word is applied⁵. Hampshire distinguishes among six uses of "interpretation", and claims that only two of them are relevant to art interpretation. I claim that four of those six types presented by Hampshire,

are actually of the same logical structure, and that this logical structure is relevant and applicable to art just as it is applicable to other fields Hampshire described.

In her recent book *On Interpretation*⁶, Annette Barnes mentions this issue, but avoids presenting a clear typology. She approaches the subject by describing several questions whose answers require interpretation⁷. These questions follow a similar line of thinking found in Hampshire's article, and I will refer to both while presenting my typology. The point they share, which I agree with, is that there are various activities concerning interpretation. It does not necessarily follow, however, that different activities differ in their logical structures.

As I do not discuss the general nature⁸ of interpretation here, but only my understanding of that nature, I will point out briefly that I take interpretations to be about the non-obvious features of the interpreted object⁸, and that I see the possibility of alternative interpretations as essential to this activity⁹.

I distinguish among five types, but I cannot and do not claim this to be the definitive typology or the only possible one. This is a suggestion that may need further development beyond this presentation. The titles I have given them may also need improvement.

1. *Interpretation of Signs*

Any interpretation of the following form, even if in different fields, is a "sign interpretation". When X, which is present is a sign of, or indicates, or hints at, or represents or refers to, or is a symptom of Y, when Y is not present, then X is interpreted as a sign of Y. The presence of X in the interpreter's direct experience, indicates the presence of Y either in a remote time or place or simultaneously with X, either as a physical or psychological or intentional entity (which does not occur in time or space). X and Y are, in such a case, separate entities which can be apprehended or experienced separately and independently of each other, and are connected in various ways: by causality, conventions, or by a theory which suggests some inner relations (not obvious in experience), and so on.

Let us examine a few cases which Hampshire presents as distinct types, while according to my typology they belong to the same category:

1. Hampshire's first type of interpretation is interpretation of symptoms¹⁰. A political event is interpreted as a symptom of intentions or future events,

and the same is the status of clouds as a sign of rain. Clouds and rain are separate entities, we may apprehend them and experience them separately, they are connected by causality, or if one prefers a more careful way of putting it, by constant and often repeated connection in experience. From the presence of clouds we conclude the (future) presence of rain, just as from the presence of a certain political event the historian concludes possible further developments (not yet present), or intentions (hidden).

2. Interpretation of ulterior motives¹¹. This, in my view, is not a different type from that of interpreting symptoms. It is the actual and revealed (present) behavior which is interpreted as indicating or hinting at some hidden motive. The interpreter infers Y (the motive) from a given data X (the action). The relation between motives and actions are not different in their general logical structure from that of the relation between clouds and rain (omitting, of course, the intentional element).

3. Psychological interpretations of dreams or free associations¹². Here, again, I fail to see a different logical structure from that underlying the interpretation of symptoms. Methods may be different, theories about the relations between the present interpreted data, and the non-present event suggested by the interpretation may vary (causality, resemblance, transference and so on), but the logical structure is basically the same: X (the dream) is interpreted as pointing at, hinting or indicating Y (the hidden feelings).

4. Interpreting oracles or horoscopes¹³ is also like interpreting signs and symptoms, though methods may vary. It is once more the basic structure of one present object which is interpreted as hinting toward another (non-present). The interpreted object and its interpretation exist separately and can be apprehended separately, even if they depend on each other for their actual existence. I may understand and experience my fortune without even knowing about the signs which indicated it (such as horoscope, prophecies and so on), and vice versa. Different theories in different fields suggest various links among events or phenomena, and the theory chosen by the interpreter does not change its basic logical structure.

Signs may be divided into two kinds¹⁴:

a. *Conventional signs*¹⁵ such as words, road signs, or flags which are usually agreed upon through conventional procedures, and need no interpretation: the sign and its conventional meaning are both known and given to all members of the same society; only an outsider needs explanations. Conventional signs usually do not allow alternative meanings. A convention

which has different meanings would make a useless convention. Road signs, for instance, would be useless if they had alternative meanings. Even a deconstructionist would not want to be run down by another deconstructionist driver who insisted on interpreting road signs in his own way. In such a case there is no room for interpretation. The meaning of conventional signs can be *described* and *learned*, but not *interpreted*. Of course, a convention can be ignored and one can insist on interpreting a road sign in an idiosyncratic way, but to do so is not interpret the conventional sign itself but to give a new meaning (create a new convention) to the signifier. By ignoring the conventional meaning of the word "right" and treating it as a sign for "left", one is not interpreting the English word "right", but creates a private language. Unfamiliar conventions need *decoding*, not interpreting, because as such they are supposed to have one correct meaning only.

b. *Natural signs*

These are natural events which are interpreted as indicating other no-present natural events. These are not real signs since they are not conventional and not intended to function as signs (unless one believes that natural phenomena are signs of God's intention, as it is said about the rainbow), but are interpreted as if they were signs, by analogy with conventional signs.

Physiological symptoms are interpreted as signs of health or illness, (as if nature hints and signals its hidden intentions): the color of the fruit indicates ripeness, cloudy sky is a sign of rain, and the rainbow is a sign that there will not be another deluge. As I have argued, when we believe an event to have one meaning only, we do not interpret it but describe it, and in many cases it does seem that natural events have more than one possible meaning. A dream, for instance, may be interpreted as sign of future events (the way Joseph interpreted Pharaoh's dreams,) and it may be interpreted as a sign of unconscious wishes (the way dreams are interpreted in psychoanalysis). Are we interpreting nature or describing it? The answer depends on the epistemological theory adopted rather than on the nature of interpretation. Whoever believes that there is only one right theory about nature must claim that we describe nature, and our description is either right or wrong. But if more than one theory is possible, then nature is interpreted by each of them.

Between conventional signs with fixed meanings and natural signs whose interpretation, may be proven right or wrong (and as such are more

likely considered discovered or decoded than interpreted, there are signs which were originally conventional but became "natural-like" through the interference of natural processes (social, psychological, historical, and so). Such signs are the most typical candidates for sign interpretation.

Words and other conventional symbols which, through natural procedures in everyday use developed a range of possible meanings in different contexts, are interpreted rather than just decoded. The specific meaning of a word often depends on its context and on its integration with other words. This type of interpretation occurs very often in art. Symbols of different kinds are often used in art, but even those which have fixed meanings in their daily use, may gain new meanings in the context of a work of art. Road signs in a painting, for instance, can be interpreted differently than in their regular context. A word in a poem is interpreted not just by decoding its conventional meaning (as explained in the dictionary), but by considering the whole context and that word's function in that special context.

The same is true for all kinds of cultural symbols, which tend to be flexible and develop more than one definite meaning. There are also private symbols of certain artists which are learned directly from their works, or indirectly from other sources. These symbols may occur in works of art, but their interpretations do not form a special kind of interpretation which is relevant to art only, and their logic is the same as any interpretation of signs, although methods may differ.

There is another kind of sign interpretation in art, when we interpret one element in the work as a sign for another within the work, and the meaning they acquire does not originate in non-artistic conventions, but in the context of the work itself. A description of a cloudy day, for instance, may be interpreted as a sign of the characters mood, although in everyday life, we would not say that the clouds signify mood (they may influence it, but not hint it).

Interpreting various components of a work as signs does not necessarily mean that a work of art as a whole is a sign or symbol of something beyond it.¹⁶ I cannot go deeper into this matter in this context, only like to suggest a distinction between two lines of interpretation: one which interprets elements in the work as signs, and one which interprets the whole work as a sign. From a psychological point of view, for instance, a work of art may be interpreted like dreams, as a sign of hidden feelings. The two lines are independent, and not contradictory, but the decision whether the

second is relevant to art (as art), depends on what we believe to be the essence of art.

2. *Substitutional interpretation*

Y is a substitutional interpretation of X when Y is suggested as a proper substitute for X for a certain function. In other words, X fulfills a certain function for which Y is interpreted as satisfactory replacement. Such an interpretation involves claims about the relevant function (s) of the interpreted object, and about the qualities of its substitute. But these claims are not necessarily verbal: they are implied in the mere *action* choosing the substitute. By replacing one object with another, one implies that the replacement functions as a suitable substitute for the original and that the original is thus interpreted by its substitute. That implied claim may be challenged either verbally or by an alternative action of replacement.

In the case of substitutional interpretation, X does not lead or hint toward Y, but they are linked by the similarity of the function they are supposed to fulfill. In those cases where the substitute is obvious, we do not actually interpret, but automatically switch from one object to another, as it is in simple cases of translations, e. g. "translation" (English) - "übersetzen" (German).

There are, of course, cases when the translation is not obvious or when we see alternative possibilities from which we have to choose. Our choice does not have to be better than the original object, nor is it meant to be identical to it, but it is believed to be a better alternative. It is meant to *fulfill the same functions* as the original, namely, be *equivalent* to it.

This kind of interpretation often occurs in more complex instances of translations. The classical case for substitutional interpretation is that in which the original has more than one simple defined function, and the substitute has to fulfill a complex of functions. Translations of literature, and poetry in particular, are typical substitutional interpretations.

In poetry, where very often one cannot separate the specific words and their functions in the poem, translation is not an automatic act, it is not just the outcome of a set of linguistic rules (and maybe most sensitive translations are not), but rather the act of finding the right equivalent which will function in a way similar to the original. The words in the poem function as sounds, symbols, and they create a certain rhythm, have certain connotations and so on. It is not easy to find the right substitute in a

different language. Sometimes, the translator/interpreter has to compromise and decide which function of the whole complex is more essential to the poem and which function may be given up (because she cannot find the ideal substitute), and choose the substitute accordingly. Such a decision may be challenged by alternative interpretations (other substitutes) for one of two main reasons : it is either a disagreement about what the essential functions are, or if those are agreed upon, it may be a disagreement about the offered substitute and its ability to fulfill those functions.

Substitutional interpretation can be found in other fields besides translation which are not considered typical cases of interpretation. A description, for example, may supply information only but it may also serve as a substitute for immediate experience. A journalist may describe an event in order to create a substitute for the reader who could not attend it himself, trying to make him feel as if he were there, but he may also describe an event just for the sake of information. The description will be evaluated differently in each case and that will indicate an understanding of different functions : an informative description is expected to be precise and clear; an experience - substitute has to create a certain atmosphere, effect the reader's feelings and so on. A photo, too, may function as a substitute when one looks at the photo of her love ones in their absence, and as source of information when one looks at the photo in order to get an idea about what that person in the photo looks like. Choosing a photo for a certain function also involves interpretation when it is not obvious which photo is the best substitute.

Representations are also substitutes. X represents Y means, not that X resembles Y (at least, not necessarily,¹⁷ but that X fulfills a certain function of Y, e. g. a lawyer represents his client in court not by being identical or similar or even by believing the same facts, but by taking his case and pleading for him, in his stead. Resemblance becomes one function which is sometimes required, but not always. A word represents an object (through convention) because it functions as if one pointed by finger toward the object. If there is only one word to point to a certain object, no interpretation is needed, but if there are more, interpretation is involved in most cases.

Substitutional interpretation may be relevant to art interpretation in two different way :

1. Just as a work of art may have signs and symbols among its components it may also have substitutes of reality among its elements. For

instance, a description of a place or of a historical event in a novel, is not in most cases, merely informative but functions as substitutional interpretation within the work : they are meant to give the reader a feeling as if she experienced it directly, they arise feelings as if they were the "real" things and so on, and as such their function is compared with the function of the real things or events, and evaluated for their success as substitutes, sometimes compared to other works in which a similar substitution occurs. Of course, it is in itself a matter of interpretation, whether a certain description should be evaluated for its function as substitute or for any other quality (not every description is considered a substitute of the described object).

In the game of "make-believe"¹⁸ in which art is so often involved, substitutes play an important role. Substitutes in art are means of creating illusions of real life, and these illusions function within the work and integrate with other non-illusionary components.

Paintings use different technique in order to create a "substitute" for the original model (not every painting, of course), but this does not mean that all the components of such a painting are illusionary or that the main function of the painting as a whole is to create an illusion. Interpreters suggest different functions of such illusions in art and evaluate them as better or worse for their functions, such an interpretation involves beliefs and knowledge about the represented reality, without which the estimation of its substitutes is impossible.

2. A work of art (as a whole) may be interpreted as a substitute of something in real life. There is an essential difference (at least theoretically) between art having substitutes as components within a work of art and the work (as a whole) being a substitute in itself. Since substitutional interpretation assumes that the substitute fulfills the same function as the thing interpreted, seeing a work of art as a substitute involves a general theory about the essential functions of art in our life. For instance, if art is believed to be a substitute for philosophy, then it is believed to fulfill the same function philosophy does; or if art is believed to have a therapeutic function, it may be understood as a substitute for psychological treatment; if art is a substitute of life, it means (or at least, that may be one of its meanings) that art creates experiences similar to real life.

The idea that art in general is an imitation or representation of the real world implies that art is some kind of substitute for the real world and

should be evaluated as such. But in order to defend this claim and make it sensible, one has to define the function of such a substitute and its logic ; why does the real world need substitutes ?¹⁹

3. *Classificatory interpretation*

When X is a general concept (law, pattern, principle), and Y is a particular case claimed to be an instance of X, than X is interpreted by Y and vice versa. This is the act of classification.²⁰ This kind of interpretation should be analyzed in two perspectives : a. from the general law to the particular instance; b. from the particular instance to the general law.

a. The claim that a case Y is a good or typical instance of a general idea X indicates an interpretation of X only when the claim can be challenged with alternatives. The law is interpreted in court by applying it to particular cases, and different judges in that act of application may sometimes offer different interpretations. But not every application of a rule is an interpretation of the rule. When the link between the general and the particular seems obvious, it would not be considered an interpretation, but when the link is not obvious we deal with interpretation.

A soldier who was trained to carry out certain orders is not necessarily interpreting them when carrying them out. When the order seems to have one possible application, the soldier obeys in the only way he was trained to, and reacts almost automatically. But when orders have a large range of possible applications, it is up to the individual soldier to interpret them. The fifth commandment to obey and respect one's parents, may have various applications and some cases may raise the question whether they are proper applications. Such an argument involves the different understandings of the rule, its spirit or implied intentions.

b. The same type of interpretation, but from the opposite perspective, occurs when we focus on the object and wonder whether it should be classified in one way or another (should avocado be classified as a vegetable or a fruit ?). The classification of an object implies a claim about what is essential about the object.

Both application and classification are common forms of interpreting works of art. The first is more typical to art theories when the focus is on the general pattern and instances are needed to interpret it, and the second expresses interest in particular works. But they are both ultimately two aspects of the same interpretative activity, namely, the effort to find the link between the general and the particular.

Every work of art may be interpreted through classification, but that does not necessarily mean that the essence of a work of art is exhausted by its classification. The pattern by which a certain work of art is classified may be considered as one of its components which interrelates and integrates with other components and it should be considered in order to apprehend the work as a whole. Aristotelians may argue that classification reveals the essence of the work, just as it reveals the essence of objects in nature. Croce would not agree, of course.

4. *Analytical interpretation*

When X is an object and Y is the set of its separate components, then Y is the analytical interpretation of X. The purpose of breaking X into separate elements is usually to show how it is built, what it is made of, what its structure is, and when it comes to a work of art, it also involves the effort to point at its uniqueness, includes not only claims about what X's components are, but also what kind of relations they have among them. Any object can be analyzed in more than one way. Its analysis is a claim about the object's structure, affected by differences of beliefs, methods, and attitudes.

I believe that to interpret an object through analysis means not only discover its components, but to make a statement about their role in the complete structure of the object. Some components are more central or essential to the whole than others, and some may be redundant or marginal, and so on.

The breaking of the whole into elements does not form a complete different entity : the separation of elements causes the disappearance of the whole, and for that reason, there are qualities of the whole that cannot be apprehended through analysis (Croce and Bergson would claim those qualities to be more essential to the object).

This type of interpretation always involves some of the other types, because any separation of the components involves not only an analysis of the whole, but also claims about the nature of the components (as signs, substitutes, or applications). In an analytical interpretation of a work of art, for example, the classification of that work reveals a pattern which can be considered as one of its elements (being a tragedy, for instance), and the qualities revealed by a certain classification may have various relations with others such as its style or its subject matter.

When interpreting a work of art, analysis is very often the leading practice, while other types of interpretations are subordinated to it. But since the elements of a work are not defined by one universally accepted method, and since the function of art is not agreed upon, its analysis cannot but be different from that of a frog or a chemical molecule.

Analytical interpretations are influenced by general theories about the role of art or its essence, its social historical and other links. Therefore it is obvious one can "dismember" a work into its elements in more than one way: a psychological point of view (where we focus on motivations and feelings); a philosophical point of view (when we focus on ideas); social point of view (when we focus on the reflections of society in the work), and so on.

5. *Complementary Interpretation*

When X is treated as raw material, and Y is the final product made of it, than Y interprets X as having a certain potential which is revealed through its procession. This type of interpretation is the opposite of analysis. It creates a whole out of raw materials while analysis, divides the whole into separate components. The interpreter shows what can be done with some given raw materials, what is hidden in them, and how those hidden potentials are to be actualized. Such a claim is not necessarily verbal: by presenting the final product, the interpreter implies his interpretative claim.

While in the previous types of interpretation, the interpreted object and its interpretation are two separate entities, in this type, the interpreted object (the raw materials) are included in the final product, namely, the interpretation itself. The previous four types interpret different aspects and elements of the work of art, complementary interpretation is actually the creation of a work of art. The artists interpret his raw materials (taken from various sources) and his final product, the work of art, is an interpretation of those raw material.

Hampshire's sixth type belongs to this category: "An actor interprets a role or part. A pianist or violinist interprets the piece of music he plays."²¹ The actor or pianist take an object (the written play, the score) and do something *with* it. They present some new potentials hidden in what are the raw materials, in this case - the original work. Different actors may do different things with the same text and present different final products.

All kinds of objects may serve as raw materials: words, situations, colors, sounds, motions, dreams, ideas, natural materials such as stone,

wood or metals, cultural objects and symbols, previous works of art, scientific knowledge, and so on. Cooking, for instance, is an act in which raw materials are processed and the final product exhibits a certain possibility (a hidden potential) of the raw materials. But not every act of cooking is an interpretation. Most people use recipes, and therefore they do not reveal anything unknown about the materials used they do not interpret, but follow a previous interpretation. When a recipe is followed, cooking is more like carrying out orders or actualizing a pattern when only one possibility exists. Cooking may count as interpreting when a new recipe is invented by which new potentials of the raw materials are revealed.

Almost everyone can learn to play the piano and perform a piece of music according to what he has learned. Such a performance is analogical to cooking according to recipes. To interpret a piece of music, to reveal new potential in it by performing it in an original way, takes more than just the acquired knowledge of reading notes and operating an instrument. The performance of an interpreter is evaluated not for accuracy, but rather for the new potential it reveals, and the way that potential is developed. Such a performance interprets the original score by regarding it as raw material and using it to make something new out of it. Alternative performances may be compared and evaluated as better or worse interpretations of the original score.

Complementary interpretation is a creation of a work of art itself. Not only the performer is interpreting, but the composer of the original work which is being performed also interprets his raw materials, those materials of which the work of art consists. The artist takes those raw materials in which he recognizes some potentials (sounds, rhythm, colors, shapes, words, ideas) and through processing them he reveals new potentials which are actualized in the final product, and the worth of his work is evaluated accordingly: were those potentials really hidden in those materials or did the artist fail to sense the right or important potential of the materials he has chosen (is he really playing Beethoven, or is his performance totally strange to the original work)? Did he succeed in actualizing those potentials (the performer may have revealed some "right" hidden potentials, but did he or did he not succeed in creating a complete whole)?

Not only the musician or the actor interprets works of art, but also an author who is using parts or structures or situations of previous literature. Stories from the Bible are often interpreted into novels, poetry or drama. A painter interprets his model, a sculptor interprets the stone or wood his

work is made of, as well as the model and the idea behind it. Two sculptors working on the same model and with similar materials are likely to interpret them differently and present two different works of art.

This is the main difference between the interpretation offered by an art critic and the interpretation offered by the musician, the actor or the singer. The performer of a play or a piece of music interprets it by creating a new work of art, while the critic classifies, analyses or interprets symbols, but does not create a new work by his act of interpretation. The interpretation offered by the critic serves to better the understanding of the interpreted work, but the complementary interpretation of an actor or a musician creates a new work. This new object is also to be interpreted by critics, and it has an artistic value of its own which is not derived from the value of the original interpreted work. The critics work exists as a separate entity different from the interpreted work; the musicians interpretation does not exist apart from the original score he is interpreting (nor does an actor's interpretation or a singer's). The complementary interpretation includes the original interpreted materials, and when I listen to a pianist playing Beethoven's Ninth Symphony, I listen at the same time to Beethoven's original work.

To sum it up, I would say, that the critic says something *about* the work of art (interprets signs and substitutes, analyses and classifies), while the performer (the artist) does something *with* the work of art. But this sharp distinction is theoretical only, since in actual experience these activities are not so simply differentiated: criticism at its best at least, has certain artistic qualities as well; it is not only "about" art but it also does something new and creative *with* art.

The five types of interpretation offered here, present theoretical distinctions which may not be found in actual experience in their pure forms. They should be considered observations of elements in any actual activity of interpretation, and as such, they present means to deal with actual interpretations and not a final and complete description of it.

References

1. Debates on the relevance of artistic intention, for instance, occupied many of the philosophical discussions of interpretation. Among the most famous recent debates is that between E. D. Hirsch and M. Beardsley.
2. R. Schusterman described and summarized the main views on this issue in "The Logic of Interpretation", *Philosophical Quarterly*, 28 (1978), 310-324.
3. Since art is defined by Croce as intuition, many activities which are typical of art interpretation (and are presented later on in this paper) are irrelevant to the apprehension and appreciation of a work of art : clasifiction, analysis, and translations. See in *Aesthetic*, trans. D. Ainslie The Noonday Press, New York, pp. 22-60
4. A. Danto claims that "the moment something is considered an artwork, it becomes subject to an interpretation" "Artwork and Real Things" *Art and Philosophy*, ed. W. E. Kennick, St. Martins Press, New York, 1979, p. 108.
5. S. Hampshire, "Types of Interpretation", in Kennick (ibid), 200-205
6. Annete Barnes, *On Interpretation*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford and New York, 1988.
7. Barnes, ibid, pp. 158-166
8. Here I follow Barnes's line that one does not interpret the obvious. ibid. pp. 8-9
9. By that I follow J. Margolis's point of view, that an interpretation can be plausible but not proven true, and therefore allow alternatives. See in *Art and Philosophy*, Atlantic Highlands, 1980. Hampshire holds a similar view : 'True interpretation' is an unusual form" (ibid, p. 205).
10. Hampshire, ibid, p. 201
11. Hampshire, ibid, p. 201
12. Hampshire, ibid pp. 201-202
13. Hampshire, ibid, p. 203
14. Saussure distinguishes among : icon, index, and sign. Icon involves resemblance, index involves causal relations and sign is conventional. My distinction (for my purposes) is a little different : I include icons in signs, because even resemblance functions as sign only by convention (not every case of resemblance is a sign); and indecxes are named here natural signs.
15. I do not go into the question of how conventions are made, or what are the interrelations between a signifier and its signified.
16. A theory such as S. Langer's is not a necessary conclusion if one

accepts the relevance of symbol interpretation to art. The acceptance of Goodman's theory, for instance, means the acceptance of art "made" of symbols, but the idea that the work as a whole symbolizes or signifies anything beyond itself is not a necessary conclusion,

17. Goodman, I believe was right about disconnecting representations from resemblance, but it does not necessarily mean that anything may represent anything. There is a certain function (a different one in each case), which has to be fulfilled,

18. The "make believe" aspect of art is presented in details by Kendall L. Walton in his recent book *Mimesis as Make-Believe*, Harvard University Press, 1993.

19. As Goodman quotes : "Art is not a copy of the real world. One of the damn things is enough," *Languages of Art*, Hackett Publishing Company Inc., Indianapolis, Cambridge, 1976, 1976, p. 3

20. Barnes implies, that to interpret is basically to classify. (ibid, pp. 7-8 . I do not agree. Classification is only one form of interpretation.

21. The critic's work and the performer's are sometimes compared and classified as if they belong to the same category. See for instance, Margaret McDonald, "Some Distinct Features of Arguments Used in Criticism of Art", in *Aesthetics and Language* ed. W. Elton, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1976, pp.114-130.

Sociological Norms and the Heroic Epic : A Comparative Note

ROGER W. ROULAND

It is generally assumed that aside from its artistic role, one of the primary functions of the epic poem is to justify the culture implicitly addressed in the epic, with *addressed* being a key word in understanding the breadth of this justificative function. In three heroic epics, *Gilgamesh*, *Beowulf*, and *The Odyssey*, the culture being justified includes the contemporary audience hearing the epic; and as such, this audience holds keys to understanding certain authorial motivations and underlying meanings. This relationship between audience and epic stems from the epic bard's relationship to a specific culture, from which the bard inherited his epic subject matter. As a result, the epic's subject matter represents an embodiment of that specific culture, designed to speak to or address a contemporary audience which shares a similar cultural heritage with characters in the epic. In other words, the bard's chosen tale is related through the epic and its characters so the audience can both learn and confirm what it already knows.

Beginning with the primary assumption of cultural justification, and assuming that the bard's intent in reciting the epic was, at least in part, didactic, this essay will consider how character behavior depicted in heroic epics can help illuminate sometimes subtle yet underlying meanings of the epic poem while reinforcing larger, more-overr themes. My examination of such character behavior tends to support the conclusion that heroic epics suggest exemplary but culturally-bound models of behavior to their contemporary audiences. This essay, therefore, will survey (1) the sociological factors the epic bard considered when creating the epic, (2) how the epic itself takes those factors and considerations into account, and (3) how the contemporary audience in selecting information specifically related to it is reminded of its culturally-bound roles and what is considered (at least by the bard and the culture he represents) exemplary behavior.

In comparing the societal hierarchy of the cultures in the three heroic epics in question, it is clear that each of the cultures involves lord-retainer relationship. In contrasting the same, it could be argued that *Gilgamesh* takes place in a pagan-warrior society; *Beowulf* in a Christian, military-oriented culture; and *The Odyssey* in a slightly-democratic but monarchical society. Nevertheless, despite these cultural differences, as well the periodic and geographic boundaries that separate the cultures and dates of authorship of the three poems, the epic bard in each case utilized similar sociological determinants in addressing his respective culture as subject matter and in ultimately addressing and speaking to the epic's contemporary audience. These behavior determinants could be said tagenerally fall within the categorical purview of genealogy (as a determinant of class), family or household position, age and sex. Given the epic function of cultural justification, it is assumed then that the epic bard was at least justifying the existence of such determinants of societal hierarchy.

In taking into account those sociological factors, it would be overly-simplistic to say that heroic epics themselves were created with the intention of simply preserving lord-retainer hierarchies and keeping retainers "down on the farm". For in each of the three epic poems, retainers are offered opportunities via exemplary loyalty or subservience, to climb the social ladder. At the same time, very few characters (rulers and gods included) escape the obligation to subservience without dire consequences. In other words, through cultural justification the epic does not simply attempt to sustain a static societal hierarchy per se; but rather, it attempts to reinforce a code of subservient behavior in the lower classes that nevertheless does not exclude opportunities for the truly exemplary to move up the social ladder, while reminding the ruling as well as the lower classes of their inherent cultural obligations to mastery and subservience, respectively.

Given the oral traditions the recitation of early heroic epics and the fact that bards wouldmost likely be employed by kings and others of significant wealth, it is assumed that when considering the epic, members of its contemporary audience would likely include those largely in the upper classes, those subservient to the upper classes, and those related by kinship or friendship to the first two groups. (It is of course further assumed that kings and the wealthy as "ring givers" would allow their retainers to hear the house poets; and additionally, that those of lower classes might also be privy to epic recitations at public festivals). That is to say, the sociological

composition of the characters in these epics was likely to be representative of the audience for which the epic bard implicitly intended his poem for : namely lords, retainers and those related to lords and retainers. For the remainder of this essay, then, I will examine and consider the behavior of types of principal characters found in our heroic epics--both in terms of epic characters and their potential audience counterparts--and what message the former group might hold for the latter.

In heroic epics the right to rule typically can be traced to a character's genealogy : heroes are usually conceived by royal parentage, conceived through god-mortal procreation, or created by a god. Other more obvious cultural factors -- including age and sex -- also come into play, given that heroes and rulers are generally males in the prime of life or slightly past their prime. But the epic poet makes it clear that kings have to earn their right to rule, as in the case of Beowulf. Though he was a prince of the Geats, he succeeds to the throne because of his legendary battle experience and because the rightful heir, in contrast, was "(un) capable of guarding the kingdom" (line 2371). Similarly, Odysseus and Gilgamesh, even as the former is the son of a king and the latter two - thirds divine, through their heroism and battle prowess earn and maintain their right to rule. All three epics, we see, stress the theme that heroes must *establish a name* as a prerequisite for earning and maintaining their kingdom; thus, this name - making characteristic also becomes a determinant for societal rank. The message here for the ruling class (while multiplistic) could certainly include a reminder that being born a prince does not guarantee that one will succeed to kingship, because earning and maintaining royal status is as important as being born into royalty.

And, as noted earlier, even after their ascendancy to thrones, heroes and those of royal birth cannot escape culturally bond obligations. Odysseus must make amends to Poseidon before he can find ultimate peace at home, Beowulf recognizes that he is a beneficiary of the Creator, and even Gilgamesh calls on the "heavenly Shamash" in order to receive assistance in conquering foes. Heroes and kings in heroic epics are also found to have an obligation of sorts to their retainers and underlings who act appropriately, as we see in the case of the king Hrothgar in *Beowulf*, who is a "gold-friend" (line 1171) of his people. Similar examples of generous and required behavior towards retainers can be seen in Odysseus' promise to reward the loyal cowherd and swineherd with land, cattle and wives; and Gilgamesh

providing Enkidu with the luxuries of royal life in return for Enkidu's allegiance. In other words, kings and rulers in the contemporary audience are sent a message through the epic that they are bound by a code of behavior to share the riches of their kingdoms with those who have helped win those riches. However, this message about heroes and kings could provide an equal-if-not greater impact on retainers, regarding the rewards underlings can hope to reap through loyalty to lords.

In fact, such loyalty typifies the most exemplary of retainers found in the three heroic epics. And because the nature of societal hierarchies places more people in retainer, rather than ruling roles, it is assumed that the larger didactic message of heroic epics is intended to be geared towards reinforcing exemplary behavior in the retainer audience, rather than reminding the ruling class of its obligations. Consider how mid-way through *The Odyssey* Homer writes: "Now you were furious at this, Eumaios, and answered - O my swineherd" (Book XV, lines 400-01). While open to speculation, I contend that the intent of the "you" and "my" in these two lines is twofold: it represents an addressing of Eumaios (who is certainly the most exemplary of model underlings, servants and kinsmen in *The Odyssey*), as a character in the epic, and it serves to address the retainer at-large in the epic's contemporary audience, via the genetive case of a sovereign's firstperson pronoun.

Like Eumaios in *The Odyssey*, Beowulf has his model retainer in Wiglaf, and Gilgamesh his model "friend" and "servant" in Enkidu. All three exemplary characters share certain traits, including the willingness to stand beside their lord despite particularly gloomy odds, recognizing as Wiglaf did the need to be loyal to a lord "at the hour of need" (line 2709) because "death is worthier for every warrior than days of dishonor" (lines 2390-91. For the contemporary audience, then, these retainers provide an example of how to reap rewards through culturally-bound subservency and loyalty.

And those potential rewards extend mere material gifts. For in all three epics we see examples of what could be termed "adopted kinship": Enkidu is adopted by Gilgamesh's mother after the two become friends, thus making the heroic men "brothers although in Tablet XII Enkidu is also referred to as Gilgamesh's "servant"; and Eumaios is raised by Odysseus' mother to later be called "uncle" by Telemakhos. And while we know that Wiglaf shares a family line with Beowulf, the retainer also could be seen as adopted into a closer kinship after he comes to be regarded by Beowulf as

the son the dying king never had. Thus the heroic acts of the more exemplary retainers in the three epics -- namely the swineherd's loyalty to during Odysseus' 20-year absence, Enkidu's willingness to descend to the unknown dangers of the underworld and search for Gilgamesh's "mikku and pukku," and Wiglaf's actions as the lone comrade-in-arms who comes to the aid of Beowulf when fighting the dragon -- are rewarded through an extension of kinship. And while it is somewhat ambiguous when the adoption of Eumaios took place (although certainly his loyalty to the family of Odysseus brought him closer to the royal family), it is clear that in the other two retainers the adoption occurred once the retainer had proven himself as a valued friend, thus sending a message to the contemporary audience that the model retainer can transcend bloodlines and become kin to his lord in heart, even if not kin by blood.

In this regard, the three epics' respective exemplary retainers--Enkidu, Wiglaf and Eumaios--were in many ways more heroic than the heroes themselves, for the retainers were not endowed with godlike traits and abilities but nonetheless, like true heroes, acted without fear for their own lives. But it should come as no surprise that the retainers embodied heroic characteristics, given the epic bards' intended local audience. In illustrating how every man can be a hero, the heroic epic extends its audience to a universal level by addressing not just model cultural behavior set in a specific place and time, but model human behavior common to the human species. The epic poet then, in creating what is generally viewed as an inherent component of the epic -- the addressing of both a local and a universal audience--extends a message to both types of audience that is not geared primarily toward heroes but toward those who could be heroic in fulfilling their duties. That message, of course, illustrates the ways in which heroes and retainers are or can be similar,

This theme of similarities between heroes and model retainers is found throughout the heroic epic, underscoring and reinforcing the notion that heroics stem from deeds, not kinship, although heroics involving loyalty can build a special kind of kinship. Consider, for instance, how another type of culturally prescribed behavior addressed in the three epics -- namely that of common courtesy to strangers -- is shared by the three epics' heroes, by good rulers and by model retainers. Beowulf initially receives a courteous welcome from Hrothgar, although certainly for numerous reasons beyond simple grace. But Beowulf himself later reinforces the notion that in Hrothgar's eventual gift-giving to the hero, "the national king followed best custom"

(line 2144). Similarly, Odysseus and his son Telemakhos are the benefactors of the "best customs" of their days, and were received with courtesy even when their royal identities had not yet been revealed. Of course one of the more memorable of such receptions is when the swineherd welcomes Odysseus who is disguised as a beggar, noting that "rudeness to a stranger is not decency, poor though he may be, poorer than you" (Book XIV, lines 67-68). In fact, courtesy can be attributed to subserviency, given the remarks of the swineherd that "all wanderers and beggars come from Zeus" (Book XIV, lines 69-70). The message here to the contemporary audience could be one designed to reinforce common courtesy, although, at the same time the message could also be viewed as a warning to retainers: be on your best behavior, because you never know when a lord or god is present in humble disguise, as your guest.

The three epics also present character models in various stages of maturity, offering cues to the epic's contemporary audience on how age affects one's ability for heroics and subsequently how one's age determines how much respect individuals deserve. Consider how by the end of *Beowulf* we recognize that contrary of the hero's wishes, Beowulf has reached an age where he cannot conquer the dragon on his own, and requires help from retainers. In taking note of younger characters' behavior, in *The Odyssey* we see Telemakhos reach an age where he begins to command household servants in a "soldierly way"; and we also see that Odysseus' father, once a great warrior, has been reduced to the status of a "greybeard" in Book XXIV, though along with an old servant both "could be fighters in a pinch" (line 554). And while elders are often revered in *The Odyssey*, *Beowulf* and *Gilgamesh* for their wisdom, ability to prophesize or ability to read signs, they are eventually relegated to a role subservient to others currently in their prime. For instance, consider the scene Gilgamesh laughs at elders' warnings not to go to the cedar forest, and subsequently the elders bless they young hero's journey. Thus in the three epics., which could in some ways be categorized as "coming-of-age poems" rooted in cultural ritual and rites, we see characters such as Telemakhos behave in a manner less than commanding and "soldierly" before adulthood, and characters such as the counsel of elders (a social body presumably comprised of those well past their prime) in *Gilgamesh* responding to the hero-come-of-age with eventual subserviency. In depicting characters in various stages of maturity, the epic, then, not only justifies the notion that age should be a determinant of societal rank, but also reinforces the culturally-accepted notion that both the young and the

old should recognize their place in society, and be subservient to the wishes of those in their prime (although because of genealogy, certainly kings and those of the ruling classes such as the aging Beowulf, prove to be exceptions).

In similar ways the heroic epic speaks to the general "place of women" in their respective cultures, and specifically to the role of females as wife, mother and even goddess. Generally speaking, model women in the heroic epic are, as in *The Odyssey*, see in roles subservient to males; they are assigned roles of bath giver, food and-drink server and parther in bed. In *Beowulf* -- where women characters are conspicuously sparse except for queens (and monsters) --; we see that the ideal woman is also found to be mindful of domestic chores as social graces, as illustrated by Wealhtheow who is "careful of courtesies" (line 614) and active filling mead cups at the banquet hall.

In addressing and justifying more specific female roles, the heroic epic reminds its contemporary audience that the role of mother is primarily one of advisor to, and nurturer and protector of, children. But the heroic epic further reinforces the notion that mothers -- like Gilgamesh's mother Ninsun and Telemakhos' mother Penelope -- should eventually become subservient to the wishes of their male children after the latter have reached adulthood. In both cases, where the sociological determinants of sex and family position come into interplay, we see that the male-of-age gains ascendancy over his mother, with both Telemakhos and Gilgamesh ignoring their mothers' wills which would have kept them safe at home and prevented the males' "heroic" journeys.

Model wives in heroic epics are similarly expected to respect the wishes of their husbands. Consider how in *The Odyssey* where themes on the value of family life abound, the epic stresses the need for wives to be faithful to husbands in the absence of the latter, as seen in the contrast presented between the unfaithful wife of Agamemnon who plots her husband's death and Odysseus' wife Penelope. And certainly Penelope is exemplary in her faithfulness. What Penelope receives in return for her faithfulness, and receives from Odysseus after his return to Ithaca, is one night with a man who has been absent for 20 years and (who, meanwhile, has had the pleasure of sleeping with nymphs and goddesses), before he hero is again off to take care of other affairs (admittedly meeting threats to Penelope as well as the couple's house, but also to see his father

and subsequently to fulfill the prophecy of Teiresias). Thus the heroic epic suggests to its contemporary audience that the wife's first obligation is to respect her husband's wishes. Perhaps this is why Gilgamesh refused the offer of the goddess Ishtar to become her consort. But despite the obvious wily nature of Ishtar, Gilgamesh's reaction can be read in at least two ways beyond his intention not to get involved with a goddess who is known to be treacherous and who is unlikely to be respectful of his, a mortal's, wishes. For one, marriage does not appear important in the culture of Gilgamesh (and of course Beowulf does not take a wife either); and two, males (perhaps only male heroes) apparently are not expected to be subservient to immortal females. Consider Athena's role as goddess in *The Odyssey*, like mortal females she too serves as help-mate (albeit a help-mate to heroes) and ultimately as arbiter in bringing peace to Ithaca. Further consider the interrupted battle in Book XXIV between Odysseus' loyal band and the angered townsmen. While the townsmen turned to flee following the command from Athena to stop fighting, Odysseus "reared himself to follow" (line 601) and only abandoned the fight after Zeus sent a lightning bolt to the ground.

While in general the message that model women in heroic epics send to their counterparts in the contemporary audience reinforces the notion that women should be subservient to men, females do receive one apparent distinction in these epics: they are often found to have the gift of prophesying or reading signs. This is most apparent in *Gilgamesh*, where nearly all the female characters, the courtesan included, are endowed with powers of prophecy and/or dream interpretation, or at least the ability to give sage advice. Likewise Wealhtheow in *Beowulf*, an exemplary female character, is seen giving sound advice to Beowulf. And in *The Odyssey*, while Menelaos "groped in his mind for the right to say" (Book XV, line 209) when asked to read the sign of a bird, Helen quickly offered an ingenious interpretation. Similarly, in the Homeric epic we see the accuracy of Penelope's dream which foreshadows the return of Odysseus and the demise of the suitors. For the contemporary audience, then, it could be argued that validity in the stereotyped notion of "women's intuition"--or the notion that women are endowed with the ability to receive and/or interpret signs carrying meanings hidden to most men -- is reinforced.

As noted earlier, individual characters' behavior can be seen as a subtle vehicle for epic themes. But in some respects, the epic bards are overtly clear in methods of emphasizing the importance of being appropriately subservient. The coastguard in *Beowulf*, for instance, is dutiful in

guarding the hero's ship and because of this Beowulf gives the retainer a new sword guaranteed to bring prestige. The boatman in *Gilgamesh*, on the other hand, is banished to the shores after he violates his duties and brings the hero across the waters to the home of Utnapishtim. The matter of "rewards" for appropriate action is perhaps driven home most graphically in Book XXII of *The Odyssey*, where maids who had taken to the beds of suitors were first made to clean up the bloodied hall of Odysseus' home, and then hung. As for the suitor Melanthios, who although of royal parentage had defiled the home of a king :

From the storeroom to the court they brought Melanthios,
chopped with swords to cut his nose and ears off,
pulled off his genitals to feed the dogs
and raging hacked his hands and feet away (lines 527-30).

While it is thus apparent that heroic epics provided their contemporary audiences with models for individual behavior based on culturally-accepted roles, it should not be overlooked that heroic epics also outlined pictures of model relationships and institutions, including : model examples of friendship, as in the case of *Gilgamesh*; model examples of marriage and the family unit, as in the case of *The Odyssey*, and model examples of entire kingdoms at a glance, as seen in *Beowulf* when Wealhtheow, in giving advice to the hero, says :

... Warrior be happy
While life is yours ! May you from my wishes
Grow rich in treasures. Be good to my son,
Act in charity from your store of joy.
Here every man is true to his fellow,
Humane of mind and loyal to his lord
The retinue are as one, the people are eager,
The heroes are wine-glad and quick to (their lord's) beckon (lines 1224-30).

If only the disloyal suitors, servants and maids in *The Odyssey* would have taken heed of such advice, their fate would have been different when Odysseus came home.

(My thanks to Dr. George Kurman, Western Illinois University, for his insights on my subject.)

Sources Cited

Heidel, Alexander. *The Gilgamesh Epic and Old Testament Parallels*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1949.

Beowulf Trans. Edwin Morgan, Berkeley and Los Angeles : U of California P, 1952.

Homer. *The Odyssey*. Trans. Robert Fitzgerald, New York : Vintage, 1990.

Moral Themes in Three Versions of the Bidpai Collection : A Study of Literary Adaptation

IBRAHIM DAWOOD

In the present work, I intend to study and compare the moral themes in the frame story of "The Lion and the Bull" in the following versions of the Bidpai fables :

- 1) *The Panchatantra* 200 B. C.
- 2) *Kalilah Wa Dimnah* 750 A. D.
- 3) Sir Thomas North's *The Morall Philosophie of Doni* 1570, the first English version of the Bidpai collection.

"The Lion and the Bull" is the longest tale, and from an artistic viewpoint it is often considered the best narrative in the Bidpai collection. It constitutes Book One of *The Panchatantra*, which itself makes up about one half of the whole collection. In *Kalilah wa Dimnah* the story and a continuation of it added by the Arab translator occur in chapters 5 and 6; it is the longest frame tale in the book. In *The Morall Philosophie of Doni* "The Lion and the Bull" and its Arabic complementary part make up the major bulk of North's work.

Except for some very brief reviews of the 1883 edition and some contemporary comments, *The Morall Philosophie of Doni* has not been the subject of critical attention. *The Panchatantra* itself has not been the subject of any comprehensive analytical study in English. Scholarship on the Bidpai collection seems to be concerned with its history rather than its artistry. The need for analytical and comparative studies aimed at deeper understanding and appreciation of the tales themselves becomes evident. This study attempts to answer that need. After presenting some important historical facts, I will show how, over a period of about eighteen centuries, the Bidpai collection underwent changes in the Hindu, Islamic, and Christian lands.

A study of the variations in the Bidpai fables will lead us to some of the elements which survived the process of many adaptations and translations

J. C. L. A Vol. XII : Nos. 1-2 ; 1989

along the route of the fables' journey to Europe, I hope this research will add to our understanding of literary adaptation and literary translation -- especially in the eighth and sixteenth centuries. I will also analyze social, religious, political, and cultural concepts which were superimposed upon the Bidpai collection for didactic purposes at two major stations on the way from India to the West across the Arab lands.

Historical and Textual Consideration

Ibn al-Muqaffac translated "The Lion and the Bull" among other *Panchatantra* frame tales from a pehlevi version rendered directly from Sanskrit. Since this version is now lost we cannot speak of its influence on the Arabic version, but it is clear that the Arab translator dropped some stories in which Hindu deities or teachings were given important roles such as the tale of "The Weaver Who Loved a Princess". Others he adapted by eliminating the Hindu elements, as in "The Plover Who Fought the Ocean".

The Morall Philosophie may be viewed as the end product of several Western versions rather than the work of North as such. Joseph Jacobs describes its descent as follows ;

It is the English version of an Italian adaptation of a Spanish translation of a Latin version of a Hebrew translation of an Arabic adaptation of the pehlevi version of the Indian original.¹

It is clear from Jacob's words that *The Morall Philosophie* is seven times removed from the original. It reflects numerous changes in content, theme, and structure which the tale of "The Lion and the Bull" underwent under various hands in the West. Factors similar to those which influenced the Arab translator of the Bidpai fables influenced as well in one way or another, the Western translators who contributed to *The Morall Philosophie of Doni*.² I will therefore deal with North's text as a representative of what happened to the implied moral structure of the Bidpai collection in the West, while "The Lion and the Bull" in *Kalilah wa Dimnah* will serve to demonstrate what happened to the same text in the Arab East around eight centuries earlier.

Moral Themes in The Panchatantra Version

To understand the structure of moral values in "The Lion and the Bull" in *Kalilah wa Dimnah* and in *The Morall Philosophie* the world view

and system of values in the same tale as they occur in *The Panchatantra* must first be considered.

In *The Panchatantra*, "The Lion and the Bull" takes place in the court of a lion king in the midst of a forest whose laws and logic are like those of humans. The lion king is supported by a retinue of animals which consists of four classes called 'The circle of Four'. The Circle of four clearly reflects the Hindu caste system according to which society is strictly divided into hierarchical classes to which individuals are tied from birth. It is not possible according to this system for an individual from a lower class to move into a higher one.

The plot of "The Lion and the Bull"³ revolves around a jackal called Victor,⁴ a member of the second circle in the lion king's retinue. Victor is presumptuous and aspires to rank and distinction in the court. He even desires to influence the lion king himself. Seen in Hindu terms, he is a rebellious member of his caste. Being intelligent, he has a good eye for opportunities. One day a bull named Lively⁵ arrives near the forest where the lion Rusty⁶ lives. When Victor notices the lion's fear of the bull's loud bellowing he uses the occasion to approach him. Victor holds counsel with his fellow jackal Cheek⁷ who recommends that Victor not meddle in the matter since his low condition would not qualify him to exert any influence on the lion.

The self-willed Victor rejects Cheek's advice and holds strongly to his principle that the intelligent should always search for distinction rather than food. Then he goes to meet the lion king and offers his services to him. Noticing Victor's intelligence the lion sends him to discover the source of the bellowing. Finding the bull, Victor reports the news to the lion; after journeying back and forth he convinces Lively to go to meet the lion king by providing him with a royal safe-conduct. The lion receives the bull and the two very soon become intimate friends. The bull holds sway over the dull lion's mind and courage; as a result the other animals are neglected by the lion and the two jackals are not even allowed to meet with him. The situation deteriorates when the animals start to suffer hunger since "they lacked the lion's prowess" (pp. 55-56).

What the narrator presents up to this point is an allegory of Hindu society in which certain factors are disrupting its caste system and order, and consequently endangering peace and happiness. At the head there is a lion king, whose dullness provides the proof of his insufficiency to run his

court properly as one of his class should. His "qualifications" for kingship are presented ironically as power, ruthlessness, pride, and haughtiness. As a result of Victor's intrigue, the lion finally kills the bull although he soon regrets it. This chaos of badly performed roles in the two upper castes is clearly contrary to the Hindu ideal of organized society.

While the narrator alludes through Cheek's words to the Hindu concept of the ideal society in which each member functions within his fixed place in the caste to serve the well being of society as a whole he in no way intends to present any ideal image of the world. On the contrary, he presents a dark view of it far from the ideal, in which presumptuous individuals such as the jackal Victor care for nothing except self interest; where an ignorant tyrant such as the lion king is always liable through ignorance -- synonymous with vice in the story -- to bring disorder, violence, and starvation to his people. The narrator attributes to human society as a whole the manners of the forest beasts whose major interest is survival at the expense of the others (pp. 55-7).

"The Lion and the Bull" in *The Panchatantra* does not condone surrender. It offers instead the counsel of wise living. Prudence is the proper defense against external aggression; it is favored in fact over force. Prudence is presented as the key to power and happiness. The morality which the tale as a whole preaches is not primarily religious but it is ruled by social standards. Victor's intrigue is condemned as a cause of disorder in society rather than as a sin to be punished by some supernatural power.

Moral Themes in the Arabic and in the English Versions

I will address myself to two major points in each version : the overall worldview and the narrator's attitude towards the problem of good and evil.

The narrator of "The Lion and the Bull" in *Kalilah wa Dimnah* presents an image of a world not quite so dark as the one found in *The Panchatantra* version. On the contrary, the man who instructs his sons at the beginning of the tale in *Kalilah wa Dimnah* establishes for them the basic concepts of honorable living which corresponds to Islamic idea of balance between fulfilling our worldly needs and providing a provision for the hereafter, between the physical and the spiritual in our life. According to him, the goals of one's life should be riches, dignity, and an appropriate provision for the life to come. To realize these goals, he thinks, one should earn money legally, control and invest it properly, and spend it on one's needs, on things that would please family and friends, and on whatever contributes

to charity.⁸ The concept of the hereafter is introduced as a substitute for the Hindu concept of a cyclic series of lifetimes. The hereafter in Islam, as in Christianity, is an end in itself, which is determined by the individual's actions in this life. The Hindu concept of cyclic time is changed into linear time. The principles cited above are among those which the Qur'ān establishes for Moslems.⁹

In *Kalilah wa Dimnah*, the king's court is not a reflection of Hindu hierarchical society. Dimnah's guilt, therefore, is interpreted in terms of his low condition and vicious nature rather than as a result of a break with hierarchical structure in the lion king's society. Although, when first introduced in the tale, the lion king is described as "conceited, haughty, detached and contented with his own opinion" (p. 46), he does not rule within a rigid class system as does his counterpart in *The Panchatantra*. Presenting the lion's court in this way the narrator prepares the way for his own addition to the tale in the Arabic "The Investigation of the Conduct of Dimnah" where the image of the lion and his court recalls the Moslem ideal of society. From the beginning of the tale, therefore, the narrator insists on bestowing upon the lion king a more dignified character. Dimnah does not presume to ridicule him as his counterpart does in *The Panchatantra*. By declining to stress his dullness and arrogance, the narrator of the tale in *Kalilah wa Dimnah* reserves the right to change the lion's character in his own version.

In the part of the tale entitled "The Investigation of the Conduct of Dimnah" not only does the lion feel sorry for murdering shanzabah and realize that his action was both hasty and mistaken but he also seeks justice by asking his counsel to investigate the crime of Dimnah. The narrator shows how human society can and should be a place where justice reigns where good is rewarded and evil is punished, where humans are not ruled by the forest law of the survival of the fittest in mutual self-prey, an impression which looms large in *The Panchatantra*.

What image of the world do we find in *The Morall Philosophie*? In the prologue to the tale the narrator presents a somber world view the tale reflects. He superimposes on the work a gloom not found in the *Kalilah wa Dimnah* version.¹⁰ His view of the world recalls that of Christianity. He writes ;

Surely reader, this book shall be a looking

glasse for thee, wherin thou shalt most lively behold
the daylie and present daungers and deceytes of mans
most miserable lyfe, and the eyes of thy underrstanding
shall be made open to discerne the flatteries of
disceytfull men, and the wisdom of this most guileful
worlde : by meanes wherof yee may easily blotte out
many malignant effects of this (alas) our crooked age.
(p. 14)

One means used by the narrator of *The Morall Philosophie* to support his view of the frame tale as an illustration of a dark and evil world is to make the vicious mule (who stands here for the jackal Dimnah in the Arabic) ironically condemn the world as evil. In following such a plan, the narrator wants to present evil as self-condemned. In his introductory words to the bull the mule sees only evil in the world : "Truly faith hath left hir habitation on the earth, and bountie reigneth no more in any land" (p. 146).

The Morall Philosophie is set as an image of what the narrator labels in the respective titles of its three major parts as "... the wonderful abuses of this wretched world," "... the great treason of the Court of this World," and "... the end of the treason and miseries of the Court of this World."

As seen by the lionking's mother in the Arabic version, who does not appear in *The Panchatntra* version, Dimnah's intrigue is a betrayal of the lion king, which harms him and the public as well. She thinks that unless such a crime is punished other vicious individuals may feel tempted to commit other crimes. To protect the community from similar crimes the lion's mother insists that it is the lion king's duty to put Dimnah to death and thus rid the court of evil.

The mother's reasoning is in fact a paraphrase of the Quranic verse :

In the Law of Equality

There is (saving of) Life

To you, O ye men of understanding ;

That ye may

Restrain yourselves.¹¹

according to which a murderer should receive the death penalty unless the aggrieved family gives remission. The application of this religious law is

considered necessary to prevent further bloodshed and to protect society from continued violence. The sense of injustice we feel at the end of "The Lion and the Bull" in *The Panchatantra* because Victor's intrigue goes unpunished is the major force behind Ibn al-Muqaffac's addition of "The Investigation of the Conduct of Dimnah" to the original tale. The lion orders a court to look into Dimnah's crime. The court applies Islamic laws : it convicts Dimnah only after two witnesses bear testimony against him, and thereupon he is executed by the order of the king.

In "The Investigation of the Conduct of Dimnah" Ibn al-Muqaffac introduces another Islamic element clearly lacking in the original Sanskrit -- that is the theological nature of Dimnah's guilt. Dimnah's intrigue is seen by Kalilah his brother, not only as a social vice which brings disruption to the lion king's court but also as a sin that must be punished in the hereafter. As Kalilah reprimands Dimnah in jail for never listening to his moral instruction he ends up by telling him that he should repent his sin :

I advise you to admit your crime and to acknowledge your sin for you are dying inevitably. And to be executed for what you have done is better than to be tormented in the hereafter, with sinners and profligates (p. 112).

The narrator in *The Morall Philosophie* stresses the theological aspect of the mule's intrigue even more than his counterpart in the Arabic. He associates the punishment with divine justice. When the leopard overhears the ass' reproof of the mule and his condemnation of the intrigue he immediately realizes that if he were allowed to overhear such a reproof it was because God wanted it to be so. And he figures that the mule should be punished by the wrathful lion, "and that he should dearely buye the Princes grieve, falling into that snare he had layde for many others" (pp. 222-23).

The narrator in *The Morall Philosophie*, unlike his counterpart in the Arabic, tries to present the nature and inner struggle of evil characters in his attempt to shape our attitude towards evil in general. Rejecting the world, in the narrator's terms, becomes in fact equivalent to struggling against evil. He presents the conflicts in the soul of a vicious character such as the mule in order to arouse the reader's disgust at evil, and to instruct him on the motivations of evil characters. After the mule's loss of his prestige in the lion king's court, following the arrival of the bull, he loses his temper and falls into a state of psychological disorder. His anger at the bull runs

rampant—a situation which leads him to intrigue his intrigue between the lion and the bull. The conflict in the mule's feelings on this occasion is clearly evident in his speech to the ass (p. 112).

After discussing the treatment of plot in the Arabic and in the English versions of "The Lion and the Bull" and the moral issues related to it, it would be worthwhile to investigate whether or not they share a common attitude as to how one should live.

Kalilah wa Dimnah recognizes the existence of evil in the world. It also assumes that man is doomed by fate—a theme illustrated in 'The Story of the Man Who Escaped from the Wolf.' But it does not call on man to surrender to evil powers nor to become morally perfect. While it does accept the Islamic principles of fate, charity, and the laws of reward and punishment in the hereafter, and integrates some of these principles in the tale, it urges man to use his reason properly in the first place; it does not see prudence as inconsistent with being a good Moslem. Man is an intelligent being and he should use prudence to protect himself against evil. The narrator of the Arabic version by no means renounces the world; his version praises a moderate style of living in which the spiritual and the physical needs of man are fulfilled.

The narrator in *The Morall Philosophie*, on the other hand, presents a theological attitude towards the problem of evil in the world. While magnifying the image of evil he often admonishes the reader against it (p. 128). He calls on him to see the world as inherently evil. Therefore, he thinks that one should reject evil and be upright in word and in deed to avoid God's punishment and to gain heaven's reward. It should be mentioned, however, that many parenthetical stories and fables in *The Morall Philosophie* illustrate man's need for prudence in order to defend himself against the evil powers around him; but the narrator tends to derive from them moral rather than practical lessons. An action for him is classified as either good or evil rather than prudent or imprudent. To live prudently for him is equivalent to living uprightly. Such morality is opposed to that of *Kalilah wa Dimnah* which is mainly practical and only secondarily theological.¹²

In dealing with moral themes in the frame tale of "The Lion and the Bull" in *The Panchatantra*, in *Kalilah wa Dimnah* and in *The Morall Philosophie of Doni* we have discovered three different moral systems, influenced by the respective religious values of Hinduism, Islam, and medieval

Christianity. The moral themes in *The Panchatantra* version are influenced by the negative Hindu view of the material world and by the Hindu rejection of the human body's attraction to concrete and material surroundings--which Hindus call 'prakriti.' The dark image of the world in *The Panchatantra* version of "The Lion and the Bull" is a result of these Hindu concepts. In addition to this, the narrator implicitly suggests that the symbolic society in the tale is vicious because its members do not perform the proper and peaceful roles assigned to them within the caste into which they are born. From the Hindu perspective evil arises when individuals break away from the teachings of 'Karma,' and 'Samsara.'¹⁸ The solution of the problem of evil in the story as Cheek says to Victor is for the individual to perform his role peacefully and prudently within his caste. This is not to minimize the apparent emphasis of the work as a whole on prudence as a way of life. The Hindu concepts and morality in the tale are not at odds with prudence.

In the Arabic version the somber image of the world is not exaggerated. The fact that Islam, as a religion, speaks to both the spiritual and worldly needs of man influences the plot of the story in *Kalilah wa Dimnah*. The crime of Dimnah is not seen as a reflection of an innately evil and remediless world but as a sin punishable by the religious laws of Islam, not only in the hereafter, but on earth as well. Such punishment is considered necessary, as we have seen, for the protection and well being of society. The narrator adds Islamic concepts to the story such as the law of Equality, laying out the basis for prosperous living at the outset of the story, the preparation for the hereafter, the frequent reference to God, and the details of how to fulfil justice. However, he does not neglect the original *panchatantra* emphasis on the importance of prudence as a way of protecting oneself against aggression in this world, and as a way of doing what is wise on the right occasion in order to realize a worldly happiness which does not contradict one's spiritual fulfillment. And this is why there is a great deal of discussion of questions related to practical life and ethics as such, the elimination of which would not detract from the literary unity of the tale.

In *The Morall Philosophie of Doni* the narrator superimposes on the Arabic text a somber world view which, as we said, is identical with that of Christianity. He lays emphasis on the theological consequences of vices and virtues rather than on reasoning and the value of prudence. He does, however, retain the Arabic version's treatment of the theme of the theme of crime and how it must be punished. While the work as a whole

still illustrates the importance of prudence as a way of life, the narrator constantly emphasizes the necessity of the rejection of evil and urges the reader to live uprightly.

The changes of the Bidpai tradition in the Arabic and English versions explored in this study are many; the nature and number of these changes may justify describing the two versions as examples of literary adaptation. The concept of faithful translation is represented by neither. Although the term adaptation was not used in the eighth and sixteenth centuries in its modern sense, the literary form it denotes is represented by both *Kalilah wa Dimnah* and *The Morall Philosophie*. Ibn al-Muqaffac was aware throughout his reworking of the Bidpai narrative of the need to adapt the Sanskrit material which he drew from his Pehlevi sources to the needs and tastes of his Arab Moslem readers; the Western translators who contributed to *The Morall Philosophie*, on the other hand, adapted that same tradition to Christian tastes. The introduction of the Bidpai narrative into these different cultures meant the superimposition upon the work of new social, political, religious, and cultural concepts and the elimination of some original ones. But all in all the three texts which have formed the basis of our thesis reveal that, regardless of country and creed, fundamental human truths are expressed in these animal fables. Beyond translation and adaptation, the tales survive with surprising vigor to our own day.

Notes and References

¹Introduction by Joseph Jacobs in Sir Thomas North, *Fables of Bidpai, The Morall Philosophie of Doni*, ed. Joseph Jacobs (London: David Nutt, 1888), p. xi. page references to this book will hereafter be cited in the text.

²Since there were many translators who contributed to the work I will not refer to any specific one among them as I proceed to discuss the text; I will rather refer to the narrator as such. will refer, however, to Ibn al Muqaffac as the author of at least a part of the tale we are dealing with, since the Arabic version is clearly his alone.

³For my study of the original Sanskrit text I have used *The Panchatantra* as translated from the Sanskrit by Arthur Ryder (Chicago : The University of Chicago press, 1964) Ryder's source is the purnabhadra version (1199 A.D.) which Johannes Hertel edited and published in 1908; it is the most authentic text of the original *Panchatantra*. Page references to Ryder's translation will hereafter be cited in the text.

⁴This name in the original Sanskrit is 'Damanaka.'

⁵The bull's name in the original is 'Nandaka.'

⁶'Pingalaka' is the lion king's name in the Sanskrit version.

⁷'Karataka' is the name in the Sanskrit version.

⁸See *Kalilah wa Dimnah*. Trans. from Peblevi by 'Abdallah Ibn al - Muqaffac, ed. Taha Husayn and 'Abd al - Wahhab Azzam (Cairo : Matbac at al - Mac arif, 1941), pp. 43-44. This edition is deemed by critics as the most dependable of all Arabic editions of Ibn al-Muqaffac's work. Page references to to this book will hereafter be cited in the text. The quotations from the book are given in my own translation.

⁹See Qur'an, S. II., 177.

¹⁰This somber world view, however, is counterbalanced in the English version by a good deal of humor in the treatment of the evil character of the mule, which gives the text both liveliness and vigor.

¹¹Qur'an, S. II , 179.

¹²See Ahmad Amin, *Duha al-Islam*, 6th ed. (Cairo, Maktabat al-Nahdah al-Misriyyah, 1961), p. 227. Amin refers to the morality of Ibn al - Muqaffac in *Kalilah wa Dimnah* as one based on philosophy rather than on religion. He mentions, however, that such morality does not contradict the spirit of religion. Islamic

spirit in *Kalilah wa Dimnah*, however, has been discussed by other Arab scholars who often identify statements scattered throughout the book which reflect ideas found in the Qur' an or in the tradition of prophet Muhammad.

¹³For the meaning of these terms see David R. Kinsley, *Hinduism A Cultural perspective* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice - Hall, Inc., 1982, pp. 84 - 85). Here, Kinsley

writes :

'Kharma,' the moral law of cause and affect by which one reaps what one sows, and 'samsara,' rebirth, combine to teach that the particular caste into which one is born is determined by one's past actions and that the caste that one will be born into in the future is being determined in the present by how one acts.

Music, Universality, Emotional Character & Authenticity

PETER MEW

In my view, which I have expounded in some detail elsewhere,¹ the essential significance of music resides in its capacity to expressively arouse feelings, including what would be standardly referred to as emotions: this capacity is realized, I believe, without recourse to any form of representation, imitation, description or convention, and without the mediation of beliefs. Music, I would maintain, is the natural, direct voice of feeling: it expresses a feeling for some listener by or in directly arousing and shaping that feeling in him.

There may be several contentious elements in this brief presentation of my view of musical expression but the most obviously contentious claim is that a piece of music may expressively arouse a feeling in a listener *objectlessly*, even when that feeling is one which would, in extra-musical contexts, necessarily take an object. I have attempted to explicate and defend this claim elsewhere² and it is not my purpose here to do so again. Instead I want to explore some of its implications and those of the wider claim of which it is a part, *viz.*, that music is an unmediated mode of the expressive arousal of feelings. For it seems to me that my view does help to explain certain certain well-entrenched, but seemingly unexcogitated beliefs that many people have, and have had, about music.

First, and perhaps most obviously, it helps to explain the widely-held belief that music is the most *intimate* and *inward* of the art-forms. Music does not present or represent parts of the world as a way of arousing or expressing feelings; it moves directly to the inner life of feelings and gives it an immediate shaping voice. I believe that no other art-form can do this. It is undeniably true, of course, that a literary or visual work may in some sense express feelings directly or spontaneously, but, necessarily, it cannot do this without the mediation of some part or parts of a world (real or imaginary) realized through description or depiction. In order to discover and express feelings literary and visual works must present parts of a world which are not themselves feelings but which are apt to arouse them.

Secondly, it is. I believe, the fact that musical expression is achieved without the mediation of representation or belief that accounts for the common belief that music is non-moral and no political, for if music is unmediated in the way I have outlined it is incapable of expressing moral or political *judgments*. And it is surely this feature of musical expression which explains why Marxist aestheticians generally avoid music when they are expounding a Marxist view of art, for, to summarize ruthlessly, if, as Marxists suppose, art expresses ideology and ideology is constituted by a set of value-judgments, descriptive judgments, or depictions of political significance, then music *cannot* express an ideology. Rather than give up the thesis that art express ideology, Marxists choose to ignore music.³

Against this rather baldly stated view concerning music and ideology, it might be urged that it does not follow from the fact that music, unlike the other art forms, cannot make judgments on the world, either explicitly in the form of value judgments, or implicitly through selective depiction or description, that it has *no* moral or political significance. This, I believe, is true but the significance that music does in fact have is only tenuously related to anything that might be called moral or political, and is certainly not construable as a set of moral or political *messages*. For if I am right in my thesis, the significance that a piece of music actually has (when it has any) consists in its being the expression of an emotional quality (the quality of the feeling expressed). That emotional quality may be one or more of an indefinite number of qualities or characters ranging from the sentimental and declamatory to the authentic and sincere. It might be argued thus that the moral significance of a piece of music can be located in the emotional quality it expresses and hence invites in the responses of the listener. But here it is very important not to overestimate the weight of this putative moral significance: in particular, it would be wrong, I think, to suppose that the emotional quality of a piece of music can actually alter the emotional quality of the relevant extra musical emotional relationships of a listener who has responded to that quality in the way that it invited. It seems to me that what must happen when an emotion with a particular quality is expressively aroused in a listener by a piece of music is that the music discovers and gives a shaping voice to an emotional capacity or tendency *already possessed* the listener. Seemingly that is a conceptual truth, but it is a conceptual truth which should not be taken to imply that music is relatively powerless, for first, as I have already claimed, music may awaken and give unmediated life to feelings which might otherwise have lain dormant

or have existed only in mediated form, and second, pieces of music may become part of the active expressive repertoire of a listener.⁴

It is fairly clear, I think, that the emotional qualities to which I have drawn attention are *value* qualities just in so far as saying that an expression or feeling has one of them is to say something for or against that expression or feeling. This might seem to clinch the case for the moral significance of music, if it is right to assume that the value in question is a (kind of) moral value. But is it right to make such an assumption? I feel unable to answer this question categorically since I am not sure what (if anything) a moral value is. However, though I shall not pursue the matter further here, it seems to me probable that the following complex hypothetical is valid and its antecedents true. If the value-quality of the feeling expressed by a piece of music (*i.e.*, the value-quality of the feeling expressively aroused in some listener by the music) is capable of harming or benefitting a listener, and if, other things being equal, the harm or good that a person or group does to another person or group is always a moral issue, and if, in musical cases, other things always are equal, then music has moral significance. And here it is worth remarking that if music really does have moral significance of the kind adumbrated, it is not of the kind that lends itself to political or ideological analysis, since the value-qualities that embody the supposed moral significance are neutral in respect of political belief and ideology: as I have been concerned to stress, they are intrinsic properties of feelings and expressions, *i.e.*, they are independent of beliefs and objects.

I should like now to return to a consideration of the unmediated nature of musical expression. If, as I have suggested, the unmediated nature of musical expression makes it impossible for a piece of music to express a political or moral judgment, this may be seen as a limitation on its expressive power, but it may also be seen as constituting a potential expressive power which the other art-forms could not possess. That potential expressive power is a potential power to transcend, in expressively arousing feelings, any such inter-cultural or intra-cultural boundaries as are set by inter-cultural or intra-cultural differences in belief. Since music is free from objects and beliefs its appeal cannot be limited by such belief-boundaries. This not to say that the other art-forms cannot also transcend inter-cultural or intra-cultural boundaries; only that they cannot do so if the beliefs by reference to which their depictions or descriptions may be said to express feelings are peculiar to a particular historic-cultural period or to a particular individual or group within a given culture.

The point is that the production of visual and literary works is perpetually vulnerable to what might be called *object-opacity*. Visual and literary works can only express feelings through depicting or describing *objects* of feelings and in so far as individuals differ in what they regard as acceptable objects of feelings, visual or literary works which depict or describe objects of feelings acceptable to one individual or group may be opaque to other individuals or groups.

Of course, this is not to say that there are no historicocultural differences in musical production: the history of music is in part the history of changing musical styles and forms, but neither these differences of styles and forms between different cultures viewed synchronically (Western European, Chinese, Indian etc.) seem to present insuperable barriers to appreciation. Even religious music can, it seems, be fully appreciated by the atheist, and this strongly suggests that the core of the music has absolutely nothing to do with religious *belief*, which, of course, is just what my view of musical expression would lead one to expect. Music expresses (or fails to express) feelings, and there are *no* feelings which are the sole prerogative of the religious *believer*, or, indeed, of any other kind of *believer*. If there are religious, they are not religious in virtue of the kind of feelings that they are (ardent love, deep tenderness, passionate longing etc.) but in virtue of the *objects* of those feelings, objects which are identified in terms of *beliefs*.

My account so far may suggest that I believe that music alone amongst the art-forms speaks with a universal voice, but I do not. Such a view would be seriously wrong in at least two important ways. First, it would show no acknowledgment of the fact that, despite being perpetually vulnerable to what I have called object-opacity, both visual and literary works are capable of expressing and exploring universal themes, so that works of one time and culture may be appreciated by people from other times and cultures. This, together with the fact that the imagination is capable of breaking through certain culture and individual barriers, (we may not believe in ghosts, for example, but we may *imagine what it would be like* to believe in them and hence come to sympathise or even identify with characters such as Hamlet) means that some visual and literary works may achieve as wide an appeal as music: they are not necessarily doomed to be sunk in their own times and places. (My remarks here, of course, can only be true if there are indeed universal human themes: I assume, as against some vulgar Marxists, that there obviously are.) Second, it is clear that not every piece of music appeals to

or is appreciated in the same way by every listener : there are obviously wide divergences in musical taste which, if my thesis is right, must be explained without reference to inter- or intra-cultural differences in beliefs or conceptions of appropriate emotional objects. It seems to me that these divergences can best be explained by reference to differences in the emotional lives of listeners : specifically to differences either (a) in their emotional characters or (b) in what might be called the authenticity of their emotional lives.

I shall try to explicate what I mean by differences in emotional character by a consideration of certain emotional differences in extra-musical contexts. The differences I have in mind are those between the objects of person's loves, likes and dislikes. Take, for example, the differences in taste in countryside of different people : some prefer bare, wild mountain countryside, others lush generous countryside, and so on. Although people may and do argue in favour of their own preferences by comparing typical features of their own favoured countryside with those of other sorts, it would surely be a mistake to think that one set of preferential judgements was right and the others wrong, especially if purely aesthetic considerations are part of what form the preferences. It seems to me that such preferences are harmlessly and irreducibly relative.

I believe that the differences in the objects of countryside preferences be token differences in the feelings to which they give rise, and the closeness of the match between objects and feelings is revealed by the fact that both may properly be described in the same or similar general terms. And this suggests that it could reasonably be argued that differences in countryside preferences reveal quite general differences in emotional character, differences which might be expected to emerge in either areas where emotional proclivities are expressed. One of those areas is the experience of listening to music, an experience which, if my view of musical expression is right, essentially involves the expression of objectless emotions and hence provides what might be called neat evidence of differences in emotional character.

Clearly, the spread of the appeal of music will be limited by differences in its expressions of emotional character : some listeners will prefer expressions of one kind of emotional character, others the expressions of another, and so on, but this it might be said, does not constitute such a severe limitation on its appeal as does object-opacity in the case of literature and the visual arts, since the preferences which express a person's emotional

character need not be, and usually are not, exclusive : thus, for example, I may prefer countryside of kind X to countryside of kind Y and yet still like countryside of kind Y and other kinds of countryside. Thus one's emotional character exhibits a more or less varied hierarchy of different likes and different dislikes, and this helps to explain how it is possible for one listener to enjoy many different kinds of emotionally expressive music, even though he may have a *preference* for music which expresses one particular kind of emotional character.

I turn now to a consideration of (b), the authenticity of emotional lives.

I must confess here that I feel daunted by the prospect of raising this topic, not merely because it is obviously complex, but also because the terrain is very dim because relatively uncharted. In order to try to get some order into my discussion of the complexities and unclarities, I want to begin by considering ways in which a person's emotional life might be *in* authentic in extra-musical contexts and then relate this to the musical cases.

In extra-musical contexts, feelings can be said to be inauthentic for several different kinds of reason. In such contexts, a feeling may be said to be inauthentic because either (i) the belief or set of beliefs involved with it is irrational or unreasonable or (ii) its object is inappropriate or (iii) the desire or set of desires involved with it is in some way inappropriate or (iv) it is itself intrinsically inappropriate or (v) its manifestation (expression, evincing etc.) is in some way inappropriate.

A type (i) reason invokes what is now a commonplace in the philosophy of mind, namely, that just in so far as beliefs are involved with feelings those feelings may be assessed for their rationality and reasonableness: if a belief involved with a feeling is irrational or unreasonable so too is the feeling itself. I have no quibble with this partial bridging of the gap between reason and feeling. However, philosophers of mind who have written on the emotions seem generally to treat a belief that is involved with a feeling as part of the feeling itself, and this inclusion I believe to be wrong. Beliefs, it is true, are sometimes necessarily involved with feelings but they play a causal role in their generation and course, and nothing is a cause of itself (*pace* Spinoza). Nonetheless, once we have grasped that beliefs play a merely causal role in the arousal of feelings, we can allow that their rationality and reasonableness may legitimately be predicated of the feelings

to which they give rise. But this kind of inauthenticity of feeling clearly cannot afflict music since music comprises no beliefs at all.

Similarly, a reason of type (ii) would also be irrelevant in any consideration of the authenticity of feelings expressively aroused by music, since music does not present objects. Again a reason of type (iii) would also be irrelevant to the musical case, since music is never composed of specific, fully-fledged desires. I say 'specific' and fully-fledged' because it seems to me that music does sometimes expressively arouse what might be called objectless *feelings* of desire. Such feelings (as well as the purely feeling-elements of desires in extra-musical contexts) may indeed be inauthentic but I shall postpone discussion of them until I consider reasons of type (iv) and (v).

I have been brisk in my treatment of reasons type (i)- (iii) because, although they are interesting in their own right, they are not relevant to musical cases of inauthenticity, but before I leave them it might be worth stressing that they are fairly closely related, sometimes so closely related in fact that each reason may point to an identical inauthenticity, the difference residing merely in the point of view from which the inauthenticity is judged. Thus, it may be my *irrational beliefs* (reason (i)) which cause me to identify an *inappropriate object* (reason (ii)) which renders my *desire concerning the object inappropriate* (reason (iii)). I propose to examine reasons (iv) and (v) together since the ways in which each bears upon cases of musical inauthenticity are intimately related.

At first sight it might appear that a reason of type (iv) is also irrelevant to the musical case since, although music expresses feelings, it is not composed of them. However, despite this, the connection between the inauthenticity of feeling itself and the inauthenticity of the expression of feeling is more intimate than that between the latter and the other kinds of inauthenticity. The intimacy of the connection consists in this : that if a feeling is inauthentic its expression will also be inauthentic (otherwise it would not be an expression of *that* feeling) but not necessarily vice versa, for it is possible for a person to experience a perfectly authentic feeling and yet to be incapable of expressing it authentically⁵. (It seems to me that the musical case is of interest here because, if my thesis concerning the musical expression of feeling is right, then to say that a piece of music is inauthentic is to say that one has been made to *feel* inauthentically through the inauthentic *expression* constituted by the music. But more of that below.) But what is

it for a feeling *itself* (i. e., a feeling abstracted from any belief, desire, object or manifestation) to be inauthentic, or, to put it another way, is there such a thing as an intrinsically inauthentic feeling?

It seems that in extra-musical contexts a feeling may be inauthentic without being intrinsically inauthentic, as, for example, when it is just too strong or too weak for the occasion which gives rise to it but not necessarily for other envisageable occasions. But I believe that there are also some feelings which are intrinsically inauthentic in that they do not constitute an appropriate response to *any* envisageable occasion. It would be a mistake to think that one could be certain of the existence of such feelings only from introspection, from reflection on the nature of one's own emotional experiences, for there are certain kinds of inauthentic *manifestations* of feelings which are criterial, in wittgenstein's sense, for the presence of intrinsically inauthentic feelings, the manifestations being the more or less direct effluents of the feelings.

And this brings me to the musical case, for a piece of music will be judged inauthentic by a listener, if the feeling that it invites or expressively arouses is judged by him to be inauthentic: the music gives auditory body and shape to a feeling that he deems intrinsically inauthentic in the sense that he believes that the feeling thus aroused could not be an appropriate response to anything. Such inauthenticity is not solely of one kind: a piece of music that is *permeed* inauthentic in this way may be so because it is thought to be sentimental or turgid or declamatory or thin or mawkish or plangent and so on - the list would seem to be uncloseable.

If I am right in my view of the character of the value of musical expression then it would seem that what must separate those who disagree about the authenticity of a piece of music is the authenticity of their own emotional natures. I believe that to be the case, but my own account of how it comes to be so raises certain issues which I must now confront.

In extra-musical contexts, disagreements concerning the authenticity of a feeling can be adjudicated just in so far as the feeling is open to rational criticism. Such criticism will normally take the form of showing either (a) that the belief or set of beliefs involved with the feeling is or is not irrational or unreasonable or (b) that the desire or set of desires involved with the feeling is or is not irrational or unreasonable because of (a) or because it does or does not have otherwise undesirable consequences or (c) that the object of the feeling is or is not inappropriate because of (a) or because

having it as an object is or is not likely to have undesirable consequences. But adjudication by rational criticism is clearly not possible in the case of disagreements concerning the authenticity of pieces of music since musical expression of feeling is objectless and involves no beliefs. This, of course, raises the question of the objectivity of such judgments, but I do not wish to pursue that question here: for my purposes it is sufficient to point out that such disagreements exist and that they are likely to be a permanent feature of musical appreciation, since emotional inauthenticity is not likely to be eradicated. Furthermore, it seems clear that emotional authenticity is not the monopoly of any particular era or culture, and this is reflected in musical expression. Authentic musical works have been produced in all ages which means that one's appreciation of authentic music is not confined to any particular period.

Unlike beliefs and ideas, then, emotional authenticity and emotional character would appear to have no history. Thus, if I am right in the view that music is judged primarily for its emotional authenticity and character, we have here an explanation of the fact that the appeal of music may pass through historical and cultural boundaries more smoothly than that of the other artforms.

I am acutely aware that the topics I have raised in this article involve complexities and difficulties which I have not discussed, but I hope that my arguments can be seen as fruitful, if tentative, suggestions.

Notes and References

1. *The British Journal of Aesthetics* winter 1985.
2. *ibid*
3. One notable exception to this is Theodor Adorno, especially in his book, *The philosophy of Modern Music*. However, if I understand him correctly, his use of the concept of ideology is broader than most Marxists would allow, and this enables him to include ways of feeling as part of ideology.
4. I say 'repertoire' here because I believe there is a sense in which all expressive music is potential 'occasion' music, just in so far as there will always be occasions on which it is appropriate to play it.
5. I acknowledge that this might be more unusual than my formulation might suggest.

Kantian Aesthetics : A Pragmatist Critique

VIRGINIA M. GIOULI

If Kant were a "confused pragmatist" can we lay any claim to his pragmatism as having a bearing on his aesthetics ?¹

We should first examine the pragmatic tools he used in a range determined by practical reason. Then we may profitably examine them in the range determined by aesthetic reason. The practical reason mainly accompanies the participation of human consciousness in the spatio-temporal order of facts. The nature of this participation remains, even at the level of practical reason, as well as of pure reason, indeterminate and confusing. But it becomes clearer at the level of aesthetic reason. But in another way, should question the nature of the spatio-temporal order of facts : what really *is*; and does it exist independently or is it dependent on human consciousness ? We should add a further epistemological question : does Kant's skepticism allow to ascertain the knowledge of this order, or of what really *is* ? Let us expand this question to the realm of aesthetic facts.

The categorical imperative of action, which is an absolute principle of action, applies practical reason in the realm of facts.² Via the laws of intellect, this reason can subject and reduce these facts to certainty. This certainty is valid, according to Kant, only as far as the phenomenal order is concerned; so, the very nature of this order remains, I imagine, unclear. The method implied by the aforementioned procedures is deduction. We should always bear in mind that such gaining of knowledge implies the experiencing of this order at the phenomenal facts.³ According to Kant, we are unable to pursue any truth-values at the level of the noumenal facts. But then, are not these values fallible ?

We could clarify such an issue if we refer to aesthetic values and to aesthetic experiences. As such, they imply within Kant's philosophy the ideal strain more than the empirical one. As a matter of fact they imply a more profitable strain, that is a creative one, taken from a pragmatic viewpoint.⁴

If the aesthetic fact, in its spatio-temporal order is indeed beautiful, it does not really matter. What matters, indeed, is its interpretation as such.

At this point, we deem it necessary to open a parenthesis stating that we should deal cautiously with such terms as "interpretation." Its substance has been discussed *ad nauseam* through the history of ideas. We do not intend here to proceed toward an examination of the historical background as far as this substance is concerned. We could reduce, in fact, the whole value inquiry into such an examination calling into question the degree upon which values exist independently or dependently on human consciousness; something, here, logically unnecessary. Thus, we should tackle this inquiry only from a logical viewpoint. By the same token we should be aware of the classical Fregean differentiation between *Sinn* (meaning or sense) and *Bedeutung* (indication or reference), as these terms are sometimes translated to define the capability of consciousness to refer to things.⁶ Which is the particular sense qualifying a thing which could enable us to attribute a meaning to it? And, hence to interpret it?

Back to Kant again, since we differentiate aesthetic things—that is, things interpreted as such from the naturally beautiful ones, we refer to the term "interpretation" in a pragmatic sense. This sense implies that the ascertaining of any meaning to the aesthetic things presupposes their reconstruction, their recreation. This recreation, in order to be successful, has to be executed according to their very nature and through a plan of action of human consciousness. In such a view, principles determining such a procedure exist only to serve this success.

Likewise, we could scrutinize Kant's pragmatism in his doubts about the validity of aesthetic principles, regarding the noumenal order of things, especially the aesthetic ones. In view of such procedures, we need not repeat that Kant refutes any possibility of pure reason to expand our conceptual range thus far as to reach noumena, that is the things-in-themselves (what really *is*). It can only reach phenomena, that is, what they look like. In the same order of ideas, if this range could guarantee any certain knowledge, is due to the use of the aforementioned imperative of action. Again, such knowledge seems fallible even at the level of practical reason, since Kant was never clear if such use could guarantee our grasping of what really *is*, of the things-in-themselves. Such fruition is only expected after experiencing aesthetic things.

Are we then allowed to speak of knowledge in such a sense, since our empirical tools are overemphasized, and at the expense of ever accomplishing any analytic truth ? It is only by aesthetic judgement that knowledge is, in a pragmatic sense, more certain and less fallible than knowledge gained by pure reason or practical reason.

On the grounds of induction, such a judgement does not imply any general principle or imperative; it implies, instead, each time, a qualitative assessment, a representation of the aesthetic objects themselves. We should here take into consideration the two systems of categorization of the objects in question, the system of the beautiful and that of the sublime (*The Critique of Judgement*, Books I-II). However, no particular and necessary sense could qualify these objects in order to be referable to the aforementioned categories.

Likewise, every sublime or beautiful aesthetic phenomenon (§ 58) is sublime or beautiful, according to Kant, because we feel that it is referable to each of these categories. The uniqueness which qualifies its form, each time, implies that any certainty of knowledge, before experiencing, sham; any attempt to evaluate it in this way would prove meaningless.

Kant does not easily repudiate his idealism; still, the aesthetic things in their order do not cease to exist virtually by the aforementioned categories, or tools of categorization. The knowledge thus rendered possible is due to the success of the aesthetic judgement regarding the representation, the reconstruction of the aesthetic objects in their spatio-temporal order.⁷ Such a judgement is true.⁸

If we call it in question as we did earlier we would lapse into a lazy skepticism. Wishing to avoid it we call into question the facthetic action; a factor of utmost importance regarding the use of Kant's aesthetic theory. This could be then viewed as a theory trying to do justice to both aesthetic things and their reconstruction.⁹ And this could be due to the special nature of aesthetic things, a preeminently creational one.

Notes and References

1. Cf. James Feibleman, *An Introduction to Peirce's Philosophy* (London : Harper), p. 300.
2. Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. Lewis White Beck (London : Macmillan, 1985), pp. 20 ff.
3. Cf. Kant, *The Critique of Judgement*, trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1928), pp. 13-26, 86.
4. Cf. William James, *Pragmatism, a New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (New York : Longmans-Green, 1949), pp. 131-132.
5. Cf. Michael Proudfoot, "Aesthetics" in *An Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, eds. G. H. R. Parkinson, T. E. Burke, J. G. Cottingham, M. A. Proudfoot, J. E. Tiles (London : Routledge, 1988), pp. 831-856, esp p. 847 and n. 30.
6. Cf. Gottlob Frege, "Über Sinn und Bedeutung", *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, 100 (1892), pp. 25-50.
7. Cf. William James, *A Pluralistic Universe Hibbert Lectures at Manchester College on the Present Situation in Philosophy* (London : Longmans-Green, 1920), pp. 225 ff., esp. pp. 243-248; James, *Psychology, Briefer Course* (New York: Holt, 1910), pp. 335-350.
8. Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, pp. 155-165.
9. Cf. T. E. Burke, "Science as Conjecture and Refutation" in *An Encyclopedia*, *loc. cit.* pp. 205-224.

Identifying Musical Works of Art

JUDITH LOCHHEAD

Most of us began to love music as we played or listened to music which has a common practice score. We learned to speak of Beethoven's *Fifth Symphony* and performances of this work. Philosophies of music trying to pinpoint what performances are of have located the work in a type, mega-type, compliance-class, intentional, or mental object². I am proposing a simple alternative, namely, that musical works and performances are the same. Although you may initially find this solution counter-intuitive, I hope the advantages of this theory will persuade you to consider it seriously.

First, I will outline my position, then I will argue for it by presenting two analogies and an exposition of the analogies. Finally I will offer general criteria for judging theories of musical identity and show why the position presented here succeeds in answering questions left unanswered by other theories.

Position

I believe a musical work of art and a performance are synonymous 2. A musical work is a construct of sounds and silences developing through time. Each is as unique and unrepeatable as a painting. I believe that musical works are heard. Some of the beauty of music is tied to the quality of sound. The strain of the voice reaching a high note, the subtleties of execution of a phrase or ornament, the starkness of the contrasts in dynamics, for example, are elements of the musical work. The sonorous surface of the work is created by performers. The creation of the harmony, melody, rhythm, and other musical features is, in Western music, often the responsibility of someone other than the performer. However, in Jazz, aleatoric, and non-Western music, the performer and composer are often the same.

I believe we philosophers of music have been ethnocentric. In much of the great Western music, the composer creates a score which records many of his ideas. These scores are then used as blueprints for producing

performances. But, theorists have often been obsessed by the role of the score. The score should be seen for what it is, an incomplete set of instructions for producing something important : the work of art that is heard³. (We do not place as much emphasis on the blueprints of a work of architecture, for example.) Furthermore, a complete theory of musical identity must account for scores of various kinds and unscored music from non-Western traditions. I believe that identifying musical works and performances allows us to explain music of all types.

By locating musical works in performances I am *not* suggesting that music is merely uninterpreted sound. Performances are complex events, and I will not present a complete theory of performances here. In fact, if I am successful in persuading you of my thesis, I hope that you will join me in focusing attention on this very topic. I do not believe, that listeners are simply using the sounds heard in a performance as a conduit for something beyond the performance such as disembodied musical relationships⁴. Listeners revel in the beauty of both the structure created by the composer and the sensuous aspects of the sounds themselves, both of which are heard in a performance.

Analogies

I will offer two analogies to explain this theory. First, the gene analogy will be presented in order to clarify the relation between score and performance; and second, the cake analogy to clarify the relation between performance and musical work. (These analogies obviously refer to music created from a score. Other of music will be considered later.)-

Zygotes contain the genetic information which directs the development of an organism. The hereditary instructions are contained in the chemical (DNA) of the genes. The organism is produced by those instructions being actualized in an environment. In a controlled study, a scientist consciously selects the conditions under which the organism develops. The scientist may decide to modify the information of the genetic code by subjecting the developing individual to certain controlled physical environments, e.g., light, moisture, etc. Since genes, to be expressed, must be actualized in some environment, with or without the conscious control of a scientist, modifications are inevitable. A scientist *regulates* changes in order to produce certain characteristics. Scientists may also expose the organism to chemicals and thus actually alter the genetic structure. Changes of this sort are optional, but such influences can produce substantially better (or worse) organisms.

The scientist selects the environment which will produce the desired characteristics of the individual. The same genes can produce two very different individuals, as when identical twins are raised in different environments. It is possible to have equally healthy but different organisms developing from the same genetic instructions.

Now let's apply the above in an analogy to music. The score is the genetic information. All the markings on the score such as notes, rests and repeat marks are comparable to the chemical code of each gene. The score has the potential for realization in a number of ways. The performance is the organism. The performance is the result of environmental influences on the genetic instructions. The performer acts as a scientist, a conscious part of the environment. A performer must actualize the score. As she brings the score to fruition some of the potential of the genes will be actualized. The resulting musical work will be a product of both the structure of the score and the creative input of the performer (s). A phrase marked on a score is realized in a number of possible ways: grace notes must be interpreted in the actual playing, tone quality must be controlled, balance between the parts must be considered. Just as environmental influences such as light and soil necessarily affect the developing individual, the touch of the finger on the keys of a piano necessarily affects the sound produced. The elements of a score must be realized in sound. *Rubato*, *diminuendo*, pedal markings, rests, *fermatas* all must be actualized and to actualize them is to construe these elements in one way or another. The performer's skills and musicianship, the acoustics of concert hall, and the quality of the instrument (s) provide the environmental additives which are *necessary* in the development of a performance.

So far, I have considered only the necessary modifications of the score that performers make. But a performer may alter a score in other ways. For example performers add phrase markings, breath and bowing marks to scores. Performers even choose to leave out groups of notes in complex passages or change a note in a score where the composer has written a note which the performer judges to be inconsistent with other passages. These changes are optional, as is the decision to bombard an organism with X-rays in order to alter the developing organism's phenotype.

The performances of the score, like the individuals who have the same gene structure, share family resemblances (with apologies to Wittgenstein). Performances may have overlapping characteristics, yet be very different from

each other 5. Some offspring are brighter and more interesting than others. Some performances of the same score may be more exciting and aesthetically interesting than others.

This analogy reveals a flexible relationship between score and performance. There are certain necessary modifications and additions which the score must undergo as it is realized in sound. The performer plays a very important role in constructing a musical work from the score's instructions. I do not want to downplay the creative genius of the composer; I wish merely to insist on the necessary creative function of the performer.

Next consider the relationship between works and performances. This is the heart of the question of identity. Where a score exists, it may serve as a rough criterion for grouping performance as individuals related to one another. But it is the individual that is aesthetically important. When listening to music, one may be aware of the similarities and differences between this performance and other performances of the same score, but the focus of attention is this performance with all its aesthetic qualities. All of the members of a family may be called Smith, but they are also Christine Smith, or Megan Smith, or Jordon Smith. When applied to music, all performances of the score of *The Goldberg Variations* by Bach can be grouped as a family, but aesthetically it is Gould's 1955 recorded performance of the score, or Landowska's performance of the score, or Landowska's performance of the score which is the focus of a given experience of music. The class of performances of a certain score is comparable to grouping Titian's *Danaes* or Monet's *La Gare St. Lazare*. There are five various *Danaes* and seven *La Gare St. Lazare*, each of which is a work of art, just as each of five performance of a score is a work of art. In short, I reject Goodman's allographic/autographic distinction.

Another analogy will perhaps make this point about performances and works clearer. Reflect, for a moment on a chocolate marble cheesecake. There is no THE chocolate marble cheesecake to be identified with the class of compliance-cakes, an ideal cake, a conceptual cake, or a type-cake. There are only cakes and recipes 6. If I have a recipe, and if I know how to cook I can imagine other cakes similar to this one. But those are simply imagined cakes, what is real is this cake in front of me which I am about to eat.

This, I propose, is also the case with music. There are only scores and performances. Each performance of the score of *The Piano Concerto in G*

composed by Ravel is a unique musical work of art. We can group cakes by the recipe, and we can group performances by the score, but the group is not central. Many of the aesthetically important properties of one musical work completed by one performer of a score will be missing from another musical work completed by another performer of the same score. Compare Hogwood's performance of the *Jupiter Symphony*, with Bernstein's performance of the same score. Two very different works of art are created using the same Mozart score. Indeed, each time the same performer plays the same score, many subtle but aesthetically important changes are made 7.

Further more, the better the recipe, the cook, the ingredients and the equipment, the better the cheesecake. The better the score, conductor, the performers, and the instruments, the better the musical work.

Recipes are written in a language, and thus can be copied word for word given to neighbor. The neighbor can, in turn, produce his own cheesecake. These facts do not reveal some mysterious logical status of cheesecakes. Cheesecake is still something I eat, I eat cheesecake, I look at paintings, and I hear musical works.

Exposition

Two analogies have been presented : one concerning genes and one concerning recipes. The gene analogy focuses on the score-performance relation. Its aim is to reveal the necessary as well as the optional modifications which occur when a score is realized 8. This analogy focuses on the abstract and unrealized nature of a score. This point is also an element of the cake analogy. Recipes are not cakes, but only instructions for producing cakes. But a more important element of the cake analogy is the performance-work identification. The musical work, and the dish, are what one experiences.


A composer's production of a score and a performer's reading of that score are directed toward one goal : production of a musical work, i.e., a performance. Likewise, recipes are written and copied in order to produce food to be eaten.

Most of the above discussion has concerned performances which result from scores. But there are some types of musical works for which there is no score. For example, improvised jazz pieces and electronic music are not always scored. In both of these cases the composer is the performer. In electronic music such as Varese's *Poeme electronique*, a composer/performer creates one tape. When such a tape is played, listeners have heard the musical work. This is comparable in the recipe analogy to a concoction


which a desperate college student creates out of leftovers. (I do not intend to imply a value judgment of Varese or electronic music in general.) While dishes which are created by following a recipe will have other dishes which bear family resemblances to it, the student's concoction is unique, but it is still a dish. A child without siblings and a child with siblings are both children. A performance created by following a score and a performance created on a tape and played for listeners are both musical works.

Jazz improvisation, like that of Coltrane, may be like electronic music, that is, a work not closely related to any other musical work. But most jazz improvisations are members of a family of performances all called by the same name. In this case there is usually a "mental" score, e.g., a set of chords or melody, which is freely improvised. Here a performance is not exactly like an orphan electronic piece, but is more like aleatoric music.

Aleatoric music is the opposite of electronic music. Whereas electronic music is completely determined by composers (who are the performers), aleatoric music is, to a large extent, determined by performers. Scores for aleatoric compositions, for example in the score of Variations I by Cage, are loose and very informal (like grandma's recipes which call for a pinch of this and a dab of that.) Scores for aleatoric music are often graphics. Graphics indicate stress and time and pitch by a variety of means.⁹



Graphics are created by composers to reflect their musical ideas. The creation of the music is then completed by the performer who "is expected to realize the notation not only differently but differently at each performance."¹⁰ Sometimes composers, such as Earle Brown, even compose scores that intersperse explicit notation with graphics. The graphics may be played by one or more of the performers, or there may be silence. "The music thus goes back and forth between events controlled by the composer and events that are largely unpredictable."¹¹



So, the family of performances becomes very loosely defined 12. It is a performance, not a family, that is a musical work. Each performance of an aleatoric score is a musical work as is any performance of a common practice score. If performances are musical works then the unscored performances, electronic music, aleatoric music, and performances of the kinds of scores that exist since 1650 are all accounted for.

Advantages

I wish to make clear criteria by which any theory of the identity of a musical work should be judged.

1) A theory should be able to account for all kinds and periods of music, e.g., aleatoric, non western, Baroque, contemporary, and unscored music.

2) A theory should clarify the relations between the work, performance, and various types of scores.

3) What is identified as the musical work must be consistent with our aesthetic experience of music. There are intellectual pleasures when listening to a performance as when one appreciates the harmonic structure, as well as sensual pleasures as, for example, when one appreciates texture. Music must be something that can give rise to these experiences.

4) The theory should take into account the types of judgments made about music.

I do not have the time here to examine the problems in each of the rival theories. However, I would suggest that theories of types and mental or ideal works cannot account for aleatoric, jazz, or non-western music in which the composer (if there is one) *expects* the performer to help create the music. A theory of compliance-classes has difficulty accounting for unscored music or music created from graphics.

I hope that the examples given in the explication of my theory have shown that it can explain music created using both common practice scores and other "irregular" scores, as well as a variety of kinds and periods of music. So I will concentrate here on showing that this theory can meet criteria numbers three and four.

A complete theory of music must recognize all of the features of music, the richness and complexity of the rhythm, e.g., as well as the appropriateness of the timbre to the dynamics. In the music most of us are accustomed to, the former is created by composers, and the latter by performers. Most theories pay tribute to the contributions of composers, but the importance of the performer is underplayed¹³. The performer must join the composer's score in creating the work of art because a composer's idea for a work and the score produced are both unactualized potential¹⁴. In music, the composer who creates a score presents elements for a *group* of works of art. Composers 'and performers' roles in creating the musical work depends on several fluid elements. In some works, the performer is responsible for many of the aesthetically important properties (e.g., Bach *Invention*, a medieval chant, a jazz performance, a raga or a work of Cage). In other works, the composer's score is highly restrictive (e.g., Mahler and Webern and Stravinsky) But even the most specific score does not release the performer from the obligation of helping to create the work of art. Bernstein and Berlioz, Horowitz and Handel, Menuhin and Mendelssohn--these are all artists who help create music. What is real is the individual performance, the formed matter or substance (to use Aristotle's language) In short, I wish to replace the Platonic theories of musical identity with an Aristotelian theory.

Another advantage of this view is that it explains the discriminations made concerning a musical work. Critics sometimes evaluate scores on the basis of potential and performances by comparing the achievement with that

potential. This is comparable to scientists spotting "good" genes, i.e., one for which there is a high probability of healthy organisms, or cooks judging the likelihood of a good cake by reading the recipe. A conductor can make the same predictions from a score. In short, it is possible to judge potential as such. Furthermore, even a sensitive listener can learn to distinguish the qualities of the performance that are attributable to the performer and those inherent in the score. A listener might say: "Tonight's performance was good; it is only a mediocre score, but Horowitz really made something out of it." This judgment compares the potential of the score with the achievement of the performance. When one says, "The performance is bad, but it's not a bad piece," one means the score has a high potential for good performances but that potential was not realized. Or, one means there are other performances of this score which are much better. When one judges by comparing aptitude to achievement, the more the performance actualizes the potential of the score, the "better" the performance.

According to my position, a performance may also be judged "good as a kind" or just "good." When I judge "good as a kind," I compare the individual to some group. The group to which I compare this individual may be an historical period, e.g., "The recording I just bought is an excellent example of koto music of the Tokugawa period." Or I might judge a work by its genre, e.g., "Armstrong's *Dippermouth Blues* is classical jazz at its best." I may judge a performance as a good or bad rendition of a score (if there is one). For example, "The university orchestra missed so many notes last night you could hardly tell they were performing the score of Mahler's *First Symphony*." Or, I judge the performance in relation to the potential for aesthetic quality of the score. Critics might say, "This performance did not bring to light the complexities of rhythm found in the score of *Le Sacre du Printemps*". Finally, one can judge a performance according to its faithfulness to the score or authenticity to an historical period, e.g. "Ormandy's performance of the *Suites* by Bach is not consistent with Bach's period. Pinnock's, on the other hand, is historically correct"¹⁵. All these types of judgments are made and are consistent with theory presented.

Another judgment made of musical works is simply in terms of achievement. Some performances are not created by actualizing a score, and even when there is a score, sometimes we judge the musical event, *per se*. Critics ask, "Is this a good individual when compared to all others? Is this good music?" Judgments such as "Harty's rendition of *Water Music* is not

historically accurate, but it was very moving." Or, "I don't know if this is a good *raga* or not, but it was very powerful aesthetically." Or, "I know the score indicates that the piece should be louder and faster, but the music had a lilting quality which was marvelous." When such judgments are made, critics are judging the work, i.e., *per se*, and distinguishing this judgment from judgments as "good as a kind" whether according to accuracy to the score, historical period, or genre. When a musical work is judged as a work of art in and of itself, listeners evaluate the musical structure and the sounds and silences which are heard. Along with the variety and strength of the rhythm, grace of the melodies, and complexities of the harmonies and coherence of these elements (created by the composer,) exquisiteness of the technique, quality of the voice, and intricacies of the balance (achieved by the performer) are highly valued in a particular performance.

Conclusion

Locating the musical work in a performance corresponds closely to our aesthetic experience of all types of music and to the judgments critics and listeners make of music. Therefore, I propose that we should abandon the views of musical work as an ideal, or a concept, or a type, or a megatype, or a compliance class. Let us focus on performances and begin to describe and develop a complete ontology of these complex events.

Notes and References

1 See, for example, R. G. Collingwood, *The Principle of Art* (Oxford, 1938), p. 139, and, Renee Cox, 'A Defence of Musical Idealism', *The British Journal of Aesthetics* Vol. 26, No. 2 (1986), pp. 133-142 for the ideal position. See for example, Richard Wollheim, *Art and Its Objects* (Ringwood, Australia, 1968), p. 91; Joseph Margolis, *Art and Philosophy* (Atlantic Highlands, 1979), ch. 2-4; and Philip Alperson, 'On Musical Improvisation, *The*

Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism Vol. XLIII, (1984), p. 25 for the type/token position. See Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols* (New York, 1968), p. 197 for the compliance-class position.

2 I am not at this point indicating what constitutes a performance, but it is certainly more than soundwaves vibrating in the air. Similar views of performances are found in the follo-

wing works : Langer, op. cit., p. 138. "Performance is the completion of a musical work;" Jay Bachrach, 'Type Token and the Identification of the Work of Art', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* Vol. 13 (1971), p. 417; and Edward T. Cone, *Musical Form and Musical Performance* (New York, 1968), p. 34.

3. Although performances that are imagined when reading the score are very similar to performances which are heard, I agree with Langer when she says, "Inward hearing usually stops short of just that determinateness of quality and duration which characterize actual sensation." Susanne K. Langer, *Feeling and Form* (New York, 1953), p. 137.

4. I believe Ingarden comes close to this when he says, "Listening to a specific performance with our attention on the work itself, we seem involuntarily to ignore the individual mode of existence of the currently occurring individual concrete sounds. We extract from the manifest *concretum* the composition itself. (emphasis added) Roman Ingarden, *The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity* trans. Adam Czerniawski (Berkeley, 1986), p. 62.

5. After writing this essay, I discovered a similar analogy applied to *raga* music. "Every *raga*, then is a melodic seed. Sow the melodic idea

of a *raga* into the depths of the mind. There are species of seeds. Each will give its own kind of plant: a mango seed will yield only a mango tree but not a banyan. However, no mango tree is identical with another mango tree - Two renderings of the same *raga* are essentially similar, but different in details owing to the temperament of the musician and the mood of the situation." Bigamudre Chaitanya Deva, *An Introduction to Indian Music* (New Delhi, 1973), p. 12.

6. This analogy is mentioned in Nigel Harrison, 'Types, and the Identity of the Musical Work', *The British Journal of Aesthetics* Vol 15 (1974), p. 344-345, but it is rejected without development.

7. Notice the difference in two recordings of the same blues melody made on consecutive days. The performances even have different names: *S.O.L. Blues* and *Gull Low Blues*. *The Louis Armstrong Story* album, Vol. 2 ML54384).

8. See Gordon K. Greene, 'For Whom and Why Does the Composer Prepare a Score?', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* Vol. 32 (1974), p. 506.

9. Kurt Stone, 'Notation', *Dictionary of Contemporary Music*, ed. John Vinton (New York, 1974), p. 523.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid., p. 525.

12. A position such as Goodman's, which focuses on families or classes of performances, has a great deal of difficulty accounting for aleatoric music or jazz.

13. For example, James Feibleman speaking of Bruno Walter says, 'It means that he trained the orchestra, and it means that he keeps time for them and by his presence reminds them of their training...But it does *not* mean that he wrote the music,

or that he is responsible for it in any way.' (emphasis added) in 'On the Metaphysics of the Performing Arts', *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* Vol. 28 (1970), p. 298.

14. Schoenberg discusses the many elements of music which a performer must add to the score in *Style and Idea* ed. Leonard Stein, trans. Leo Black (New York, 1975), p. 200-201.

15. For an interesting discussion of criteria for authenticity, see Stephen Davies, 'Authenticity in Musical Performance', *The British Journal of Aesthetics* Vol. 27, no. 1 (1987), pp. 39-50.

Book Reviews

Arthur C. Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher*. MacMillan Co. 1965.

Danto's widely read study of Nietzsche has assumed the status of a classic since its publication over 20 years ago. In the Anglo-American philosophical world, only Walter Kaufmann's *Nietzsche : Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ*, appealed to a scholarly as well as a lay audience. Danto's book had the signal merit of commanding the attention of academics, not only in philosophy but in literary studies as well. After a generation, his work remains the point of departure for the growing body of contemporary Nietzsche studies.

Danto's Nietzsche is not the poet of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, nor the logical successor of the German philosophical tradition from Kant through Hegel to Schopenhauer. Instead, Danto views Nietzsche as a precursor of contemporary analytical philosophy, despite the strongly existential themes which pervade Nietzsche's thought. Thus, Danto's first chapter, "Philosophical Nihilism," sets the stage for the remainder of his interpretation. According to Danto, nihilism for Nietzsche is the view that the world has no meaning, value, or sense in its own right (pp. 32-3). From this insight, Danto

claims that characteristic Nietzschean doctrines follow : perspectivism, master and herd morality, anti-Christianity, the will to power, the overman and eternal recurrence. Succeeding chapters are devoted to each of these Nietzschean themes. Danto is at his strongest in the areas of epistemology and philosophical psychology. Accordingly, his discussions of perspectivism and philosophical psychology are the most celebrated in his study. Here he puts his analytical skills to the task of showing convincingly how Nietzsche's perspectivism, his insistence that "there are no facts but only interpretation", issues from a rejection of the correspondence theory of truth and results in a radical relativism in which "man is the measure of all things" (Protagoras). Danto's equally adept in elucidating Nietzsche's philosophical psychology. Nietzsche's reductivism - his attempt to show that the subject distinction is fictitious, his attack on the Kantian thing-in-itself and the very notion of "substances" independent of a human context as illusions, are very much in the spirit of Hume and other predecessors of analytical philosophy. Even more importantly, Danto illuminates Nietzsche's employment of "genealogy" (so influential on post-modern

thought) to dismantle theological and philosophical notions which held sway in European philosophy since Plato.

Danto is at his weakest, however, in his account of the will to power, the overman, and eternal recurrence. He has considerable difficulty in reconciling these metaphysical and axiological notions with Nietzsche's forays into the areas of psychology and the nature of knowledge. In this respect, Kaufmann's earlier study serves as a useful counterpoint to Danto's "perspective." Nonetheless, Danto's stimulating interpretation continues to exercise a profound influence on the present generation's community of Nietzsche scholars.

Ronald Roblin
Buffalo State College

Yrjö Sepänmaa, *The Beauty of Environment: A General Model for Environmental Aesthetics*, Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedakatemia, 1986, pp. 184.

Man's aesthetic sense originated in his perception of beauty in Nature: the environment outside his mental world. Any cursory glance over the Vedic hymns, man's first verbal reaction to the external world would find the statement self-evident. The sky, the fire, the seas,

forests, hills, rivers, villages, towns, planetary bodies all are the objects and dawn, morning, noon, evening and night the points of time and different seasons are all the phenomena that aroused his sense of beauty, stimulated the zest for living beautifying the living itself. He sang the glory of the creation in the hymns relishing the honey of life itself that oozed from the environment. If poetry is the first art that man created then it is all for and about the environment. But when art or *techne* in the Greek sense of the term originated in the representation of Nature, aesthetics or theory and criticism of the arts neglected the analysis and interpretation of the physical environment, the very source of the artistic creation. Aristotle's *poetics* is the first and last example of this practice. Even with the Romantic philosophers and critics of art, it is the artist's mind, and not Nature, which is the focus of analysis. But in the recent years a genuine need for the cultivation of Nature has been realized after a random deforestation and pollution of water and air all over the world due to massive growth of population, heavy scientific experiments and disaster brought by several wars. It is now very sincerely realized that environment is not merely a background of man's life, it is rather the very basis of

common civilization and therefore thinkers of various branches such as natural sciences, archaeology, anthropology and sociology have given urgent slogans for preservation of environment and simultaneously aestheticians have started formulating the principles of studying the beauty of Nature not as the source or background of art works rather as an art work in itself.

The present work is an attempt at such a formulation : "a systematic outlining of the field of environmental aesthetics beginning from the basis of analytical philosophy". Environment is defined as the physical milieu and the basic distinction between the environment as a natural state and that altered by man is drawn and only that part of the mental environment which regulates a person's reaction to the physical environment is dealt with.

The author's concern is with two groups of questions : ontological and metacritical - what is the nature of environment as an aesthetic object and how this object be interpreted and evaluated along the direction of the paradigm of art. Finally there is a movement from the theoretical to the applied research dealing with the practice and benefits of environmental aesthetics.

In the presence of a lot of materials on the subject the merit of

the present work is its presentation of the subject in its totality. It is perhaps the most systematic of all the works written on the subject so far. On the theoretical side Sepanmaa has been extremely successful in building up an environmental aesthetics with its field of research, central questions and methods and materials of research along the line of traditional aesthetics with its three major wings - philosophy of beauty, philosophy of art and philosophy of criticism (or metacriticism).

If aesthetics is a part of philosophy, environmental aesthetics is also a part of environmental philosophy. In the second chapter the objects, categories and paradigms of the environment are elaborately dealt with. Similarly, while building up an environmental aesthetics, the function of general aesthetics i. e. philosophical criticism is also demonstrated in answering to the questions such as what is environmental criticism, who are the environmental critics and what are the components of environmental criticism - description, interpretation and evaluation. The third chapter deals with the application of environmental aesthetics distinguishing between the environmental education in general and aesthetic environmental education in particular and considering the searching of the means

of description, interpretation and evaluation. Suggestions are also offered for influencing the ideals both privately and communally. The author correctly comments : "the understanding of the aesthetic nature of the environment creates a basis for nature protection and for the protection of the built environment for when value is seen in something there is a willingness to protect it." But the use of the phrase "preservation of habitability" (p. 138) does not suit to the ecological principle where it is better to use "conservation of habitability", because preservation restricts the use whereas conservation permits use of habitation up to optimum level.

Apart from the wealth of information contained, the book is highly persuasive in its presentation of arguments in such a lucid way that far from being merely technical, it provokes even the general reading public to rethink about the environment. It seems that the author has followed two eminent American aestheticians John Hoppers and late M. C. Beardsley (whom he quotes frequently) both for their style of argument and presentation of the materials. The result is that the work is greatly useful for both the specialists in the field and even for the beginners who want an introduction to the subject. It projects the author's sincere involvement with

the field he studies, clarity in understanding the problems convincing the readers to get themselves involved in the problems and finally compelling them to work out their own projects for possible improvement in their taste for and active cooperation in the rebuilding of the environment that is highly necessary in the fag end of the present country that has caused disastrous injury to both the environment itself and our attitude toward it.

B. K. Senapati

Sambalpur University

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari
Anti - Oedipus : Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Viking Press, New York : 1977. Preface by Michel Foucault. Trans. by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane of *L 'Anti - Oedipe : Capitalisme et Schizophrenie*, Les Editions de Minuit, Paris : 1972.

A schizophrenic out for a walk
is a better model than a neurotic
lying on a couch.

Anti - Oedipus

In view of the dozen or so books on Nietzsche which have come out during the last couple of years, *Anti-Oedipus* deserves another look. Deleuze knows Nietzsche well, having published in 1962 his

Nietzsche et la philosophie, a very congenial and sensitive work, even if his remark that Nietzsche must be understood as an anti-Hegelian is overstated and inaccurate. Deleuze obviously uses the things he had learned from Nietzsche about positivity and the dangers of representation as the basis for his autoproductive unconscious; and the use and misuses of the desiring machines reflect rather precisely the joyous uses and the desperate abuses of the Nietzschean will to power, whether we consider the will to power an individual psychological event or the later cosmological impetus to transformation of energy centers, etc. (Here are a couple of subjects for books or dissertations) *Anti-Oedipus* also contains a strong flavor of surrealism. These remarks should appear clearer and more valid at the end of this review.

Anti-Oedipus, in a convincing but ferocious jargon, purports to found a materialist psychoanalysis on the concept of the autoproductive unconscious, which is manifested in its libidinal investments as a desiring-machine in a universe of desiring machines. The autoproductive desiring-machine is a contentless, nonmoral force (like the Freudian id), whose products are always already also and immediately social production - thereby, it would seem, handily solving the problem of the

relation between the self and the collective, that collective which according to Michel Serres is a "black box and a white noise".

The desiring-machine is a flow which is broken, deformed, interrupted, by breaks - flows, by the flows-schizzes. It reminds the reader of the clinamen and of Bohm's idea of fragmentation theory in which it is the combinations of vortices, of deformations of a continuum, which are perceived as the reality. I suggest this to emphasize that the desiring-machine, as a materialist event, is a phenomenon of physics, not metaphorically, but really, as a materialist psychoanalysis would demand. As such, psychoanalysis becomes a branch of physics. Since desiring production is also social production, a materialist psychoanalysis becomes likewise a materialist theory of sociology, history, and economics and allows the authors of *Anti-Oedipus* to describe the evolution of humanity in three stages, which sometimes overlap or at least retain "vacuoles" or enclaves of a previous stage. These are the stages of (1) primitive territoriality, (2) the barbarian Urstaat, and (3) capitalism. Each of these states has its own way of engraving itself on the body of its citizen, and capitalism is the ultimate stage in which "the capitalist social formation...mobilizes [previously coded] flows that are effectively decoded ... by substituting for the

codes a quantifying axiomatic that is even more repressive" (p. 176).

Although capitalism does not invent Oedipus, it exploits it cynically and mercilessly, supported by modern Oedipalizing psychoanalysis, in order to forch onto the autoproductive unconscious the triangular structure of the Oedipus, to define and limit the autoproductive unconscious to a familiar concept which effectively breaks it away from the larger cultural and socioeconomic framework, and in order to deform and replace its productivity by representation, by the despotic signifier. What had been real and productive is deformed by representation and the metaphysical atmosphere of idealism, rationalism, capitalism, and neo-idealist psychoanalysis.

Anti-Oedipus will replace the paranoid, molarizing, capitalist, neurotic, Oedipal psychoanalysis with schizoanalysis: a molecular, schizophrenizing point of view that sets free the autoproductive unconscious. That is, it will provide a point of view from where the desiring-machines may be identified before their deformation by Oedipus and seek the dissolution of egos. The first positive task consists of discovering in a subject the nature, the formation, or the functioning of his desiring-machines, independently of any interpretation" (p 322). "In this regard,

the first thesis of schizoanalysis is this: every investment is social, and in any case bears on a sociohistoric field" (p. 345). "Libidinal economy is no less objective than political economy.." (p.345). "Schizoanalysis would come to nothing if it did not add to its positive tasks the constant destructive task of disintegrating the normal ego: (p.362). Here we have a basic theory for psychoanalysis and politics, whose adherents Michel Serres recently sarcastically referred to as "les psyches-et-pos" (la psychanalyse et la politique).

Anti — Oedipus has a curious surrealist quality, which comes from its heavy reliance on "privileged" mental states and on the primacy of the unconscious, not to mention the shocking literary style. For *Anti-Oedipus* it is not so much a matter of the unconscious outside any concern for the moral or aesthetic," as Breton's *Premier Manifeste* had it, as it is of freeing the desiring-machine of the unconscious for an authentic desiring-production-which-is-the-equivalent-to-social-production. The mere expression of the autoproductive unconscious would deny it its productivity by replacing its productivity with representation, represented by Oedipus. Breton's view of the unconscious was not as broad as that of Deleuze and certainly his analysis of the problem

was not so deep, so scientific, or so well thought out in its relations between the individual desiring - machines and the socio-economic sphere. Nevertheless, the freeing of the unconscious has the same goal for both surrealism and Anti- edipus : an expression-production freed from preconceived ideas, most particularly capitalist - bourgeois ideas.

Both *Anti-Oedipus* and surrealism require a destructive posture in relation to bourgeois capitalism, and both look to abnormal (privileged) states of mind for insights. In *Les Vases communicants*, Breton and Eluard sought to imitate the states of the various mental affliction, and *Anti-Oedipus* does specify the difference between schizophrenia as a critique and schizophrenia as a disease : it becomes a disease when it is frustrated as a process by oedipalizing psychoanalysis and by capitalism, which cause the process to take itself as an end. "So the schizo is effectively neuroticized, and it is this neuroticization that constitutes his illness" (p. 363) Still, Deleuze tracks Artaud about in much the same way Breton tracked Nadja, expecting to find and finding in mental illness some insight, and even a greater sanity than in the world of bourgeois normalcy, and drawing further material from the diary of Nijinsky, from *L'Art brut*,

a periodic series of reproductions of art works done by residents of psychiatric hospitals in Enrope. "There is never a delirium that does not possess [a strong politico-erotic content] and that is not originally economic, political, and so forth, before being crushed in the psychiatric and psychoanalytic treadmill" (p. 274) "Why does it [capitalism] confine its madmen and madwomen instead of seeing in them its own heroes and heroines, its own fulfillment ?" (p. 245).

The problem of a similarity in the concept of representation between surrealism and *Anti-Oedipus* is somewhat more complicated, given the great theoretical emphasis placed on the signifier by structuralism and post-structuralism, a concern which largely post-dates Breton. In the stage of the barbarian Urstaat, however, Deleuze sees the despot establishing the practice of writing : "It is the imperial formation that makes graphism into a system of writing in the proper sense of the term" (p. 202). Referring to the studies of Leroi Gourhan, Deleuze remarks that "primitive societies are oral not because they lack a graphic system but because, on the contrary, the graphic system in these societies is independent of the voice" (p.202). When, however, the graphic system begins to mirror the spoken word, tends to supplant it. Writing, as

Derrida has often pointed out, takes its origin in the priestly class and has its roots in power, the age of the sign being essentially theological.

Surrealism was notorious mutilator of language (V. Tzara's poems made by cutting, shuffling and pasting), a mutilation done in the name of a graphism which had been appropriated by bourgeois power. This dislocation of language is more easily done with poetry, since poetry is "nearer" the "aesthetic phenomenon" than prose. Sartre no doubt thought thus when he opted for prose over poetry as a form of commitment, fully accepting the metaphysics of presence and its basis in power, making of prose a form of action which acted on the external world and rejecting the word-for-the word's-sake. Sartre saw language as an order forced on a formless world of objects and would have wanted nothing to do with desiring-machines. He rejected surrealism as well--ironically putting himself in the bourgeois camp, at least from the point of view of an autoproductive unconscious. Seen from this angle, surrealism's assault on phonocentric bourgeois writing is consistent with its expectation that primitivism may provide a purified view of things. Nevertheless, Deleuze would have to see the anti-bourgeois linguistic mutilations of

the surrealists as ineffective : "Writing has never been capitalism's thing. Capitalism is profoundly illiterate" (p. 240). "Electric language does not go by way of the voice or writing; data processing does without them both, as does that discipline appropriately named fluidics, which operates by means of streams of gas; the computer is a machine for instantaneous and generalized decoding of the flows" (p. 241). Modern hackers and computer terrorists are neo-surrealists.

Besides the role of the unconscious and the automatism recommended in the *Premier Manifeste* the second major principle of surrealism (*Second Manifeste*) is the unification of opposites : male and female, good and evil, subjectivity and objectivity, etc. Deleuze deals with the opposition between male and female in his criticism of anthropomorphized sex and in general his concept of the desiring-machines does away with these oppositions. "Everything is objective or subjective, a one wishes," he writes. "That is not the distinction : the distinction to be made passes into the economic infrastructure itself and into its investments. Libidinal economy is no less objective than political economy, and the political no less subjective than the libidinal..." (p. 345). Those who, like Reich,

tried and failed to create a materialist psychiatry were confined to the duality of the subjective and the objective because they did not understand "how desire was part of the infrastructure" (p. 345). Such ideas of unification seem more methodological in the *Anti-Oedipus* than mystic and in any case the problem is solved by the desiring-machines. Yet, as Habermas frequently points out (*The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*), mysticism seems to be lurking about in any post-modern who tries to resolve the Hegelian diremptions - and the desiring-machine is certainly an omnivorous concept, unifying everything (like Serres' parasites).

Breton traced the concept of "amour fou" as a transforming phenomenon back to the omnipresent desire of the Marquis de Sade. But for Deleuze, desire "does not take as its object persons or things, but the entire surroundings that it traverses." (p. 292). "In a word, the social as well as biological surroundings are the object of unconscious investments that are necessarily desiring or libidinal. The libido as sexual energy is the direct investment of the masses, of large aggregates, and of social and organic fields" (p. 292).

We must be careful in claiming that *Anti-Oedipus* provides a much

wider definition of desire than that which Breton traced back to Sade. Considering the importance Breton gave to the unconscious and to desire, I am convinced that if Breton did not go as far in extending desire as to have conceived the desiring-machine, he would certainly have found this Deleuzian concept congenial. "The truth is", writes Deleuze, "that sexuality is everywhere: the way a bureaucrat fondles his records, a judge administers justice, a businessman causes money to circulate, the way the bourgeoisie fucks the proletariat. Hitler got the fascists sexually aroused. Flags, nations, armies, banks get a lot of people aroused" (p. 293).

This last quotation naturally brings up the style of *Anti-Oedipus*. The book is an abstruse, jargon-ridden piece of work, interlarded with poems by, quotations from and references to Artaud, D. H. Lawrence, Nikinsky, Allen Ginsberg, Jack Kerouac, Henry Miller, Samuel Beckett, etc, with a use of vulgarities unexpected in a difficult essay on philosophy. The style is that of a surrealist shock-treatment, as if the sudden impact of the language would drag you out of your capitalized, Oedipalized, molarized, paranoid stupor and make you realize the truth of the autoproductive desiring-machine.

Anti - Oedipus rather surprisingly, has little regard for the usefulness of dreams, and certainly not that fascination the surrealists had. Dreams are Oedipal. "and this comes as no surprise since dreams are a perverse reterritorialization in relation to the deterritorialization of sleep and nightmares. But why return to dreams, why turn them into the royal road of desire and the unconscious, when they are in fact the manifestation of a superego, a superpowerful and superarchaized ego .. ? (p. 316).

At last, let us return to the parallel between the will to power and the desiring-machines: Neither the desiring machine nor the will to power guarantees a liberation of the individual or humanity, neither promises a basis for revolution or any kind of final utopia. Just as Nietzsche's will to power may be abused by the herd-man, so the desiring-machines may desire their own domination (to the dissatisfaction of J-M. Bernard in *La Revolution structurale*). Deleuze does not allow any place for a concept such as the *Übermensch*, much less the eternal recurrence, so that there is no moral dimension to Deleuze's vision as there is in Nietzsche's Overman.

Finally, in my opinion, the translators deserve a lot of credit

(even gratitude) for putting into English a work by one of the major modern French thinkers, many of whom needlessly mar their work by an overly great admiration of the aesthetics of hermeticism they inherited from the 19th century. Whether *Anti-Oedipus* gives us a basis for a useful problematic to approach the analysis of cultural institutions remains to be seen, but my recommendation is to bear up under the difficulty of the style because it is worth the effort.

William Plank

Professor of French
Eastern Montana College

David Patterson *Literature and Spirit: Essays on Bakhtin and His Contemporaries*, The University Press of Kentucky, 1988, pp. 166, ISBN 0-8131-1647-3.

Mikhail Bakhtin can certainly be counted among the literary thinkers responsible for the present state of maturity of novel theory. His concept of heteroglossia in the novel has revolutionized the interpretation of fiction by making the critic aware of the interplay of different ideological voices in the word. In this context it is appropriate that David Patterson in his latest work, *Literature and Spirit* takes him up for a comparative study with some of his

contemporary thinkers. In the Introduction the author claims to have put the thinkers as well as the different chapters in a dialogic relationship with one another. But it is difficult to assert that he has really succeeded in achieving that kind of a dialogism.

The work begins with a comparative analysis of the ideas of Bakhtin and Foucault and a working out of their relation to literature. Bakhtin's concept of laughter is shown having a close parallel in Foucault's idea of madness, and both are said to be contributing substantially to the dialogical dimension of literature. Laughter, it is claimed, frees us from the prison of the prevailing categories, and madness challenges the monological authority and paves the way for the dialogic word. Thus laughter and madness are aberrations by virtue of which they have an affinity with truth which is always the other.

In the second chapter Patterson shows how Bakhtin, Berdyaev and Gide deal with the spiritual aspect of Dostoevsky and of literature at large. To be precise, he discusses here 'a poetics of spirit'. According to Patterson, Bakhtin emphasizes the point that a discussion of the polyphonic form of the novel involves a consideration of the spatial and not the temporal aspect of its structure. This pronouncement he

makes keeping in view the novels of Dostoevsky saying that the latter's apprehension of the world is spatial rather than temporal, and that he always creates characters facing a crisis or interacting with the other. Bakhtin observes that the primary task of the novel is to challenge the false and conventional elements of human relationship. As for Gide, he looks upon convention as a force that suppresses truth and undertakes a large scale production of falsehood. His truth or reality is a result of the interaction of the author with the world, and that of a penetration of the personality of the self which is a source of the conventional. This he illustrates through a study of the characters of Dostoevsky. Bakhtin would further say that the idea is created through an interpersonal relation. It is pursued in a process of development and not reached in a state of inertia. Berdyaev, for his part, reads in Dostoevsky the statement that the inner being cannot find expression in the stability of the day-to-day life, but is revealed through an outburst of a certain kind which marks a complete annihilation of the lifeless forms of a decadent society. All the three maintain that the idea is something that is enacted in the polyphonic form. According to Patterson, Berdyaev and Gide look at it as an existential problem, but Bakhtin perceives it also in an

artistic context. Berdyaev observes that in Dostoevsky man is shown having to sacrifice his freedom and to surrender himself to necessity and compulsion. This, he adds, is nothing but a strangulation of the selfish individuality in response to the voice of the other. All of them are said to believe ultimately in the view that novel asserts the dialogic nature of truth.

In the third chapter Patterson compares Bakhtin with Lacan and in the process argues that the writer's relation to his own self is mediated by the other i.e. the hero. Bakhtin and Lacan believe that the hero issues from the author's wound which thereby becomes a womb. This creation of the hero, who is the other, is a dialogical process whereby the author becomes self-conscious. They also have a concept of the Third or spirit which Patterson sometimes describes as the implied reader. In only one condition can the author be said to be representing some purpose or meaning within the literary framework, that is if the implied reader becomes a Third with the advantage of watching and judging every human act, whom it is impossible to name or thematize.

The fourth chapter compares Bakhtin and Levinas and brings out the interconnections their thinking traces among signification, respon-

sibility and spirit, and shows how it establishes their importance. To them signification is some sort of meaning beyond what is conveyed by the signs. It is 'the open-endedness of saying' which includes both the past and the yet to be. It is an answer to a cry of pain. The language of signification and responsibility is the dialogical word. Subjectivity also means responsibility as the former can be understood as making oneself vulnerable through the wounds received as a consequence of one's response to the other. Both Bakhtin and Levinas understand spirit as a totality and soul as a manifestation of that totality. They maintain that spirit originates in the wound, which the self in its response creates for the other to pass through and come into the same.

In the last chapter Patterson examines the opinions of Bakhtin and Heidegger on Word and Being. Bakhtin, he argues, sees the space between the speaker and the listener as the polarity of dialogue and its substance as discourse. Similarly Heidegger considers language 'the house of being' which exists in the between. Both regard the between as a wound, which is cut open by a passionate determination, and where being takes its birth. They bring in a concept of the Third whom they call the builder of 'the house of being'. The Third, they say, is

nearer to us than even our own inner selves. The I is related to the Thou through the Third who communicates with the I through the Thou and whom the I answers by responding to the Thou. At the end Patterson concludes that spirit transforms literature into life and life into literature in the sense that the spiritual word or the dialogic word turns every I into a literary text which starts living the moment it finds utterance and gets enriched being heard.

Patterson's analysis of the intricate ideas of Bakhtin and his contemporaries in a very simple and natural style is almost effortless and hence commendable. But the simplicity is sometimes overdone which betrays a reduction of the dialogue to the barest minimum and a mere juxtaposition of the ideas of the given thinker. Anyway the work appropriately creates condition for further dialogues on the subject.

Dennis A. Foster, *Confession and Complicity in Narrative*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 146.

Dennis Foster writes this book with an awareness of the post-structural literary theories. He rather uses the ideas derived from the

latter to analyse some of the confessional writings such as Augustine's *Confessions*, Kierkegaard's *Diary of a Seducer*, James's 'Figure in the Carpet', Hawthorne's *The Scarlet Letter*, Faulkner's *Absalom, Absalom!* and Beckett's *The Unnamable*. Particularly the idea of the loss of the author or the authority of the text is brought forward to be related to the Freudian concept of the loss of the primary experience that comes in handy for his study. Foster says that the primary experience, according to Freud, is an inertia. All our struggle for perfection is motivated by a desire to go back to the inanimate state once again. It is the gap between the satisfaction desired and that achieved that keeps the struggle going. To extend the argument Foster invokes Lacan and says that the primary experience of satisfaction is always beyond the power of language to express. That, he adds, results in a sense of alienation, a sense of being lost from ourselves. So we try to produce ourselves through language. And we produce not the self but an 'I', which belongs not to us but to the language. The 'I' is only a signifier, the signified of which is absent. Thus we lose the self and get the language, the signifier the subject of which is another signifier. This happens with 'the fall into desire, into the dualism of subject/object', which coincides with the introduction

of language and the sublimation of language and the sublimation of narcissistic libido'. The consequent sense of loss and guilt gives rise to a desire to return to that primordial paradise, a desire to find the truth which is selfevident. This necessitates a confession, the sin being a violation of the divine totality synonymous with the loss of self. Sin takes away the capacity of the sinner to comprehend himself. So through confession the sinner makes an attempt to understand himself, his state of being prior to sin. But he can conceive it only as 'the opposite of sin, the negation of a negation'. Only by repeating the sin can he refer to innocence. The confessional text is an expression of a sense of loss, guilt and desire, a desire for meaning and presence. It does not serve as a mediator of truth, as a sign of the writer's potency. It is so due to the perverseness of language, which leaves scope for interpretation. Consequently the listener is drawn into the production of meaning. The history that the listener tries to understand turns out to be his own. In order to understand the text the listener has to be complicit with the motivation of the speaker. But the complicity with the speaker or the interest in sin ultimately becomes an involvement.

The confessor needs a listener,

who would confirm his alienation from God and legitimize his sin as sin. But it is found that the listener or the reader of the confessional text makes the story his own as he himself is also a sinner and sees the possibility of his own redemption.

In his efforts to comprehend the individuality or his self, which was equal to the entire world before the fall in to derire, the speaker of the confessional text has a desire to possess the 'I', which belongs to God, as his own. And the listener imitating the struggle of the speaker tries to appropriate the discourse of the speaker, when the speaker strives to perpetuate his discourse. Because 'the only final escape from sin is to become God'.

Foster conceives narrative as confession rather than expression, and translates the struggle for power between the confessor and the listener into that between the writer and the reader in the narrative. He says that the individual subject, being alienated from the divine totality, falls into a world of dualism and so requires an objective world to be conscious of or the 'I' requires a 'not I' against which to define itself. But the absence of an objective world from the narrative reduces the writer's 'I' or his word to an empty signifier devoid of meaning. So the writer requires a reader to validate his meaning, to accept the

fact of his being in control of his meaning or to be complicit with his motivations of writing. But in his turn the reader appropriates the text to produce his own meaning or to find in it his own discourse.

While trying to show the complicity of the reader in the aforesaid confessional writings Foster reveals some of his assumptions about the meaning in narrative. In fact he vacillates at one point between the intention of the author and the interpretation of the reader as a determinant of meaning. He invokes Nietzsche to stress the role of the reader, as Nietzsche points out that we can see only the effects (response of the reader) in the world, and not the causes (intention of the writer). Moving from cause to effect is a false reasoning and is an attempt to justify the effects that we see and feel. But at the same time Foster finds it too cruel to admit that the text does not reveal the consciousness of the author but invites the

reader to attempt a representation of the writer.

Ultimately his ditherings are settled in the idea of complicity which not only means an acceptance of the writer's mastery over meaning by the reader but also suggests a power struggle between the writer and the reader. Because the reader becomes complicit with the writer or shares his discourse only subsequently to make it his own.

This book is a landmark as a critique of confessional writings and at the same time an important contribution to reader — response criticism. The economy of its style, far from making it sketchy, adds to the pleasure of reading. Foster's ability to achieve precision in the face of a difficult content is rather commendable.

S. K. Panda
Sambalpur University

Books Received

1. Angela Livingstone, *Pasternak : Doctor Zhivago*, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 118.
2. Antony Easthope, *Phantasy and Poetry*, Cambridge University Press, 1989 pp. 227.
3. Daniel Cotton, *Text and Culture : The Politics of interpretation* Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1989, pp. 177.
4. David R. Richter, (ed.), *The Critical Tradition : Classic Texts and Contemporary Tradition*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1989, pp. 1470.
5. Derek Affridge, Geoff Bennington and Robert Young (eds.), *Post-Structuralism and the Question of History*, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 292.
6. Didier Coste, *Narrative as Communication* (Foreword by Wlad Godzich), University of Minnesota Press, 1989, pp. 370.
7. F.W.J. Schelling, *The Philosophy of Art* (Edited, Translated and Introduced by Douglas W. Stoff and Forwarded by Daniel Simpson), University of Minnesota Press, 1939, p.342.
8. ———, *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 294.
9. Francis Cairns, *Virgil's Augustan Epic*, Cambridge University Press, 1989. pp. 280.
10. Frieda S. Brown, Malcolm Alan Compitello, Victor M. Howard and Robert A. Martin (eds.), *Rewriting the Good Fight : Critical Essays on the Literature of the Spanish Civil War*, Michigan State University Press, Michigan, 1989, pp. 266.
11. Gary Gutting, *Michel Foucault's Archeology of Scientific Reason*, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 306.
12. George A. Kennedy (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism* Volume-I : Classical Criticism, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 378.
13. George Dickie, Richard Sclatani and Ronald Roblin (ed.), *Aesthetics : A Critical Anthology*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1989, pp. 678.

14. Hans Robert Jauss (Edited, Translated and with an Introduction by Michael Ways), *Question and Answer : Form of Dialogic Understanding*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1989, pp. 283.
15. Iain Fenlon and James Haar, *The Italian Madrigal in the Early Sixteenth Century Sources and Interpretation*, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 369.
16. Jacques Cateau, *Dostoyevsky and the Process of Literary Creation*, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 553.
17. Juliet Sychrava, *Schiller to Derrida : Idealism in Aesthetics*, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 256.
18. Klaus Thewebit, *Male Fantasies*, Volume-1 : Woman, Floods, Bodies, History, Volume II : Male Bodies, Psychoanalysing the White Terror, 1987 and 1989, University of Minnesota Press pp. 517 and 507.
19. Leinsky Waters (ed.), *Paul de Man : Critical Writings 1953-1978*, University of Minnesota Press, 1989, pp. 246.
20. Lindsay Waters and Wlad Godzich (editors), *Reading De Man Reading* University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1989, pp. 294.
21. Manfred Frank, *What is Neo Structuralism ?*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, (Translation by Saloine Wilke and Richard Gray and Foreword by Martin Schwale) 1989, pp. 482.
22. Margaret P. Battin, John Fisher, Ronald More and Anita Silvers, *Puzzles about Art : An Aesthetic Case Book*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1989, pp. 226.
23. Mary Cowling, *The Artist as Anthropologist : The Representation of Type and Character in Victorian Art*, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 391
24. Maurice A. Fino Cohiaro, *Gramsci and the History of Dialectical Thought*, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 313.
25. Ninian Smart, John Clyton, Patrick Sherry and Steven T. Katz (eds.), *Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West*, Vols. I and III, Cambridge University Press, pp. 335 and 342 ; 1988, Vol. II, 1989, pp. 361.
26. _____, *The World's Religions*, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 576.

27. P.E. Easterling and B.M.W. Knox (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Classical literature* Vol. I, Pt. 1 Early Greek Poetry (paper back edition), Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 251. er-
28. _____, Vol. I Pt. 2 *Greek Drama*, 1989, pp. 217. ss,
29. _____, Vol. I, Pt. 3, *Philosophy, History and Oratory*, 1989, pp. 218- sa-
30. _____, Vol I, Pt. 4, *The Hellenistic Period and the Empire*, 1989, pp. 278. nd
31. Paul Cantor, *Shakespeare : Hamlet*, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 106. l.
32. Reed Way Dasenbrock (ed.), *Reading the lines : Analytic Philosophy, Deconstruction and Literary Theory*, University of Minnesota Press, 1989, pp. 263. t - ss,
33. Renato Bailli, *Rhetoric* (Translation by Giuliana Menozzi), University of Minnesota Press, 1989, pp 164 ad
34. Richard Kearney, *The Wake of Imagination*, University of Minnesota Press, 1989, pp. 467. nd
35. Roberto Fernandez Retamar (Translated by Edward Baker, Foreword by Fredric Jameson), *Caliban and other Essays*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1989, pp. XVI + 139. l),
36. Roger W. Cowley, *Ethiopean Biblical Interpretation : A Study in Exegetical Tradition and Hermeneutics*, Cambridge University Press, 1989 pp. 490. ity
37. Ruth M. Kempson (ed.), *Mental Representations : The Interface between Language and Reality*, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 229. ss,
38. Ruth Varity Sharman, *The 'Cansos' and 'Sirventes' of the Troubadour : Giraut De Bornel : A Critical Edition*, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 504. nd
39. Sheila Stern, *Proust : Swan's Way*, Cambridge University press, 1989, pp. 128. rys
40. Simon Gaunt, *Troubadours and Irony*, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 232. ity
41. Stirling Haig, *Stendhal : The Red and the Black*, Cambridge University Press, 1939, pp. 102. on,
42. Sture Allen (ed.), *Possible Worlds in Humanities, Arts and Sciences Proceedings of Nobel Symposium 65*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1989. sm
43. Theodor W. Adorno (translated with an Introduction by Robert Hullot-Kentor), *Kierkegaard : The Construction of Aesthetics*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1989, pp. xxiii + 166. 89,